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ABSTRACT 
 
Challenging the Status Quo: The Rise and Consequences of Anti-Establishment Parties 
in Western Europe. (May 2009) 
Jason Matthew Smith, B.A., University of North Texas; 
M.A., University of North Texas 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Robert Harmel 
 
 This dissertation examines two interconnected research questions: What 
conditions give rise and lead to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties and 
what are the consequences of this electoral success? Literature concerning anti-
establishment parties fails to investigate this phenomenon in its entirety by focusing 
disproportionately on the electoral success of these parties neglecting the consequences 
of this electoral success.  Although the electoral success of anti-establishment parties and 
the subsequent consequences have different theoretical underpinnings, the effects that 
anti-establishment parties have on individual parties and the party system are dependent 
upon the electoral success of these of parties.  Therefore, this dissertation focuses on 
both the electoral success and the consequences of anti-establishment parties in Western 
Europe.  
Concerning electoral success, this dissertation offers a new approach to the 
literature by arguing that anti-establishment parties, regardless of their placement on the 
political spectrum, are born out of the dissatisfaction towards traditional parties within 
the electorate.  Using quantitative analyses of eighteen Western European countries 
 iv 
covering the time period 1970-2005, this dissertation offers a unified analysis of anti-
establishment parties, regardless of their placement on the political spectrum, examining 
the political, social, and economic conditions that give rise to the anti-establishment 
party phenomenon. The findings indicate that while the factors leading to the emergence 
of anti-establishment parties may be the same regardless of the placement of these 
parties on the political spectrum, the factors leading to their electoral success are 
dependent upon their ideological orientation.   
Furthermore, the electoral success of these new parties has consequences for 
other individual parties and the broader party system.  This dissertation argues that the 
existence of these parties alone is not enough to accomplish this aim; these parties must 
be seen as threats to existing mainstream parties on either the left or the right or in some 
cases, both.  In order to counter the threat from these anti-establishment parties, 
traditional parties may change their ideological positions or organizational structures.  
Utilizing qualitative (face-to-face interviews with party elites) and evidence from party 
manifestos from 1970-2005 in six countries, these analyses indicate that the electoral 
success of anti-establishment parties affects individual parties by altering the ideological 
placement, particularly on issues relevant to anti-establishment party electoral success. 
To a lesser extent, traditional parties alter their organizational structures (i.e., allocating 
more power to rank-and-file members, regional, and local branches), in order to counter 
this new electoral threat. 
Moreover, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties causes instability 
within the broader party system.  Utilizing quantitative, statistical methods to analyze 
 v 
eighteen western European countries between 1970 and 2005, this dissertation finds that 
the electoral success of anti-establishment parties increases the amount of electoral 
volatility and the amount of polarization both within the system and between traditional 
parties.  However, anti-establishment parties do not mobilize the electorate leading to 
increases voter turnout in these eighteen countries.  Finally, anti-establishment parties, 
by gaining seats in national legislatures, upset the traditional coalitional dynamics. As 
such, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties leads to shorter coalitional 
governments within the party systems of Western Europe. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING THE EMERGENCE OF ANTI-
ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
 
 There is little doubt that new entrants into the electoral arena have changed the 
political landscape within Western European party systems over the past four decades.  
The 1973 Danish parliamentary elections experienced what is now referred to as the 
“landside election” or Jordskredsvalget.  The relatively stable party system experienced 
seismic electoral volatility with new parties capturing over thirty-four per cent of the 
votes cast.  The most successful of these new entrants, the anti-tax Progress Party 
(Fremskridtspartiet), gained 15.9 per cent and twenty-eight seats becoming the second 
largest party in the Danish legislature, Folketing.1   
In 1983, the German Green Party, Die Grünen, seized upon the growing support 
for the anti-nuclear armaments movement, an issue overlooked by the traditional parties 
at the time, garnering 5.6 percent of the vote and twenty-seven seats in the Bundestag.  
This “breakthrough” electoral success, and impressive showings in subsequent national 
elections, upset the traditional coalitional dynamics within the party system of Germany.   
The Austrian parliamentary elections in October 1999 witnessed the meteoric 
rise of the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) as the most 
successful party of its kind in Western Europe.  The FPÖ, a far-right, anti-immigrant 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of the American Political Science Review. 
1
 Although the Progress Party was the second largest party in the Folketing, it was not part of the ruling 
coalition due to the refusal of other parties to cooperate with the party. 
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party, became the second largest party within the Nationalrat garnering 26.9 per cent of 
the vote and fifty-two seats.  After negotiations to form the traditional coalition between 
the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) disintegrated, 
the ÖVP enlisted the assistance of the FPÖ to form a coalition government.  This 
coalitional arrangement quickly prompted the fourteen other members of the European 
Union to impose diplomatic sanctions against Austria seeking to oust the party from the 
Austrian government.2  Although the controversial leader of the FPÖ, Jörg Haider, 
resigned from his leadership position at the end of 2000, the party remained in 
government until 2002.3 
Outside of being new entrants into the political system, these parties appear to 
have little in common.  The Progress Party in Denmark and the Freedom Party in Austria 
are considered by most experts to be far right, populist parties, whereas Die Grünen, 
when the party first emerged, was not easily classified on the traditional left-right 
spectrum.  Furthermore, these parties differ with regard to ideology, organizational 
structure, primary goals, and electoral success.  However, the one important 
characteristic these parties have in common is that they saw themselves as challengers to 
the political establishment.  The Progress Party of Denmark, the Freedom Party of 
Austria, and the Green Party in Germany, like many other parties in Western Europe, 
were “anti-establishment” parties.  
                                                 
2
 These sanctions were soon seen as counterproductive and cooperation between the Austrian government 
and the leaders of the European Union returned to normal in summer 2000. 
3
 The collapse of the coalitional government was brought on by internal struggles within the FPÖ which 
forced the resignation of the Vice Federal Chancellor, Susanne Riess-Passer, and the Minister of Finance, 
Karl-Heinz Grasser, prompting early federal elections in November 2002. 
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As these examples briefly illustrate, the rise of anti-establishment parties 
transformed the party systems of Western Europe.  In the forty years since Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967:50) concluded that the “party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few 
significant exceptions, the alignments of the 1920s,” the party systems of Western 
Europe have undergone a dramatic transformation.  New entrants into these party 
systems have capitalized on, and possibly contributed to, a “thawing” of the once 
“frozen” party system by pushing new issues to the forefront of debate and challenging 
existing social cleavages and traditional political parties. 
The rise of anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum is a 
consequence of this transformation.  New entrants into a party system can destabilize a 
“frozen” party system or reinvigorate a decaying system (see Harmel 1997).  The 
success of anti-establishment parties, by garnering electoral support and/or gaining seats 
within parliament, changes the dynamics of the political systems within Western Europe.  
This dissertation investigates the rise, and more importantly, the consequences of anti-
establishment parties (on both sides of the political spectrum) to the party systems of 
Western Europe. 
The electoral success of anti-establishment parties, particularly the Front 
National (FN) in France led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, sparked the interest of political 
scientists to examine these new entrants into the party systems of Western Europe.  In 
2002, the French presidential elections made headlines across the globe as the 
controversial Le Pen defeated Lionel Jospin, the French Prime Minister at the time, in 
the first round of elections qualifying for a second round runoff election against 
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President Jacque Chirac.4  Yet, even with this much deserved interest, the success and, 
more importantly, the consequences of anti-establishment parties remain understudied 
within this body of research.  While the electoral success of anti-establishment parties on 
both sides of the political spectrum continues to generate a scholarly literature,5 these 
studies treat anti-establishment parties as a residual category since they do not easily fit 
into any particular theoretical model or typology.  Moreover, these studies do not offer a 
clear operational definition of anti-establishment parties.  This dissertation remedies 
these problems by examining anti-establishment parties, regardless of their placement on 
the political spectrum, in a single theoretical framework; thus, allowing for a single, 
unified analysis of the conditions leading to the success of anti-establishment parties. 
Along with the established body of literature examining success, there is a 
developing literature concerning the effects of this success, both upon individual parties 
within the system and upon the party system itself.6  In spite of this, the consequences of 
anti-establishment parties remain grossly understudied.  While it may be widely 
accepted today that anti-establishment parties may reinvigorate or destabilize the broader 
party system, what remains unexamined is the manner by which anti-establishment 
parties alter the party systems of Western Europe.  For example, how do anti-
establishment parties affect other political parties in their own party systems?  What 
effects do anti-establishment parties have on their party systems more generally?  With 
                                                 
4
 Le Pen garnered 16.86 percent of the vote in the first round of voting narrowly defeated Jospin by 
approximately 195,000 votes or 0.7 percent of the vote.  Jacques Chirac (82.21 percent) soundly defeated 
Le Pen (17.79 percent) in the second round of voting in the 2002 presidential election.   
5
 For example, see Betz (1994), Betz and Immerfall (1998), Dalton and Kuechler (1990), Golder (2003a), 
Ignazi (1992), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Kitschelt (1988), Knigge (1998) and Müller-Rommel (1989). 
6
 For example, see Bale (2003), Mair (2001), and Rohrschneider (1993). 
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these questions in mind, this dissertation makes important contributions to this 
burgeoning body of literature.   
Research Questions 
No single volume systematically studies anti-establishment party success and the 
consequences of this success; thus we are left with an incomplete understanding of the 
anti-establishment party phenomenon.  This dissertation attempts to fill this lacuna.  The 
first section of this dissertation focuses on the institutional and environmental conditions 
that allow anti-establishment parties to succeed by developing a unified theoretical 
framework.  Previous studies of anti-establishment parties often focus on one side of the 
political spectrum, neglecting the other.  Although anti-establishment parties of the left 
are distinctly different from those on the right in terms of organizational structures and 
ideological positions, both compete under the same institutional arrangements.  
Moreover, the general argument is that anti-establishment parties are often a product of 
postmaterialism, a shift in the value system within the electorate that transformed the 
party systems of Western Europe.  Because all anti-establishment parties are thought to 
emerge from the same root cause, this analysis examines anti-establishment parties as a 
single phenomenon.  What conditions, both institutional and environmental (socio-
economic), lead to the success of anti-establishment parties?  This research question 
directs the analyses in the first section of this dissertation.      
The second section of this dissertation investigates the consequences of anti-
establishment party success upon individual parties and upon the broader party system.  
What are the consequences of anti-establishment party success for the establishment 
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parties within the system?  How have establishment parties reacted and adapting to the 
success of anti-establishment parties?  If anti-establishment parties are indeed viable 
electoral challengers to establishment or traditional parties, then establishment parties 
should alter their image, identity, and organizational structure in order to counter this 
new threat (see Harmel and Svåsand 1997). 
Moreover, does the success of anti-establishment parties alter the characteristics 
and coalitional dynamics of the broader party system?  The emergence of these new 
entrants may change the characteristics and coalitional dynamics of the party system.  
Anti-establishment parties help mobilize new voters by pushing new issues to the 
forefront of the political debate or by tapping into a growing discontent towards the 
traditional parties within the electorate.  This discontent may increase electoral volatility 
within the party system, which may alter the coalitional dynamics with the legislatures 
of Western Europe.  These questions guide the analyses in the second part of this 
dissertation.   
Why Anti-Establishment Parties? 
 Why study anti-establishment parties?  When answering this question, there are 
several important interrelated questions that must be answered before we can fully 
appreciate the anti-establishment party phenomenon.  First, why should we study 
political parties at all?  Second, why have anti-establishment parties emerged in the party 
systems of Western Europe?  This question leads to the third interconnected question: 
Why study anti-establishment parties within a single theoretical framework?  Finally, 
how can anti-establishment parties affect the individual parties against which they 
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compete or the party systems within which they operate?  The following sections will 
discuss each of these questions in more detail. 
The Importance of Political Parties 
Political parties are essential to the democratic process (Bryce 1921; 
Schattschneider 1942; Easton 1957; Huntington 1965).  As E.E. Schattschneider (1942:1) 
concluded, “modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties.”  In 
order to explain the importance of political parties, it is first necessary to define what the 
term political party means. A political party is “an organization that pursues a goal of 
placing their avowed representatives in government positions” (Janda 1980: 5).  A closer 
examination of the elements of this definition demonstrates that a political party has 
“organization--implying recurring interactions among individuals with some division of 
labor and role differentiation” (Janda 1980: 5, emphasis in original).  Any organization 
has multiple goals.  However, one goal of the organization is the placement of its 
avowed representatives into government positions, which means that representatives 
must openly identify, and be identified, with the party name or label (Janda 1980).  The 
term placement is interpreted broadly.  However, for this study, the term placement 
means “through the electoral process (when a party competes with one or more others in 
pursuing its goal)” (Janda 1980: 5).7  Organizations that label themselves “parties,” yet 
are not oriented to providing governmental leadership (since they do not pursue the goal 
                                                 
7
 For Janda (1980: 5), the term placement may also refer to political parties placing their avowed 
representatives into governmental offices by “direct administrative action (when a ruling party permits no 
electoral competition) or by forceful imposition (when a party subverts the system and captures the 
governmental office).”  
  
8 
of placing their avowed representatives in government positions), do not qualify as 
parties under this definition (Janda 1980).8   
Even before E.E. Schattschneider expounded the importance of political parties 
to modern democracy, Bryce (1921: 119) wrote, “parties are inevitable. No one has 
shown how representative government could be worked without them.”  Democracy 
necessitates the existence of intermediary structures or groups between the government 
and the governed for the articulation, aggregation, and advocacy of disparate views and 
policy preferences.  Indeed, if a democratic system is to survive, flourish, and remain 
stable, then the needs and wants of the people must be heard and satisfied.  Without 
viable institutions to articulate and meet the demands of the public, democracy and the 
democratic system wither and decay (Easton 1957; Huntington 1965).  
Thus, political parties are essential institutions in the processes of democracy.  
Political parties aggregate and articulate the interests of the people to the government.  
Political parties embody both conventional political participation and institutions.  By 
mobilizing the electorate and representing various social groups, political parties are 
essential to negotiating a balance between the masses and the political elite. In other 
words, political parties link the electorate to the government and provide a way for 
citizens to hold party officials accountable for their actions in government.  Sartori (1968: 
471) echoed the sentiments: “citizens in Western democracies are represented through 
and by parties. This is inevitable” (emphasis added).  Within the development of 
                                                 
8
 Janda’s use of the term “governmental” has at times created confusion , with some assuming the 
“parliamentary” sense of the word (i.e., cabinet).  In fact, though, Janda is using the term in its more 
“American” sense (i.e., positions within government more broadly defined and encompassing legislative 
and judicial as well as executive offices).   
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political institutions, the importance of the political party for providing legitimacy and 
stability cannot be overstated (Huntington 1965).  
Aside from the functions of interest aggregation, interest articulation, mobilizing 
the electorate, and providing legitimacy, political parties perform several other equally 
important functions.9  First, political parties perform a policy agenda setting or issue 
structuring function.  Parties play a critical role in shaping the choices and alternatives 
along different issue dimensions (Gunther and Diamond 2001a).  Arguably, political 
parties structures political debate and discussion within representative government.  
Political parties also present the electorate with candidates and electoral manifestos (i.e., 
policy agenda setting or issue structuring) from which to make their electoral choices 
(see Epstein 1980 and Sartori 1976).  The vast majority of members of parliament, 
across Western Europe, belong to political parties. It follows that parliamentary politics 
are inherently party politics.  Thus, the focus of electoral campaigns and debate within 
the parliaments of Western Europe are the interests and preferences of parties. 
Second, political parties perform a social integration role as they “enable citizens 
to participate effectively in the political process” (Gunther and Diamond 2001b: 8).  
Through political parties, citizens come to feel that they have a vested interest in 
perpetuating the democratic system (Gunther and Diamond 2001a).  Third, political 
parties, if they perform these tasks well, can form and sustain governments.  All 
competitive parties are interested in winning governmental positions; all parties seek 
                                                 
9
 Gunther and Diamond (2001a) recognize seven functions of political parties.  These include candidate 
selection, electoral mobilization, issue structuring, societal representation, interest aggregation, forming 
and sustaining governments, and social integration.  Gunther and Diamond (2001a) observe that this list of 
functions corresponds closely to those identified by Epstein (1980) and King (1969). 
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governmental power (see Sartori 1976).  The performance of these tasks has important 
implications for the coherence and stability of public policy in the long term (see Dalton 
and Wattenberg 2000a).  All things being equal, parties that consistently perform these 
tasks will continue to gain representation within the legislature; thus, they gain the 
ability to influence the policy process.   
Political parties are undeniably important for democracy to function properly.  
Political parties mobilize and represent the interest of mass public, offer alternatives and 
set the policy agenda within the electoral arena, and connect the electorate with the 
governments they help form and maintain.  For all of these reasons, the importance of 
political parties to democratic governance cannot be overstated.  
The Changing European Electorate 
 After the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan, the party systems of Western 
Europe were commonly referred to as “frozen” due to the persistence of the cleavages 
that underpinned party politics (see Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984).  However, since 
the late 1970s, the party systems of Western Europe underwent a pervasive 
transformation.  Scholars attribute this transformation to declining traditional cleavage 
structures that shaped the party systems of the 1960s (see Inglehart 1971, 1977).  But 
why have the party systems of Western Europe “thawed” over the last four decades?   
 The party systems of Western Europe changed for several reasons.  First, the 
value system of Western European electorates shifted.  As Inglehart (1977: 3) states, 
“the values of Western publics have been shifting from an overwhelming emphasis on 
material well-being and physical security toward greater emphasis on the quality of life.”  
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This transformation of value orientations took the form of a shift from materialist (i.e., 
material well-being and physical security) to postmaterialist (i.e., quality of life) values 
(Inglehart 1971, 1977).  Flanagan (1982a, 1982b) argues that values of a better quality of 
life and a tolerance for a variety of life styles replaced traditional values. 
The emergence of this new set of values gave rise to what scholars refer to as the 
“new politics” (Inglehart 1984; Dalton 1988).  This shift towards postmaterialism affects 
partisan preferences and alignments.  Müller-Rommel (1989: 7) argues that this “new 
politics” emphasizing values of environmental quality, social equality, grassroots 
participation, and minority rights led to the formation of Greens parties in Western 
Europe beginning in the late 1970s.  Moreover, Kitschelt (1988, 206) links this argument 
of a “silent revolution” to the success of left-libertarian parties in Western Europe.  In 
other words, this value shift “produced new political alignments and new political 
movements on the left side of the political spectrum” (Ignazi 1992: 5, emphasis in 
original).10 
Second, several studies published in the last decade point to rising discontent 
within the party systems of Western Europe.  This discontent takes the form of 
disenchantment with established political parties (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000a; 
Poguntke and Scarrow 1996) or unhappiness with the workings of the broader party 
system (Norris 1999; Pharr and Putnam 2000).  Anti-party sentiments develop from the 
interaction of mass opinion towards politics and elite attempts to channel mass support 
                                                 
10
 As a result of this movement to the left by the electorate and, in numerous instances, established parties 
themselves, Ignazi (1992) argues that populist or extreme parties on the right emerged to fill the vacuum 
created on the right side of the political spectrum by the movement on right-oriented traditional parties.   
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(Poguntke and Scarrow 1996).  This interaction is obviously a two-way street.  Elites 
may emphasize anti-party arguments to fuel popular resentment towards established 
parties within the electorate; in turn, electoral behavior inspired by these arguments may 
compel elites to propagate their anti-party stance more explicitly or forcefully (Poguntke 
and Scarrow 1996).  The success of anti-establishment parties may force the traditional 
parties into unpopular grand coalitions unavoidably fueling attitudes that all 
establishment parties are alike. 
Another sign of discontent with political parties is the decline of partisanship 
within many industrialized democracies.  As Dalton (2000: 36) notes, “what is stunning 
about partisan dealignment is the commonality of trends across a wide variety of 
advanced industrial democracies.”  If partisan ties are weaker, this allows for new parties, 
campaigning on new issues, to garner electoral support.  Dalton, McAllister, and 
Wattenberg (2000) argue that more voters are now making their electoral choices based 
on campaign issues instead of partisan loyalties.  Established parties may lose electoral 
support if they fail to articulate the interests of the electorate on new issues emerging 
from the changing value systems within Western Europe.  This allows new political 
movements and parties that challenge the established or traditional parties to emerge. 
Furthermore, more and more citizens are unhappy with the internal working of 
the party system.  Trends in public opinion within Europe show “the basic picture is one 
of spreading disillusionment with established political leaders and institutions” (Putman, 
Pharr, and Dalton 2000: 10, emphasis added).  These patterns of cynicism towards 
political institutions accelerated during the past decade (Putman, Pharr, and Dalton 
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2000).  Klingemann and Fuchs (1995: 440-441) argue the citizens of Europe possess a 
“skeptical attitude” toward the reality of democracy.  Other studies point to “clear 
evidence of a general erosion in support for politicians in most advanced industrial 
countries” (Dalton 1999: 63).  Norris (1999: 26) advances these claims stating, “in 
established democracies, during the last decades of the twentieth century, growing 
numbers of citizens have become increasingly critical of the major institutions of 
representative government.”  Public support for essential representative institutions 
(including parties, parliaments, and governments) is declining in many established 
democracies (Norris 1999).  Whether it is disillusionment with the established parties or 
the party system, rising discontent within the electorate makes it possible for anti-
establishment parties to gain a foothold within the political arena. 
Third, in the four decades since Lipset and Rokkan posited the “frozen party” 
thesis, electoral volatility increased in Western European party systems.  Exploring the 
electoral support of parties in seventeen western democracies, Rose and Urwin (1970: 
295) deduced, “the electoral strength of most parties in Western nations since the war 
had changed very little from election to election, from decade to decade, or within the 
lifespan of a generation.”  Bartolini and Mair (1990:119) validated these findings stating 
“there has been no substantial and sustained growth in electoral mobility across the 
class-cleavage boundary; in these terms at least, the cleavage remains frozen.”   
However, several scholars noted shifts in the stability of voter alignments by the 
end of the 1970s (Pedersen 1983; Maguire 1983; Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984; 
Crewe and Denver 1985; Franklin et al. 1992).  These scholars illustrated greater 
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electoral volatility within the party systems of many industrialized democracies.  Thus, 
scholars concluded that the frozen party cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967) were “thawing.”  Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck encapsulated these findings stating:  
Electoral alignments are weakening, and party systems are experiencing 
increased fragmentation and electoral volatility. Moreover, the evidence 
suggests that the changes in all of these nations reflect more than short-
term oscillations in party fortunes. This decomposition of electoral 
alignments often can be traced to shifts in the long-term bases of partisan 
support—party identification and social cleavages.  Virtually everywhere 
among the industrialized democracies, the old order is crumbling. (1984: 
451) 
 
Franklin et al. (1992: 404) note that “the electoral impact of social cleavages may well 
have been already in decline before the 1960s.” Thus, political cleavages became more 
irrelevant to party success.  Moreover, Schmitt and Holmberg (1995) found partisan 
attachments waning in many Western European nations (see also Klingemann and Fuchs 
1995).  
Recently, however, Mair (1997: 30) found evidence supporting the frozen 
cleavages model arguing that, “the electoral balance now is not substantially different 
from that of thirty years ago, and, in general, electorates are not now substantially more 
volatile than once they were.”  This conclusion corroborated the findings of Bartolini 
and Mair (1990: 119) who argued that the electoral volatility of the 1970s appeared to be 
a “gross exaggeration.”  Conversely, other scholars show evidence of weakening 
partisan loyalties, growing volatility and increased party fragmentation in many 
industrialized democracies since the 1970s (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b).  To echo 
Drummond (2002:12), “political parties generally are experiencing gradual increases in 
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electoral volatility, variability and elasticity.”11  Thus, as one can see, the stability of 
these party systems is subject to an ongoing debate.   
Anti-Establishment Parties as a Single Phenomenon 
Although a vigorous debate concerning these claims continues, little debate 
exists that the party systems of Western Europe have changed since the Second World 
War.  The changing value system, rising discontent, and increased electoral volatility of 
the past four decades within these party systems materializes in the amount of electoral 
support for parties that challenge the traditional parties within the system (i.e., anti-
establishment parties) (Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000; Poguntke 1996).  
Anti-establishment parties, and other new parties, altered the political landscape and 
dynamics of party politics.  Therefore, the party systems of Western Europe today 
appear significantly different from those examined by Lipset and Rokkan in the 1960s.   
However, research on anti-establishment parties dismisses the fact that these 
parties are indeed borne out of these changes.  Ignazi (1992:6) argues that anti-
establishment parties, regardless of their placement on the political spectrum, are “the 
legitimate and unwanted children of the New Politics” as “common problems and 
common concerns coalesced in partisan organizations at different ends of the political 
spectrum” (Ignazi 1997: 318).  Thus, the rise of anti-establishment parties is a by-
product of the postmaterialist value system.  Moreover, anti-establishment parties take 
advantage of, and contribute to, the growing discontent and increased volatility within 
the party systems of Western Europe. 
                                                 
11
 However, Drummond (2002) cautions against taking these results as definitive proof of instability 
within the party systems of western democracies.  For a discussion of these results, see Drummond (2002). 
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Although anti-establishment parties of the left are distinctly different from anti-
establishment parties of the right in terms of ideology, organizational structure, and 
bases of support, anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum are 
borne out of the shift to postmaterialism, the growing discontent, and increased electoral 
volatility within Western European party systems.  Each of these parties challenges the 
political establishment providing an outlet for the voting public to voice their 
disenchantment with “politics as usual” in Western Europe.  Anti-establishment parties 
provide alternatives to those among the electorate that wish to vote against the 
establishment (Abedi 2004).  Thus, contrary to previous studies, it would be somewhat 
foolish not to put these parties into the same category. 
Even though previous studies fail to examine these parties as a single 
phenomenon, the notion that all anti-establishment parties emerge from the same root 
causes is not lost within the literature.  Mackie (1995) argues that challenger parties (e.g., 
parties that challenge the establishment) of the left and right are born from the same 
phenomenon due to the fact that left-libertarian parties and “new populist” parties share 
the same electoral fortunes and the same “enemy” within the same countries.12  “To 
some extent the new populist parties are the mirror-image of the parties of the libertarian 
left.  They too inveigh against the democratic leviathan” (Mackie 1995: 177).  Taggart 
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 It should be noted that this definition of a “challenger” party differs greatly from the definition of a 
“challenger” party offered by Rochon (1985).  Rochon (1985) argues that “challenger” parties locate 
themselves at the same ideological position on the political spectrum as an existing or established party.  
Thus, these parties challenge established parties in terms on vying for the same segment of voters.  This 
differs from the definition offered by Mackie (1995: 174) that “challenger parties” are those that challenge 
“the status quo in terms of major policy issues or the nature of political activity.”  For Rochon (1985), 
anti-establishment parties are more likely to be classified as “mobilizer” parties as these parties often 
mobilize new or apathetic segments of society against the established parties by campaigning on new or 
neglected issues.   
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furthers the “mirror image” argument that “New Populism” parties and “New Politics” 
parties (i.e., anti-establishment parties) are indeed one phenomenon by concluding:  
Through examining their ideology, it is clear that their commonality lies 
in the fact that they are reactions to recent developments in West 
European politics.  They are united in what they oppose. They stand in 
opposition to what they see as the failed post-war settlement. In their 
actions and organisations there is a self-conscious effort to contrast 
themselves with ‘old’ established parties. (1996: 45) 
 
The “symmetrical pattern in ideological, organizational and electoral features of parties” 
demonstrates that these parties “represent two sides of the same coin” (Taggart 1996: 46).    
The emergence of anti-establishment parties results from the “value change and 
the related incapacity of traditional parties to represent new issues” (Ignazi 1997: 318).  
This value change first spawned the rise anti-establishment parties on the left (i.e., left-
libertarian or “New Politics” parties).  As a reaction to this shift towards the left side of 
the spectrum, anti-establishment parties of the right (i.e., “New Populism” parties) 
emerged and thrived in many west European party systems.  It is clear that anti-
establishment parties should be examined as a single phenomenon.   
What Are the Consequences? 
 The effects of anti-establishment parties are far reaching.  Some scholars 
interpret the anti-establishment party phenomenon as a “symptom of a system in crisis” 
(Ignazi 1997: 318).  Disaffection with democracy and a lack of confidence its 
institutions have been a growing concern since the early 1970s (see Crozier, Huntington, 
and Watanuki 1975).  However, the democratic systems of Western Europe are not an 
endangered species; democracy is in good health.  Political parties and party systems are 
under threat more so than democracy.  But how exactly do new entrants (e.g., anti-
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establishment parties) change the political system?  In other words, what are the 
consequences of anti-establishment parties to individual parties and the broader party 
system?  When thinking of the different consequences of anti-establishment parties, it is 
important to keep in mind the various functions performed by political parties.   
Harmel (1997) argues new entrants into the political arena may serve to 
reinvigorate as well as to destabilize a party system.  New entrants often force traditional 
parties to address new or long neglected issues.  In this manner, anti-establishment 
parties reinvigorate a party system.  However, anti-establishment parties can destabilize 
a party system by gaining electoral support. This shifts the dynamics of the coalition 
formation process.  These two examples only highlight ways in which anti-establishment 
parties affect individual parties and the broader party system.  There are three 
consequences of anti-establishment parties that are of interest to this dissertation. 
First, new entrants can influence the ability of established parties to articulate 
and aggregate the interests of the electorate and set the policy agenda within the national 
legislature.  Spatial theory suggests that political parties adjust their policy programmes 
or manifestos in response to shifts in public opinion.  In order to win elections, parties 
tailor their manifestos to the policy preferences of their core supporters in particular, and 
the electorate in general.  Moreover, spatial theory suggests that political parties adjust 
their policy programmes in relation to their opponents, usually their nearest rival.  Thus, 
parties’ issue profiles are shaped, at least in part, by the policy positions of the other 
parties within the party system.   
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If anti-establishment parties force traditional parties to adjust their policy 
positions towards this new threat, they can change the very identity of the traditional 
parties.  This adjustment, which may be accompanied by a shift in the placement of the 
established party on the political spectrum, influences the ability of such parties to 
articulate and aggregate the interests of their supporters to the government.  Competition 
for votes may require established parties to reach out to new groups of voters by 
changing their election manifestos or altering the agenda within the national legislature.  
Thus, the important functions of interest articulate and aggregation and agenda setting 
(issue structuring) are altered by the emergence of anti-establishment parties.   
Second, anti-establishment parties, by challenging the establishment, provide 
alternatives to the electorate, which in turn, influences the ability of establishment 
parties to mobilize the electorate.  Changes in the behavior of the electorate and 
increased electoral volatility within Western Europe discussed above are but two 
examples of how anti-establishment parties affect the function of mobilizing the 
electorate.  The functions of interest articulation and aggregation are obviously closely 
linked to the ability of political parties to mobilize the electorate. This is not to say that 
anti-establishment parties stop traditional parties from mobilizing the electorate.  
However, these new entrants, by representing new issues, may mobilize more new voters 
than the established parties.13    By pushing new issues to the forefront of political debate 
and articulating different demands from that of the establishment, anti-establishment 
                                                 
13
 The argument could also be made that new voters are mobilized against anti-establishment parties.  
Thus, new voters may be mobilizing in support of establishment parties as a type of “counter-protest” to 
anti-establishment parties.  
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parties alter the range of voters that can be captured by the traditional parties.  Thus, 
anti-establishment parties may affect the amount of electoral volatility within the party 
system.  
    Finally, anti-establishment parties may disrupt establishment parties’ abilities to 
form and sustain governments.  The ability of anti-establishment parties to gain 
representation in Western European parliaments limits the opportunities available to 
establishment parties in forming coalitional governments.  As anti-establishment parties 
gain more seats, the probability of forming a majority coalition decreases.  As such, the 
more seats occupied by anti-establishment parties, the smaller the governing coalition 
formed by the winning parties (based on the remaining parties) is likely to be.  Smaller 
governing coalitions are obviously more likely to face a larger opposition group (see 
Warwick 1979).  Therefore, the ability to maintain a stable coalition may be hampered 
by the number of seats won by anti-establishment parties.      
What Is an Anti-Establishment Party? 
   
In defining anti-establishment parties, a dichotomous distinction should be drawn 
between anti-establishment parties and establishment or traditional parties.  However, a 
consensus does not exist in the literature concerning the definition of anti-establishment 
parties.  Previous definitions are wrought with problems.14  The fact that previous party 
taxonomies treat anti-establishment parties as a “residual category” creates numerous 
problems within previous definitions (Ignazi 1992: 6).   All of the labels detailed below 
convey “important aspects” of the anti-establishment party phenomenon, yet they all 
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 For another detailed discussion of the problems of previous definitions, see Abedi (2004). 
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suffer from imprecision.  Most of these definitions are too general and, therefore, they 
conceal the specific target of anti-establishment “crusades” (Schedler 1996: 292).  The 
following sections detail these problems before offering a definition that overcomes 
many of the deficiencies with previous definitions.   
Problems with Previous Definitions   
Numerous previous definitions stress differences between opposition parties to 
“distinguish anti-establishment opposition forces from opposition parties that belong to 
the political establishment” (Abedi 2004: 6).  In an early study of opposition parties, 
Kirchheimer (1966: 237) differentiates between “loyal opposition” parties, which oppose 
the policies of the parties in government but accept the democratic system and 
“opposition of principle” parties, which pursue goals that are “incompatible with the 
constitutional requirements of a given system.”  Sartori (1976: 133) utilizes the term 
“anti-system” to classify a party that “undermines the legitimacy of the regime it 
opposes.”   
Smith (1987: 63) argues that opposition parties can be differentiated by asking 
two questions: are the goals of the party “compatible with the existing regime and its 
adherent structures?” and do the adherents of the party “pursue a course of action that is 
acceptable to others” namely other political parties and officials?  Refining previous 
definitions, Capoccia (2002:10) distinguishes “relational anti-systemness” and 
“ideological anti-systemness.”  The “relational anti-systemness” of a party impacts the 
mechanics of a party system “by pushing it towards increased polarization and 
centrifugality” (Capoccia 2002: 24).  “Ideological anti-systemness” affects the 
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democratic system as a whole, as the party opposes one or more of the fundamental 
characteristics of the democratic system (Capoccia 2002).   
Abedi (2004) argues that definitions stressing differences in opposition parties 
are both too broad and too restrictive.  These definitions are too broad “in that all the 
parties that these categories comprise have only one thing in common, namely, their 
anti-system stance with regard to their ideology and/or their behavior” (Abedi 2004: 7).  
At the same time, these definitions are too restrictive “in that they do not include parties 
that are ambiguous with regard to their position on democracy (Abedi 2004: 7).  With 
many anti-establishment parties wrapping their anti-democratic attacks in democratic 
rhetoric, this type of definition captures only those parties that are overtly anti-system 
and/or anti-democratic (Abedi 2004).   
Yet, these definitions also miss the point that anti-establishment parties, by 
definition of being political parties, are not anti-system parties.  By competing in 
democratic elections, anti-establishment parties are granting legitimacy to the 
“constitutional requirements of a given system” (Sartori 1976:13).  Although their 
policies and behavior may not be acceptable to other established parties within the 
system, anti-establishment parties are not overtly or covertly anti-system.  Thus, the 
“anti-system” label should not apply to anti-establishment parties.     
Described as a “specter” that is haunting the world, scholars utilize the term 
“populism” or the “populist” label to describe the parties with anti-establishment 
sentiments.  Scholars conceptualize populism to include not only traditional agrarian 
parties on the right, but also non-agrarian movements on the left side of the political 
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spectrum (see Ionescu and Gellner 1969).  Mény and Surel (2002) argue that all populist 
movements develop their arguments in three distinct steps.  First, populists place their 
emphasis on “the role of the people and its fundamental position, not only within society, 
but also in the structure and functioning of the political system as a whole” (Mény and 
Surel 2002: 11-12).   Populist movements emphasize “the supremacy of the will of ‘the 
people’ over that of any special interest group” (Abedi 2004: 7).  Second, populist 
rhetoric usually claims that “the people have been betrayed by those in charge” (Mény 
and Surel 2002: 12).  Third, demands are made for the restoration of “the primacy of the 
people” (Mény and Surel (2002: 13).  In addition to these three common features, 
populist movements are often characterized by negativism defining themselves more by 
what they are against than what they are for (Abedi 2004).  Populist parties stress the 
discontent between establishment parties and the voting public by campaigning on issues 
long neglected by these traditional parties.   
Other scholars attempt to further demarcate the concept of populism   Canovan 
(1981) makes the distinction between agrarian and political populism. Agrarian 
populism “is a kind of rural radicalism” focused of a particular socioeconomic group 
(i.e., farmers), while political populism concerns itself with the phenomenon in which 
“the tensions between the elite and the grass roots loom large” (Canovan 1981: 8-9).  In 
other words, political populism stresses the divide between the political establishment 
and the people.  More recently, Canovan (1999: 3) describes populism in modern 
democratic societies “as an appeal to ‘the people’ against both the established structure 
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of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society.”   Populist movements are 
“of the people, but not of the system” (Taggart 1996: 32). 
 Taguieff (1995) also distinguishes between two types of populism: “protest” 
populism and “identitarian” populism.  The main feature of “protest” populism is that 
“the appeal to the people is meant primarily as a criticism or denunciation of elites, be 
they political, administrative, economic or cultural” (Taguieff 1995: 32).  This distrust in 
elites is inextricably linked to a trust in ordinary citizens.  Thus, “protest” populism 
idealizes direct democracy over any form of representative democracy.  “Identitarian” 
populism is “an appeal to the whole people” despite the heterogeneity (i.e., class 
divisions) of the populace (Taguieff 1995: 33).  This type of populism stresses 
xenophobia (fear of foreigners) over distrust of elites.  The emphasis of this appeal is to 
defend the unity of the people against immigrants or foreigners and their cultures as well 
as attempts to divide the people by political elites.  
Taggart (2002) goes as far as to delineate six characteristics of populism.  It is 
not necessary to discuss all of these characteristics given the amount of overlap with 
other aspects detailed above.  However, three of these characteristics deserve further 
discussion.  First, populism is hostile to representative politics.  Taggart (2002: 66) is 
quick to point out that this does not mean that populism “cannot exist where there are no 
institutions or the ideas of representative politics,” but that it is only through the 
conditions created by representative politics that populism can become a political force.  
Second, populism lacks “core values” (Taggart 2002: 68).  Populist movements develop 
and react against elites and institutions according to the nature of these elites and 
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institutions in a given country.  Thus, populism can be found on the left (i.e., left-
libertarian parties) or on the right (i.e., traditional populist parties) side of the political 
spectrum.  Third, populism tends to be “highly chameleonic,” in that the nature of a 
populist movement depends on the national context in which it emerges.  Indeed, as 
Taggart (2002) points out with another of his characteristics, populist movements 
usually emerge and thrive during times of crisis. “Populism is not the politics of the 
stable, ordered polity but emerges as an accompaniment to change, crises, and 
challenge” (Taggart 2002: 69). 
Each of these definitions of populism (i.e., agrarian, political, protest, identitarian, 
etc.) suffers from the same deficiency in that they are all difficult to operationalize.  
Abedi (2004) argues that these definitions are not developed specifically to identify 
populist parties, but rather they capture the concept of populism itself.  Furthermore, it is 
unclear whether a party must exhibit all, or just a few, traits in order to be labeled as 
populist. As Abedi (2004: 9) states: 
Is it enough if a party advocates replacing representative democracy with 
a democratic order that contains elements of direct democracy or does a 
party have to appeal to the people as a whole and challenge the political 
establishment in order to quality as a populist party?  
 
The difficulty of defining populism and “finding common features across time and space 
when considering its manifold manifestations” lies in the fact that populism “is, by itself, 
and empty shell which can be filled and made meaningful by whatever is poured into it” 
(Mény and Surel 2002: 4). 
Still other studies attempt to overcome many of these definitional deficiencies.  
Mudde (1996) refers to the “anti-party party,” distinguishing between those parties 
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having “extremist anti-party” sentiments and those having “populist anti-party” 
sentiments.  Those parties labeled “extreme” reject political parties as a matter of 
principle “often on the grounds of its diverse nature or the fact that it forms a barrier 
between the rules and the ruled (Mudde 1996: 267). “Populist” anti-parties criticize 
traditional “often because of their bad functioning or because of the group they (do not) 
represent” (Mudde 1996; 267).  These parties often condemn traditional parties as self-
interested, corrupt, and anti-democratic institutions that lack the vision and motivation to 
properly represent the people (Abedi 2004).  Although the concept of the anti-party party 
aims specifically at defining political parties, it is still unclear whether a party must 
fulfill all or some of the criteria in order to be labeled an “anti-party” party (Abedi 2004). 
 Several scholars utilize such terms as “protest parties” or “discontent parties” in 
order to better operationalize these parties (Fennema 1997; Lane and Ersson 1999).  
“Protest parties” blame the political establishment for all that ails society and seek to 
organize the citizenry who are unhappy with what they feel is “something rotten in the 
state” (Fennema 1997: 475).  Preferring the term “discontent party,” Lane and Ersson 
(1999) discount a wide range of parties that would otherwise be considered as 
challengers to the establishment (e.g., Greens parties).  For Lane and Ersson (1999: 85), 
discontent or populist parties are often “formed on the basis of a concrete issue” or 
“channeling people’s discontent.”   These parties use populist rhetoric and programmes 
and are headed by charismatic leaders.  Thus, the definition offered to distinguish 
“discontent” parties neglects the entire left side of the political spectrum.    
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In addition, these parties are often labeled as “niche” or “single-issue” parties 
(Meguid 2005; Adams et al. 2006).  Many anti-establishment parties do indeed fill a 
niche on the political spectrum left vacant by parties of the establishment.  However, 
studies that utilize this moniker frequently exclude communist parties on the left and 
anti-establishment parties that place themselves towards the center of the political 
spectrum.15  Therefore, these studies do not capture the full breadth of the anti-
establishment party phenomenon.  In a similar vein, labeling these parties as “single-
issue” parties neglects the depth of anti-establishment parties.  Anti-establishment parties 
politicize a set of issues instead of focusing one key issue.  For example, Green parties 
emerged in the 1970s focusing on not only the environment, but also nuclear 
disarmament and nuclear power.  Radical right-wing populist emerged and thrived in the 
1980s and 1990s by emphasizing immigration, traditional values, and law and order 
issues.  Thus, anti-establishment parties, on both sides of the political spectrum, altered 
the content of political debate by pushing a set of new issues to the forefront of the 
political agenda.    
Schedler (1996: 293) coins the term “anti-political establishment” party referring 
to parties that stress the existence of a “cleavage” or fundamental divide between the 
political establishment and the people on one hand and a fundamental divide between 
themselves and the political establishment on the other.  For Schedler (1996), anti-
political establishment parties occupy the space between “loyal opposition” and anti-
                                                 
15
 One notable exception includes Adams et al. (2006) who include communist parties in eight Western 
European countries in their analyses.  However, they fail to include anti-establishment parties located at 
the center of the political spectrum.  
  
28 
democratic opposition.  Thus, we see that anti-establishment parties are not against 
democracy per se (i.e., anti-system), but are against those parties that make up the 
political establishment.  
However, while the label of “anti-political establishment” shows promise, the 
definition fails in the same manner as previous attempts.  Given that this definition rests 
on the premise that anti-political establishment parties construct a divide between 
themselves and the political establishment, it is necessary to define political 
establishment.  Abedi (2004: 11) argues that although this definition puts forth the 
characteristics attributed to the establishment (i.e., corrupt and distant from the people as 
a whole) by anti-political establishment parties, it “offers no independent method of 
determining which parties, if any, possess these negative attributes.” Unfortunately, 
Schedler (1996) fails to offer a definition of the political establishment.   
Defining Anti-Establishment Parties  
 From this discussion, we can see that there is a need for a definition that can be 
more readily operationalized.  In order to define an anti-establishment party, it is first 
necessary to define what constitutes an establishment party.  Using the “governing 
potential” criteria developed by Sartori (1976), Abedi (2004: 11) argues that 
establishment parties are those that participate in government or those that the governing 
parties deemed suitable partners for coalition formation, as well as those parties willing 
to cooperate with the main governing parties by joining them in a coalition government. 
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 With this definition in place, it is now possible to define an anti-establishment 
party.16  The definition adopted by this dissertation was developed by Abedi (2004), but 
adds certain caveats that his definition overlooks.  Taking aspects from various authors, 
this definition offers four criteria necessary to distinguish an anti-establishment party 
from parties of the establishment.  The first of these criteria focuses on the idea that anti-
establishment parties are challengers to the establishment (Ignazi 1992; Mackie 1995).  
Mackie (1995: 174) argues that “challenger parties” are those that challenge “the status 
quo in terms of major policy issues or the nature of political activity.”  This definition 
for “challenger parties” serves as a starting point for the definition utilized for this 
dissertation since it specifically includes “left-libertarian” and Greens parties as well as 
far right parties (i.e., neo-fascist, populist, and anti-immigrant parties).17   
Three additional criteria are necessary to complete this definition.  First, the party 
must see itself as a challenger and present itself to the voting public as a challenger to 
the establishment (Adedi 2004).  The next criterion for this definition concerns how the 
party sees its competition.  Anti-establishment parties must make the distinction between 
themselves and establishment parties.  For a party to be classified as an anti-
establishment party, all three of the following criteria fulfilled:  
                                                 
16
 For the purposes of this dissertation, I chose to term these parties “anti-establishment” placing these 
parties at odds with “establishment” or traditional parties.  This terminology differs from Abedi (2004), 
who provides a discussion of both “political establishment parties” and “anti-political establishment 
parties.”   
17
 For Mackie (1995: 175), these parties are not deemed to have a realistic chance of participating in 
government since they “are not serious contenders for government office” or they “are not regarded as 
suitable partners by existing government parties.”  However, despite this definition, there are numerous 
examples of anti-establishment on both sides of the political spectrum entering into governing coalitions.  
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• A party that challenges the status quo in terms of major policy issues 
and/or political system issues.18 
 
• A party that perceives itself as a challenger to the parties that make up 
the political establishment. 
 
• A party that asserts that there exists a fundamental divide between the 
political establishment and the people. It thereby implies that all 
establishment parties, be they in government or in opposition, are 
essentially the same.19 
 
In addition to these criteria outlined by Abedi (2004), an anti-establishment party must 
also fulfill one additional criterion:  
• A party that agrees, through participation in democratic elections, to 
adhere to the constitutional requirements of a given system.  
 
By competing in free, fair, and competitive (i.e., democratic) elections, anti-
establishment parties demonstrate their willingness to work within the accepted rules of 
the game or the “constitutional requirements of a given system.”  Anti-establishment 
parties are not anti-democratic or anti-system parties.  As detailed above, previous 
definitions overlook this point by grouping anti-system parties, whether overtly anti-
system or not, with parties that compete within the accepted norms of the political 
system.  The negative connotation associated with “anti-system” or “anti-democratic” 
parties does not apply to anti-establishment parties.  Anti-establishment parties are not 
subversive in that they do not attempt to subvert the whole political system as a means of 
taking control of the government.  These parties merely stress the divide between the 
                                                 
18
 This criterion was adapted from Ignazi (1992); Mackie (1995); and Schedler (1996) as cited in Abedi 
(2004).   
19
 This criterion is adapted from Mudde (1999) and Schedler (1996) as cited in Abedi (2004). 
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people and the parties of the political establishment by pointing to the deficiencies of 
traditional parties.   
It must be stressed that these criteria must be assessed over time for any given 
party.  In order to classify an anti-establishment (or establishment) party, one must 
determine whether a party fulfills all four criteria at a particular time or not (Abedi 2004).  
More importantly, this definition is not exhaustive of all political parties.  There are 
parties within the party systems of Western Europe that are neither anti-establishment 
parties nor part of the political establishment.  These parties are neither politically 
relevant in that they do not have a realistic chance of participating in government nor are 
they perceived as challengers to the political establishment (Sartori 1976; Abedi 2004).   
The definition offered here should provide a meaningful dichotomy between anti-
establishment parties and establishment or traditional parties.20   
Defining Success 
 
Downs (1957: 127-128) contends that “some parties—founded by perfectly 
rational men—are meant to be threats to other parties and not means of getting 
immediate power or prestige.”  Does merely threatening the established, traditional 
parties constitute success?  It is argued that “all competitive parties are interested in 
winning some governmental positions” (Harmel 1997: 44, emphasis in original).  Does 
becoming a member of the establishment represent success for anti-establishment parties?  
Harmel (1997: 44) asks the question, “Aside from what new parties can accomplish by 
                                                 
20
 This “dichotomy” leaves out a third category of “anti-system” parties which are neither anti-
establishment nor part of the establishment.  Thus, the distinction that is being offered here is between 
anti-establishment parties, establishment parties and anti-system parties.  A list of anti-establishment is 
provided in Appendix A. 
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being in governmental positions themselves, is there evidence that new parties also 
affect policy by getting establishment parties to change their positions?”  Is the ability of 
anti-establishment parties to influence the issue profiles of traditional parties considered 
success?   
Each of these suggests a different manner by which to measure the success of 
anti-establishment parties.  Thus, the question is how to measure success of anti-
establishment parties in order to accomplish the goals of this dissertation?  Should 
success be measured in terms of electoral support or in terms of the number of seats anti-
establishment parties gain within the legislatures of Western Europe?  Is success the 
ability of anti-establishment parties to gain governmental positions or to influence 
policymaking by getting the traditional parties to alter their positions?  
In their analysis of the effects of anti-immigrant parties on traditional parties in 
Norway and Denmark, Harmel and Svåsand argue that:    
In order for party A to be perceived as a relevant threat to party B, at least 
two conditions must hold.  First, party A (here, the new party) must win 
enough votes and/or seats to be clearly noticed.  Though any new 
formation may be a potential threat, of course, it is unlikely that another 
party will change itself—given the innate conservatism already noted—
until there is evidence (i.e. in votes and/or seats) that the threat is real.  
And second, for party B to perceive A as a threat to its own well-being, B 
must have reason to believe that A’s success is substantial at B’s expense. 
(1997: 317, emphasis in original)   
 
I argue that the ability of anti-establishment parties to garner votes and/or gain seats in 
the legislature and threaten the traditional parties of the party system is part of the larger 
concept of success.  The ability of anti-establishment parties to influence government 
formation or policymaking by getting traditional parties to alter their positions is 
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contingent upon anti-establishment parties threatening, or ability to threaten, the 
establishment.  Thus, these are consequences of success not success itself.  A new party 
has the greatest probability of accomplishing these goals (consequences) if the party can 
garner enough electoral support (success) and differ from establishment parties on the 
issues (Harmel 1997).  In other words, consequences are predicated upon success. 
The definition of success utilized for this dissertation refers specifically to 
electoral success.  As part of the larger concept of success, electoral success of anti-
establishment parties, as with all political parties, can be measured as a percentage of 
votes or seats or as the simple number of seats gained in the national parliament.  Indeed, 
this dissertation utilizes both measures for the various analyses conducted herein.  In the 
second chapter of this dissertation, success is measured as the percentage of votes 
received in national parliamentary elections.  In the analysis of cabinet duration 
presented in chapter V, success is measured as the number of seats won by anti-
establishment parties.  
Structure of the Dissertation 
 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to help explain the emergence, success, and 
consequences of anti-establishment parties.  To this end, this first chapter explores the 
historical context and the conditions leading to the emergence of anti-establishment 
parties as well as to delineate the definition of anti-establishment parties and success 
utilized throughout the dissertation.  Anti-establishment parties emerge due to shifts 
within the electorate across Europe.  Citizens are more critical of the political parties that 
comprise the establishment and increasingly discontented with the institutional 
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mechanisms of the party system.  In order to satisfy the needs of, and provide a voice for, 
these new “critical” citizens (see Norris 1999), anti-establishment parties emerged to 
challenge the establishment.     
The remainder of this dissertation is divided into two connected parts.  The first 
part examines the success of anti-establishment parties.  Anti-establishment parties owe 
their success to a number of institutional (i.e., political and electoral system), social, and 
economic conditions.  These conditions are explored in detail through the analyses 
presented in the second chapter of this dissertation.  The second part of the dissertation 
investigates the consequences brought about by the success of anti-establishment parties. 
As discussed above, the success of anti-establishment parties may lead the more 
established parties within the party systems of Western Europe to alter their 
organizational structures or ideological profiles.  The changes made by established 
parties are analyzed in chapters III and IV.  Moreover, these new entrants into the 
political arena may reinvigorate or destabilize their respective party systems.  Anti-
establishment parties may increase polarization and electoral volatility as well as shift 
the traditional coalitional dynamics within the party systems of Western Europe.  The 
fifth chapter examines the consequences of anti-establishment party success to the larger 
party system.  The final chapter summarizes the findings and discusses the implications 
of this dissertation and concludes by providing some suggestions for future avenues of 
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research concerning the anti-establishment party phenomenon.  Figure 1.1 illustrates the 
outline of the dissertation.21 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Outline of the dissertation 
 
 
                                                 
21
 The arrows in this figure only point in the direction of causality investigated by this dissertation.  
Investigating the effects of party system change or establishment party change on the electoral success of 
anti-establishment parties is outside the scope of this dissertation.    
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
EXPLAINING THE ELECTORAL SUCCESS OF ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT  
 
PARTIES 
 
 
 The previous chapter discussed changes within the electorate of Western Europe 
that help explain the emergence of anti-establishment parties.  However, emergence is 
but the first step in understanding the anti-establishment party phenomenon.  This 
second chapter explores why anti-establishment parties persist and even flourish within 
many countries of Western Europe.  What leads to the electoral success of anti-
establishment parties?  What conditions allow these new entrants into the political arena 
to garner electoral support, particularly at the national level?  What role do the 
characteristics of the electoral system play in the electoral success of anti-establishment 
parties?  Do social and economic conditions help or hinder these parties in the electoral 
market?  These questions help guide the analyses conducted in this chapter. 
 The growing electoral support of anti-establishment parties allows these parties 
to exert significant influence over numerous aspects of the policy making process.  
These developments lead to a growing literature focused on the electoral success of anti-
establishment parties in Western Europe.  The vast majority of the studies neglect the 
fact that anti-establishment parties, regardless of their placement on the political 
spectrum, are a product of the changing European electorate.  Ignazi (1992: 6) argues 
that anti-establishment parties are “the legitimate and unwanted children of the New 
Politics” as “common problems and common concerns coalesced in partisan 
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organizations at different ends of the political spectrum” (Ignazi 1997: 318).  Likewise, 
Taggart (1996: 49) asserts that parties of “the New Populism and the New Politics have 
their bases in common factors.” 
Despite these claims, previous research fails to examine these parties as a single 
phenomenon.  To this end, this chapter develops a single theoretical framework 
explaining the electoral success of anti-establishment parties from an institutional 
perspective.  Most often, previous studies focus on only one side of the political 
spectrum, neglecting the other.  This leads to an incomplete picture and, more 
importantly, inaccurate representation of the anti-establishment party phenomenon.  Like 
all political parties, anti-establishment parties compete within the same institutional 
environment created by the political and electoral system.   
However, previous studies point out different economic and social conditions 
favoring the electoral success of different anti-establishment parties.  That is, anti-
establishment parties on the left thrive under different economic and social conditions 
from their counterparts on the right.  To complete the anti-establishment portrait, the 
analyses in this chapter are disaggregated to illustrate which conditions promote the 
electoral success of anti-establishment parties of the left and those conditions that favor 
anti-establishment parties on the right.  This disaggregated analysis tests the assertion 
that anti-establishment parties “succeed” for the same reasons, regardless of their 
ideological orientation.  Moreover, the analyses conducted in this chapter seek to remedy, 
at least in part, the omissions of previous studies by incorporating variables, which 
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hitherto have not been fully examined.  Therefore, these analyses develop a more 
complete picture of the anti-establishment phenomenon. 
 The remainder of this chapter is divided into the following sections.  The first 
section summarizes previous research concerning the electoral success of anti-
establishment parties.  Previous studies provide institutional, sociological, and economic 
explanations for the electoral success of anti-establishment parties.  The second section 
outlines the contributions of this chapter to this growing literature.  The third section 
delineates the theoretical orientation and expectations of these analyses and offers 
several testable hypotheses.  The theoretical expectations of this chapter are that 
institutional arrangements, political environment, and socioeconomic conditions present 
the opportunity for anti-establishment parties to garner electoral success.  These 
hypotheses concern the effects of the party and electoral system as well as social and 
economic conditions, which establish the environment in which anti-establishment 
parties compete.  Next, the data and methods utilized to examine these hypotheses are 
outlined.   
The fifth section details the findings of these analyses.  The results paint an 
interesting portrait of the electoral success of anti-establishment parties.  On the one 
hand, the institutional constraints of the party and electoral systems affect anti-
establishment parties, regardless of their placement on the political spectrum, in the 
same manner.  On the other, the social and economic conditions favoring the electoral 
success of anti-establishment parties on the left are different from those conditions 
favoring their counterparts on the right.  Thus, although the spark (i.e., value shifts 
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within the electorate) leading to the emergence of anti-establishment parties on both 
sides of the political spectrum, the fuel leading to electoral success is different 
depending on their placement on the spectrum.  The implications of these analyses are 
discussed as the chapter concludes with an eye towards future avenues of research.   
Previous Research Concerning the Electoral Success of Anti-Establishment Parties  
 Institutional, sociological and economic explanations dominate the considerable 
literature concerning the electoral success of anti-establishment parties.  Institutional 
explanations focus on electoral and party system characteristics.  Sociological 
explanations concentrate on value change within the electorate, the emergence of new 
political cleavages, particular social conditions, and numerous others.  Finally, economic 
explanations focus on unemployment, inflation, and labor issues.  This section explores 
these institutional, sociological, and economic explanations offered to account for the 
electoral success, or lack thereof, of anti-establishment parties in Western Europe. 
Institutional Explanations  
 Scholars demonstrate that electoral system characteristics (i.e., electoral or 
“effective” thresholds and the proportionality of the system) affect electoral support for 
anti-establishment parties.  Undoubtedly, electoral system characteristics affect the 
electoral fortunes of all political parties; however, Duverger (1963) argues that plurality 
electoral systems have a “mechanical” and a “psychological” effect that may be 
particularly harmful to new or small parties.  The mechanical effect of the electoral 
system relates to how the electoral system translates or converts votes into seats.  For 
new parties, the task of gaining representation is made less difficult if the electoral 
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system promotes a one-to-one (i.e., more proportionate) translation of votes into seats.  
The psychological effect relates to how the mechanical effect of the electoral system 
shapes voter preferences and party responses to these shifts.  For Duverger (1963: 226), 
voting for non-mainstream parties becomes a fruitless act; “the electors soon realize that 
their votes are wasted if they continue to give them to the third party.”  Thus, voters tend 
to vote for the lesser evil of the two major parties.  In the context of new party success, 
Rochon (1985: 421-422) argues that high thresholds “all but eliminate the possibility of 
a successful party challenge.” Similarly, Jackman and Volpert (1996: 516) conclude, 
“electoral disproportionality (through the mechanism of electoral thresholds) 
increasingly dampens support for the extreme right as the number of parliamentary 
parties expands.” 
Related to electoral system characteristics, party system attributes influence the 
electoral fortunes of anti-establishment parties.  Stemming from the arguments of 
Duverger (1963) and Lijphart (1994) concerning the electoral system, the “effective” 
number of parties competing within the party system, logically, affects the amount of 
electoral support any anti-establishment party can obtain, since parties fight over a finite 
number of seats.  Particularly within the literature concerning far-right, anti-immigrant 
parties, there are two competing hypotheses about the relationship between the 
“effective” number of parties and anti-establishment party support.  As the number of 
parties decreases, the likelihood that a party can gain seats increases since each party can 
gain a greater share of the legislative seats.  However, other scholars hypothesize the 
opposite, arguing that as the number of parties increases, the more likely an anti-
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establishment party (far-right party in their analysis) will emerge in order to gain 
representation (see Jackman and Volpert 1996).  In examining the electoral success of 
far right parties, Jackman and Volpert (1996: 519) find that “multi-partism increasingly 
fosters parties of the extreme right with rising electoral proportionality.”  Thus, the 
likelihood of anti-establishment party support increases as the number of parties 
increases.  
The amount of polarization within the party system is another aspect that factors 
into anti-establishment party electoral success.  In one of the few studies examining anti-
establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum, Abedi (2002) demonstrates 
that anti-establishment parties benefit from a close positioning of establishment parties.  
Thus, as establishment parties converge in their policy positions, anti-establishment 
parties gain electoral support.  Moreover, overall party system polarization does not have 
a strong or consistent independent effect on the electoral fortunes of anti-establishment 
parties (Abedi 2002).  Party system polarization reinforces the effect of converging 
establishment parties as more ideological space is left unoccupied at the edges of the 
political spectrum (Abedi 2002).  Anti-establishment parties therefore have more room 
to maneuver and capture voters within the electoral arena. 
 However, the findings concerning polarization are contradictory.   For example, 
Mair (1995) argues that the lack of distance between the traditional parties serves to 
alienate part of the electorate.  Given changes within the electorate, traditional parties 
find it increasingly difficult to “maintain a separate identity” as they continue to lose 
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their “natural” constituencies (Mair 1995: 49).22  Establishment parties fail to offer the 
electorate distinctly different policies from their establishment competitors.  Thus, voters 
are more receptive to the anti-establishment assertion that all establishment parties are 
the same and, more importantly, to the different policies put forward by anti-
establishment parties.  Kitschelt (1995: 48) supports these claims arguing that conditions 
are more favorable for extreme right party electoral success when “moderate left and 
right parties have converged toward centrist positions and may have cooperated in 
government coalitions.”   
 Ignazi (1992) challenges the conclusions reached by Mair (1995) and Kitschelt 
(1995).  Extreme right parties benefit from increased polarization on both sides of the 
political spectrum as traditional parties of the left react to the emergence of left-
libertarian parties and established parties on the right adopt more neo-conservative 
tendencies (Ignazi 1992).  However, traditional conservative parties risk alienating their 
base supporters if they move further to the right.  As Ignazi (1992: 20) argues, “As it 
moves more and more to the right, leaving its traditional ‘hunting territory’, a potentially 
successful competitor might emerge on its left.  The conservative party risks losing its 
ties to its traditional electorate by moving too much to the right.”  Therefore, even as 
conservative parties move to the right, new parties emerge positioning themselves to the 
right of the conservative parties and engage in “outbidding” the established parties for 
the votes of disaffected segments of the electorate (Ignazi 1992: 20). 
                                                 
22
 “Natural” constituencies can be defined in terms of class, religion, occupation, or region.  The core of 
these “natural” constituencies identify with and belong to a particular party and “would rarely, if ever, 
consider voting for an alternative” (Mair 1995: 49). 
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Sociological Explanations  
As detailed in the first chapter, changes within the value orientations of the 
electorate allow anti-establishment parties to gain a foothold and thrive in the electoral 
arena.  Most often, these shifts are a result of modernization or the emergence of post-
industrial society.  On the right side of the spectrum, Betz (1998: 7) argues that the 
electoral success of far right populist parties in the past two decades is a “result of the 
transition from the postwar system of ‘organized capitalism’ to a system of individual 
capitalism.”  This transition leads to “a dramatic increase in anxieties, insecurity, and 
pessimism about the future” which, in turn, leads to a “pronounced decline in public 
faith in the established parties, politicians, and the political process in general” (Betz 
1998: 7).  Kitschelt (1995) reinforces these claims arguing that extremist parties, 
particularly on the right, often flourish during periods of transition (i.e., from industrial 
to post-industrial society).   
Alber (1989) contends that this same phenomenon occurs on the left side of the 
spectrum with the emergence and success of Greens parties.  Educational mobilization 
and state penetration are two central processes of modernization, which serve to 
restructure the traditional cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan (Alber 1989).  
Changes within these traditional cleavage structures facilitate shifts in the value 
orientation and a decline in partisan loyalties within the electorate.  Ignazi (1996) argues 
that “New Politics” parties emerge from the structural changes associated with post-
industrial society.  Moreover, Taggart argues that changes within the party systems of 
Western Europe assist anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum: 
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[I]t is possible to see a very clear trend: ‘New’ Protest parties of both left 
and right have flourished on the fertile source of flux in West European 
politics. On the left the New Politics parties of a green and alternative hue 
have colonised the margins of parliamentary protest, and on the right a 
new breed of ‘New Populist’ parties have colonised the opposite margins. 
By examining the New Politics parties and the New Populists, we can 
trace the contours of protest in contemporary West Europe. (1996: 12)   
 
As the modernization process alters the traditional cleavage structures and value 
orientations of the electorate, anti-establishment parties thrive in the electoral arena. 
 Another factor, interrelated to the processes of modernization, utilized to explain 
the electoral success of anti-establishment parties, is the development of new cleavages.  
Inglehart (1977, 1990) and Abramson and Inglehart (1995) argue that the emergence of 
the “New-Politics” cleavage is a result of fundamental change of the value orientations 
of the electorate within advanced industrial democracies.  Due to the affluence and 
prosperity of the Western world in the post-World War II era, shifts occurred in the 
value priorities from one generation to the next (Inglehart 1977, 1990).  Thus, the 
generations that grew up before and during the Second World War concerned 
themselves with securing their basic material needs; however, the generation that 
followed granted a higher priority to postmaterialist values emphasizing quality-of-life 
issues (Abramson and Inglehart 1995; Inglehart 1977, 1990).  As detailed in the first 
chapter, numerous scholars employ this argument to explain the emergence and 
electoral success of anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum (for 
example, see Ignazi 1992; Kitschelt 1995; Taggart 1996).       
Previous studies identify specific social conditions that influence anti-
establishment party support, particularly on the right side of the spectrum.  Betz (1994) 
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argues that the main planks of the far right party platform concern immigration and 
crime and these two major issues separate far right parties from the mainstream, 
traditional parties on the right.  Immigration is a very salient issue for anti-establishment 
parties on the right.  Far right parties usually adopt xenophobic platforms playing to the 
fears of alienated voters within the electorate.  Kitschelt (1995: 1) states, “[T]he 
contemporary extreme right is a single-issue racist and xenophobic backlash against the 
multi-culturalization of Western European societies caused by the influx of immigrants.”  
Numerous scholars hypothesize that rising immigration rates facilitate growing support 
for far right parties among Western European electorates (for examples of cross-national 
studies, see Golder 2003b, Jackman and Volpert 1996, Knigge 1998 and Lubbers, 
Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002).23  
High crime rates are yet another factor numerous scholars link to the electoral 
success of anti-establishment parties on the right.  Betz (1993a, 1993b), Lubbers and 
Scheepers (2000), and Swyngedouw (1998) demonstrate crime to be an important issue 
to the far right.  Gibson (2002) argues high levels of crime, often in conjunction with 
higher levels of immigration, lead to a feeling of social insecurity within the electorate.  
Gibson (2002: 104) contends, “concerns about immigrants and crime could be a practical 
matter relating to one’s physical and material security.”  Although all parties, to some 
                                                 
23
 In numerous case studies including studies of Austria (Knight 1992, Riedlsperger 1998), Belgium 
(Fitzmaurice 1992), France (Bréchon and Mitra 1992, Fysh and Wolfreys 1992, Mayer 1998), Italy 
(Furlong 1992, Sidoti 1992), the Netherlands (Voerman and Lucardie 1992) and Scandinavian countries 
(Arter 1992), immigration was found to be a tailor-made issue for the far right.  In their studies of 
Germany, Betz (1990, 1993a), Chapin (1997), Lubbers and Scheepers (2000), Minkenburg (1992), and 
Westle and Niedermayer (1992), each found high rates of immigration to be favorable to parties of the far 
right.  It should also be noted that immigration and unemployment have often been linked together in these 
case studies as well as cross-national studies of the far right.  
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extent, campaign on law and order issues, right anti-establishment parties seize upon the 
sense of social insecurity created by higher crime rates and immigration.  Thus, as both 
levels of crime and immigration continue to increase over the past two decades, anti-
establishment parties of the right continue to flourish. 
Economic Explanations 
The condition of the economy affects the amount of support garnered by anti-
establishment parties.  However, on the right side of the political spectrum, the literature 
produces contradictory findings.  Numerous studies demonstrate that far right parties 
benefit from poor economic conditions (i.e., high levels of unemployment) (for example, 
see Golder 2003b, Jackman and Volpert 1996, and Kitschelt 1995).  These studies often 
conclude, as Jackman and Volpert (1996: 519) do, that “higher rates of unemployment 
provide a favorable environment for these political movements.”  For Kitschelt (1995: 
1), the far right “represents a revival of fascist and national socialist ideology in the 
midst of an economic crisis with high unemployment.” 
Despite these findings, Knigge (1998) finds that as economic conditions worsen, 
levels of electoral support for anti-establishment parties actually decrease.  Givens (2005) 
finds that higher levels of unemployment lead to higher levels of support for far right 
parties in Austria and France, but this relationship does not hold in Germany.  These 
contradictory findings are possibly due to the fact that many studies of extreme right 
parties suffer from methodological problems relating to selection bias.  According to 
Golder (2003a: 435), these studies “suffer from potential selection bias because they 
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ignore countries where extreme right parties are nonexistent or where their electoral 
support is extremely limited.”24   
On the left side of the spectrum, economic conditions are linked to individuals’ 
capabilities to pursue left-libertarian or postmaterialist goals (see Inglehart 1977, 1990; 
Kitschelt 1988).  As individuals become more secure economically, they are able to shift 
their attention from materialist to postmaterialist goals.  Thus, more affluent countries, as 
measured by income levels per capita or levels of gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita, see significant levels of left-libertarian party support (Kitschelt 1988; Redding 
and Viterna 1999).  Kitschelt (1988: 206) argues that “there is a strong and significant 
correlation between income levels and electoral support” for anti-establishment parties 
of the left.  Similarly, Redding and Viterna (1999) demonstrate that left-libertarian 
parties are more successful in countries with higher levels of GDP per capita.25    
These are but a few of the various explanations for the electoral success of anti-
establishment parties in Western Europe.  However, most of these studies focus on only 
one side of the political spectrum, neglecting the other, or examine only a subset of the 
full distribution of anti-establishment parties.  Thus, although these studies contribute 
greatly to our understanding of the anti-establishment party phenomenon, we are still left 
                                                 
24
 Knigge (1998) examines far right parties in six Western European countries (i.e., Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, and West Germany.) Likewise, Givens (2005) covers a range of electoral 
success for far right parties; however, she only covers Austria, Denmark, Germany, and France.  Thus, 
these studies exclude the full distribution of far right parties by ignoring countries where these parties are 
nonexistent or where they fail to win seats at the national level. 
25
 In relation to electorally successful left anti-establishment parties, GDP per capita is less influential than 
other variables (i.e., high social security expenditures).  Redding and Viterna (1999) argue that this lack of 
a strong influence of GDP per capita may be explained by their case selection.  In advanced nations, GDP 
per capita may have reached a threshold by which its influence is not longer significant. Thus, the real 
impact of GDP per capita, as it relates to electoral success of left anti-establishment parties, should be seen 
in developing nations (i.e., Eastern European democracies).     
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with an incomplete picture.  Furthermore, even though there are many cross-national 
examinations of anti-establishment parties, this literature still lacks broad theoretical 
expectations or conclusions to help explain the variation in the amount of electoral 
success garnered by anti-establishment across the various countries of Western Europe.     
Contributions to the Literature  
 This chapter makes two important contributions to this literature.  First, this 
chapter offers a unified theoretical framework to examine the electoral success of anti-
establishment parties.  As outlined in the previous section, the majority of previous 
research paints an incomplete and inaccurate portrait of anti-establishment party 
electoral success by focusing on only a subset of these parties.  However, as quoted 
earlier, Ignazi (1992:6) argues that anti-establishment parties are “the legitimate and 
unwanted children of the New Politics” while Taggart (1996: 49-50) asserts that these 
parties “have their bases in common factors.”  Despite these assertions, the literature 
fails to adequately investigate the electoral success of anti-establishment on both sides of 
the political spectrum within a single, unified theoretical framework.  This constitutes 
the first contribution of this chapter. 
The second contribution made by this chapter relates to the more extensive and 
more detailed analyses of the electoral success of anti-establishment parties.  As 
discussed in the first chapter, anti-establishment parties, regardless of their placement on 
the political, emerged due to the same catalysts, namely a shift within the value 
orientation of the electorate and disillusionment with the party system and parties of the 
establishment.  Yet, whether anti-establishment party electoral success (both left and 
  
49 
right parties) is fueled by the same factors (i.e., institutional environment, economic and 
social conditions), remains to be examined.  Given the fact that many of the factors 
detailed above not only explain the electoral fortunes of a particular subset (i.e., left-
libertarian or far-right, populist) of anti-establishment parties but also contribute to the 
electoral success of anti-establishment parties in general, a unified analysis of the 
electoral success of these parties would seem warranted.  To further examine the 
assertions of Ignazi (1992) and Taggart (1996), the analyses in this chapter disaggregate 
the electoral support for anti-establishment parties.  Thus, this chapter can determine if 
support for anti-establishment parties of the left is indeed rooted in the same factors as 
support for anti-establishment parties of the right.  Moreover, these analyses examine a 
wider range of factors, including new factors, than previous studies of anti-establishment 
party electoral success.    
Political Opportunity Structures: Theoretical Orientation and Hypotheses 
 Political opportunity theory provides the core theoretical orientation for 
explaining variations in the electoral success of anti-establishment parties (see Meyer 
and Minkoff 2004 and Arzheimer and Carter 2006).  The basic premise underpinning 
political opportunity theory is that exogenous factors “enhance or inhibit prospects for 
mobilization, for particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather than others, for 
particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and for movements to affect 
mainstream institutional politics and policies” (Meyer and Minkoff 2004: 1457-1458).  
Thus, political opportunity theories emphasize exogenous conditions for party success in 
contrast to actor-centered theories of success (Tarrow 1998: 18).  For the purposes of 
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this chapter, the exogenous factors of the institutional environment, macro-level 
socioeconomic conditions, the reaction (or lack thereof) of the political actors with the 
party system to a changing political environment, and the ability (or inability) of 
establishment parties to satisfy the needs of the voting public all create the opportunity 
for anti-establishment parties to be successful in the political arena.  These factors either 
enhance or inhibit the opportunities for anti-establishment parties to disseminate their 
message and mobilize voters in their favor.     
First, the institutional arrangements of the system (i.e., electoral system and party 
system characteristics) influence the opportunities for anti-establishment parties to 
garner electoral support.  Lijphart (1994) argues that legal and “effective” electoral 
thresholds (due to the lack of a one-to-one translation of votes to seats) impede smaller 
parties from garnering electoral support and gaining representation.  Under more 
proportional electoral systems, political entrepreneurs have greater incentives to enter 
the electoral arena and voters have more incentive to support anti-establishment parties 
(see, for example, Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Blais and Carty 1991, and Duverger 
1963).  By contrast, less proportional electoral systems deter leaders of anti-
establishment parties from fielding candidates or attempting to mobilize voters 
(Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Jackman and Volpert 1996).  Furthermore, in 
disproportional systems, voting for minor parties becomes a fruitless act as “electors 
soon realize that their votes are wasted if they continue to give them to the third party, 
whence their natural tendency to transfer their vote to the less evil of its two adversaries” 
(Duverger 1963: 226).  Thus, voters are discouraged from voting for these parties given 
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their chances for gaining representation (Arzheimer and Carter 2006).  From these 
arguments, I hypothesize that more proportional electoral systems provide a greater 
opportunity for anti-establishment to garner electoral support. 
H2.1: The more the electoral system promotes a one-to-one translation of 
votes to seats, the more likely anti-establishment parties are to gain 
electoral support 
 
The second party system characteristic of interest is the “effective” number of 
parties within the system.  Disproportionality discourages multiple parties from 
emerging within the party system (Duverger 1963; Lijphart 1994; Sartori 1976).  As 
Lijphart (1994: 76) notes, “disproportionality affects the degree of multipartism, but 
multipartism can in turn affect the degree of disproportionality.”  Thus, 
disproportionality and multipartism are interdependent.26  Duverger (1963) and Sartori 
(1976) emphasize that the degree of multipartism varies considerably given the variety 
of proportional representation systems (i.e., different formulas).  Therefore, the 
relationship between the number of political parties within the system and support for 
anti-establishment parties needs further exploration.  This examination will provide a 
direct test of the competing hypotheses, mentioned above, concerning this relationship.  
Despite these competing hypotheses, the analysis below tests the proposition that 
multipartism provides a greater opportunity for leaders of smaller parties (i.e., anti-
establishment parties) to mobilize electoral support than would be afforded them in 
disproportional systems.  Given the arguments of Duverger (1963), Sartori (1976), and 
                                                 
26
 Lijphart (1994) notes that the correlation between disproportionality and the “effective" number of 
parliamentary parties is -0.45 for the seventy electoral systems in his analysis. Although the correlation 
has the expected sign, the relationship should not be characterized as strong (Jackman and Volpert 1996). 
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Lijphart (1994), I argue that as the number of political parties increases, it is more likely 
that anti-establishment parties will emerge and garner electoral support. 
H2.2: As the “effective” number of parties increases within the party 
system, the more likely anti-establishment parties are to garner 
electoral support 
 
 Another factor creating the opportunity for anti-establishment parties to garner 
electoral support is the inability, or perceived inability, of establishment parties to solve 
the economic and social problems plaguing the nations of Western Europe.  Mair (1995: 
46) argues that “changing international circumstances” reduce the ability of 
establishment parties to pursue policy goals to solve the main economic and social 
problems within their respective countries.  “The freedom of manouevre of national 
states and national governments is therefore severely constricted, and the scope of 
partisan discretion is correspondingly curtailed” (Mair 1995; 46).27  Betz (1994: 41) 
furthers these claims asserting that a number of surveys “tracking support for the 
political system” demonstrate that: 
a growing number of citizens appear not only to believe that the 
established political class is no longer able to solve the most basic 
problems, but that politicians generally are too absorbed with themselves 
to be able to adapt to a rapidly changing world.  Recent opinion polls 
abound in accusations that political parties and politicians are self-
centered and completely oblivious to the problems they are supposed to 
solve. A growing number of voters charge politicians with lacking the 
competence, integrity, and vision necessary to respond effectively to the 
                                                 
27
 Mair (1995: 46-47) further asserts that these changes to the international environment have “two 
immediate effects on the capacity of parties in government to act as representative agencies.  In the first 
place, the responses of national governments to political and economic problems increasingly tend to be 
influenced by international as well as local pressures, and hence they cannot always respond to domestic 
demands in a way, which fully satisfies the local interests on which they depend for their legitimacy and 
authority.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, the increasing complexity of the global economy leads 
to severe problems for the monitoring and control of the policy-making process, and hence undermines the 
capacity for effective and authoritative action.” 
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most urgent problems, be they environmental degradation, soaring 
unemployment, rising crime, or mass immigration.  
 
Eatwell (2003: 69) contends that trust, defined as “feelings about the ability of the 
economic and political system to deliver desired goods,” is declining within the 
electorate of Western Europe since World War II (see chapter I for further discussion).  
The inability of establishment parties to cure the economic and social ills of society in 
conjunction with a general decline in the trust of political parties and the mechanics of 
the political system provide anti-establishment parties with the opportunity to mobilize 
the electorate in their favor (see Eatwell 2003). 
For the purposes of this analysis, the political opportunity structures created by 
the inability of the establishment parties to solve problems are examined utilizing the 
economic and social conditions of a particular country.  As the economic and social 
problems persist within Western Europe, voters will increasingly look to other 
alternatives to solve these problems.  Gibson (2002) argues that these conditions foster a 
feeling of insecurity, whether it is economic or social insecurity, and therefore, anti-
establishment parties garner electoral support.  Thus, these arguments of Betz (1994), 
Eatwell (2003), Gibson (2002), and Mair (1995) prompt the following hypotheses:  
H2.3: As economic conditions worsen, the more likely anti-establishment 
parties are to gain electoral support 
 
H2.4: As social conditions deteriorate, the more likely anti-establishment 
parties are to gain electoral support 
 
 Related to the effects of economic conditions, the wealth or, more importantly, 
affluence of a country influences the amount of electoral support anti-establishment 
parties can garner.  From the arguments of Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1990; see also Chapter 
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I), it is argued that as the affluence within a country increases, the more likely voters are 
to embrace postmaterialist values and, therefore, vote for anti-establishment parties, 
particularly on the left side of the political spectrum.  Taking the arguments outlined in 
the first chapter, the shift from materialist to postmaterialist values within the electorate 
prompted a movement of the established parties to the left.  In turn, anti-establishment 
parties emerged on the right side of the political spectrum to fill the vacuum that resulted 
from this shift (Ignazi 1992).  Anti-establishment parties are able to capitalize on the 
postmaterialist movement garnering electoral support from an alienated voter base (see 
Ignazi 1992).  Therefore, I hypothesize that as the level of affluence increases, anti-
establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum will gain electoral support.   
H2.5: As affluence within a country increases, the more likely anti-
establishment parties are to gain electoral support 
 
Political opportunity structures also emerge from the cooperation or collusion of 
establishment parties within the system at the expense of anti-establishment parties.  
This line of argument stresses that collusion undermines the legitimacy of establishment 
parties and their leaders and facilitates the emergence of challengers in the form of anti-
establishment parties (Abedi 2004; Mair 1995).  As explained in the first chapter, anti-
establishment parties campaign that there is no distinction between parties of the 
establishment; essentially, establishment parties are all the same.  Katz and Mair (1995: 
24) argue that anti-establishment parties “appear to be gaining great mileage from their 
assumed capacity to break up what they often refer to as ‘cosy’ arrangements that exist 
between established political alternatives.”  Thus, established parties are “often 
unwittingly providing precisely the ammunition” with which anti-establishment parties 
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can make inroads into the political arena (Katz and Mair 1995: 24).  The actions of 
established parties help to legitimate the protest and appeals of anti-establishment parties 
(see Abedi 2004).   
Established political parties, in order to ensure their own survival, alter ballot 
access requirements (i.e., recognition of candidates and monetary deposits to place 
candidates on the ballot) hindering the ability on new or smaller parties to gain electoral 
support (Katz 1997).  Mair (1995) and Katz and Mair (1995) argue that ballot access 
restrictions are incorporated into electoral laws in order to shield establishment parties 
for new competitors.  As Katz and Mair (1995: 16) argue in their description of a 
“cartel” party: 
The state, which is invaded by the parties, and the rules of which are 
determined by the parties, becomes a fount of resources through which 
these parties not only help to ensure their own survival, but through 
which they can also enhance their capacity to resist challenges from 
newly mobilized alternatives.  The state, in this sense, becomes an 
institutionalized structure of support, sustaining insiders while excluding 
outsiders.  
 
Furthermore, Mair and Katz (1997) argue that campaign finance regulations 
function to protect established political cartels as parties in office utilize their control 
over the allocation of campaign resources to deter challengers.  Due to the fact that state 
subventions (i.e., campaign resources) are tied to prior electoral performance, defined in 
terms of electoral success or parliamentary representation, “they help to ensure the 
maintenance of existing parties while at the same time posing barriers to the emergence 
of new groups” (Mair and Katz 1997:106).   
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These appeals concerning collusion among establishment parties gain leverage as 
anti-establishment parties campaign that all establishment parties, be they in government 
or in opposition, are the essentially the same.  In order to distinguish themselves from 
one another, establishment parties must provide distinct alternatives to the electorate.  
However, Mair (1995: 51) argues that in contemporary politics, the “capacity of 
individual parties to maintain a distinct, and hence also a distinct purpose” diminishes 
greatly.  Moreover, differences between establishment parties “are less easily identified, 
especially by voters, and ostensible protagonists may often be lumped together as 
constituent elements of a more or less undifferentiated political class” (Mair 1995:51).  
Thus, mainstream parties are vulnerable, as are the electorate, to so-called “anti-party” 
appeals of anti-establishment parties (see Mair 1995).  Kitschelt (1995: 48) supports 
these claims arguing that the environment is more favorable for anti-establishment 
parties on the right if “moderate left and right parties have converged toward centrist 
positions and may have cooperated in government coalitions.”  Hainsworth (1992: 11) 
contends that anti-establishment parties benefit from “situations where the ideological 
distance between the major parties was reduced, thereby creating a vacuum” at the 
extremes of the political spectrum.  The amount of ideological distance (i.e., polarization) 
between establishment parties decreases as they continue to cooperate with each other to 
stave off the challenge of anti-establishment parties.  As this occurs, voters tend to see 
all establishment parties as part of the same political machine.  In turn, this creates the 
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opportunity for anti-establishment parties to succeed.28  From this discussion, I 
hypothesize: 
H2.6: The more establishment parties collude, the more likely anti-
establishment parties are to gain electoral support 
 
H2.7: As the amount of polarization between the establishment parties 
decreases, the more likely anti-establishment parties are to gain 
electoral support 
 
Finally, partisan dealignment and the failure of establishment parties to meet the 
representational needs of the electorate create another political opportunity for anti-
establishment parties to gain electoral support.  Bartolini and Mair (1990) argue that the 
“electoral availability” of voters increases given the changes within the electorate over 
the past four decades (see Chapter I).  The symptoms of this dealignment are increased 
electoral volatility, increased levels of electoral abstention, decreased vote share for 
established parties, and a decline in party membership for more established parties (see 
Abedi 2004, Bartolini and Mair 1990, and Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984).  Each of 
these “symptoms” benefits anti-establishment parties; as voters become less attached to 
established parties (i.e., disillusioned voters), the electorate is more likely to look for 
viable alternatives in order to meet their representational needs.  Anti-establishment 
parties take advantage of this political opportunity structure by mobilizing new voters as 
well as attracting disillusioned voters.  Therefore, I argue that: 
H2.8: As voter turnout increases, the more likely anti-establishment 
parties are to gain electoral support 
 
                                                 
28
 Ignazi (1992) challenges this claim arguing that increased party system polarization creates an enlarged 
space at the poles of the political spectrum for anti-establishment parties to succeed.   
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H2.9: As electoral volatility increases, the more likely anti-establishment 
parties are to gain electoral support 
 
Altogether, these nine hypotheses are designed to investigate the conditions that 
create the political opportunity structures that allow all anti-establishment parties to find 
electoral success.  However, as will be shown below, it is necessary to disaggregate the 
total electoral success of anti-establishment parties into support for left and support for 
right anti-establishment parties.  It is necessary to do this in order to further examine the 
assertion made by Taggart (1996:49) that parties of “the New Populism and the New 
Politics have their bases in common factors.”  While indeed this may be true concerning 
their emergence, anti-establishment parties of the left and right may owe their electoral 
successes to different factors.  
Data and Methods 
 These hypotheses are tested utilizing data from national parliamentary elections 
between 1970 and 2005 in eighteen Western European countries.  The dependent 
variable for this analysis is the vote share of all anti-establishment parties (i.e., left-
libertarian, ecology, populist, anti-immigrant parties, etc.) regardless of their placement 
on the political spectrum.  To measure the effects of the electoral system, this analysis 
employs three variables: the “effective” threshold, the least squares index, and the 
“effective” number of parties.  Taken from Lijphart (1994), “effective” thresholds are 
the minimum percentage of votes, given district magnitude, needed for a party to gain 
seats in the legislature (Lijphart 1994).29  The intent of this measure is to take the 
                                                 
29
 “Effective” thresholds are calculated using the following formula: Teff = (50% / M + 1) + (50% / 2M), 
where M denotes the average district magnitude.  In the cases in which the legal electoral threshold 
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characteristics of the electoral system, capturing the “upper” and “lower” thresholds a 
party or candidate could receive under the most adverse and favorable conditions, and 
translate them into an equivalent threshold that would have the same effect as if this 
“effective” threshold were a legal electoral threshold (Powell and Vanberg 2000).  The 
least squares index measures the level of disproportionality of any electoral outcome (i.e., 
election), or the difference between the percentage of votes received and the percentage 
of seats any party gets within the legislature.30  To measure the extent of multipartism, 
this research makes use of the “effective” number of parties index developed by Laakso 
and Taagepera (1979), which takes into account the relative size of the competing parties 
in a given electoral system.31   
 The levels of inflation and unemployment as well as the gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita, respectively, measure the economic conditions and affluence of a 
particular country.32  Given the hypotheses above, each of these variables should have a 
positive coefficient.  To assess the social conditions within a particular country, the 
                                                                                                                                                
exceeds the effective threshold as in the case of Denmark, the legal threshold is considered the effective 
threshold.  The data necessary to calculate “effective” thresholds were taken from Lijphart (1994), Golder 
(2003a), and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (www.ipu.org).   
30
 This measure involves taking the square root of half the sum of the squares of the difference between 
vote percentage and seat percentage for each political party with a given system.  The formula for this 
index is the square of one-half times 2
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 where Vi is the percentage of the vote received by the 
ith party and Si is the percentage of seats garnered by the ith party in a given election. 
 
31
 The “effective” number of parliamentary parties is calculated as follows: ENPP = 1/Σvi2 , where vi is the 
fractional share of votes of the ith party (Laakso and Taagepera 1979).  The data used to calculate this 
index were taken from Mackie and Rose (1991, 1997) and the “Parties and Elections in Europe” website 
maintained by Wolfram Nordsieck (www.parties-and-elections.de/). 
32
 The data used to calculate these measurements were collected from the World Development Indicators 
2006 statistical database maintained by the World Bank.  The unemployment rate is the percentage of the 
total labor force that is unemployed in an election year.  The inflation rate is the average change in the 
consumer price index for the year of the election.  
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analysis uses the levels of immigration and crime.33  The coefficients for these indicators 
should be positive. 
To examine the political opportunity structures created by collusion between 
traditional parties within the political system, the analysis incorporates two separate 
variables: ballot access requirements and state support to candidates and parties.34  
 The second variable measuring collusion incorporates two provisions of state 
support: free broadcasting time and the state funding campaigns.35  Katz (1997) 
interprets the allocation of free broadcasting time and state funding based on prior 
electoral performance as an indication of establishment parties colluding to ensure their 
own survival while obstructing any potential electoral challenge for smaller parties.  
To measure the ideological distance or polarization between establishment 
parties, this analysis utilizes the polarization measure developed by Maoz (2006).   
Polarization is a complex measure that must take into account the number, structure, 
cohesion, size, and amount of overlap between various groups within a given population.  
According to Maoz (2006), previous measures of polarization fail to account for the fact 
                                                 
33
 Data for these two variables were collected from various issues of Trends in International Migration 
published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1992-2005) and the 
International Crime Statistics volumes published by Interpol (1970-2005). 
34
 Data concerning ballot access requirements and state support of parties and candidates were collected 
from Katz (1997).  Ballot access requirements are measured on a 1 to 5 scale with 1indicating no 
requirements and 5 indicating numerous or a higher level of requirements (i.e., a high level to overcome in 
order to place candidates on the ballot).  Ballot access requirements may include a petition of members of 
parliament or signatures of voters for the recognition of a candidacy and/or an electoral deposit with 
conditions for the return of that deposit (Katz 1997).      
35
 State support for candidates is measured on a 1 to 5 scale with 1 indicating no restrictions placed on 
state support for parties and 5 indicating numerous or higher restrictions on state support.  These 
restrictions may include reserving broadcast time solely for parties already represented in parliament or 
basing financial support on performance in the previous election.  Data concerning state support of parties 
and candidates were collected from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA).   
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that these attributes may interact; therefore, changes in polarization are not linear in 
nature.  The measure of polarization utilized by these analyses integrates all of these 
properties into a single measure of polarization.  For this reason, Maoz (2006) argues, 
and demonstrates, that this index offers the best measure for polarization for these 
particular analyses.36 
Voter turnout and electoral volatility are used to examine how the “electoral 
availability” of voters affects the electoral success of anti-establishment parties (see 
Bartolini and Mair 1990).  As a measure of waning partisan ties, and therefore the 
“electoral availability” of voters, this analysis employs the electoral volatility indicator 
developed by Pedersen (1979).  Electoral volatility measures the net electoral change 
within the party system resulting from individual vote transfers.37  Thus, this measure 
captures the amount of “vote switching” within the electorate as partisan loyalties 
weaken.  The descriptive statistics for each of these variables are summarized in Table 
2.1. 
                                                 
36
 This measure takes into account the thirteen policy categories with both positive and negative positions 
from the Comparative Manifesto Project.  For a more detailed discussion of this index, see Maoz (2006).  
It must be noted that scholars question the use of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data for the 
purposes of determining party positions.  Harmel, Janda and Tan (1995: 10) argue that using CMP data “as 
a gauge of issue position would be a highly risky venture.”  However, given data constraints and the 
number of countries included in these analyses, this measure provides a rough indicator for polarization 
necessary for these analyses.   
37
 This measure of electoral volatility is derived in the following manner: If we let pi,t stands for the 
percentage of the vote, which was obtained by party i at election t, then the change in the strength of i 
since the previous election will be: ∆pi,t = pi,t - pi,t- 1 and if we do not consider sign differences, the 
following relation exists for the party system: Total Net Change (TNCt) = it
n
i
p∆Σ
=1
, 0 ≤ TNCt ≤ 200 where 
n stands for the total number of parties competing in the two elections. Logically, the net gains for winning 
parties are numerically equal to the net losses of the parties that were defeated in the election. Thus, one 
may use another indicator which is slightly easier to calculate and to interpret, namely: Volatility (Vt) = ½ 
x TNCt , 0 ≤ TNCt ≤ 100 where Vt is simply the cumulated gains for all winning parties in the party system 
or, if you prefer, the numerical value of the cumulated losses for all losing parties. Its range has a 
straightforward explanation and it can be expressed in terms of percentage (Pedersen 1979). 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Anti-Establishment Party  
Support 12.19 10.14 0 77.4 
Anti-Establishment Party  
Support (Left) 7.33 7.02 0 35.9 
Anti-Establishment Party  
Support (Right) 4.86 6.29 0 44.8 
“Effective” Threshold 8.64 10.09 0.7 35 
Disproportionality  4.54 4.17 0.4 22.2 
“Effective” Number of Parties 4.49 1.59 2.3 10.3 
Inflation 7.59 8.74 0.1 76.2 
Unemployment 5.11 3.02 0.1 16.6 
GDP per capita  18042.5 7596.9 5507.5 48419.3 
Immigration 5.28 6.46 0.2 37.2 
Crime 5.05 3.10 0.2 13.9 
Ballot Restrictions  2.89 1.46 1 5 
State Support  3.08 1.16 1 5 
Polarization  0.24 0.14 0 0.6 
Voter Turnout 79.83 11.23 42.2 96.3 
Electoral Volatility  11.10 7.36 0.9 46.7 
Note: N = 179 
 
 
 
Given that standard regression models assume fixed intercepts across states and 
uncorrelated error terms, these models are inadequate for analyzing cross-sectional data.  
Rather than attempting to specify a laundry list of additional country-specific factors, or 
incorporating dichotomous variables for each country, which may affect the estimates, 
the analyses below employ a panel-estimated approach.  Specifically, the models within 
these analyses utilize a random effects model (grouped by country), which accounts for 
country-specific effects that are likely to be present in the error term (Wooldridge 2001).  
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In other words, the random effects model accounts for latent factors that are likely to 
persist within countries, but not between countries, across time.  The disaggregated 
analyses employ two separate random effects models incorporating the same 
independent variables as the unified analysis.38  The Hausman specification test, testing 
the appropriateness of this specification or model, indicates that the random effects 
model is indeed appropriate for these analyses.  For each of these analyses, the unit of 
analysis is the election year for national parliamentary elections.   
Party Stability and Party Support  
 Arguably, the greatest single predictor of electoral success for any party is the 
electoral success of the party in previous elections.  Given this, one might argue it is 
necessary (both methodologically and theoretically) to include a lagged dependent 
variable in order to control for previous support and overcome the methodological 
problem of omitted variable bias (see Clarke 2005). Researchers often put forth “bloated 
specifications” justified by the “fear that omitted relevant variables will bias the results” 
(Clarke 2005: 341).  However, Clarke (2005: 350) argues, “by including additional 
control variables in our specifications, we could very easily be making the bias on the 
coefficient of interest worse.”  Instead, we can ameliorate this problem, at least in part, 
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 Although anti-establishment parties compete for a finite number of voters against all political parties, 
the argument that anti-establishment parties compete against other anti-establishment parties, despite their 
placement of the political spectrum, for the same group of alienated voters has a logical basis.  That is, 
support for anti-establishment parties on the left is dependent upon, or at least not independent of, support 
for anti-establishment parties on the right.  Given this fact, simultaneous equations, or seemingly unrelated 
regression, would be warranted, and indeed necessary, if the error terms for these two equations were 
correlated.  The correlation between these two models (equations) is 0.1989.  The Breusch-Pagan test of 
independence between these equations was significant with a chi-square statistic of 7.082.  This result 
suggests that anti-establishment parties on the left cater to a different base of voters than anti-
establishment parties on the right (i.e., the two equations are independent).  Furthermore, this provides an 
initial test of the assumption that the anti-establishment parties on the left and right have their bases in 
common factors.      
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by utilizing “narrow, focused, controlled tests of broad theories,” which are “far more 
convincing than a regression equation weighed down by half a dozen control variables” 
(Clarke 2005: 350).   
This methodological reasoning aside, there are at least two empirical reasons for 
not including a lag for previous party support.  First, the stability of traditional 
mainstream parties over the last sixty years in most Western European countries allows 
the electorate, or at least segments of electorate, to develop and maintain partisan 
attachments.  Given the fact that this process may take decades or even generations, it is 
dependent upon the stability of the party.  Yet, this logic may not apply to anti-
establishment parties given their relatively new entrance into the political arena.  Thus, 
these parties may not develop a loyal partisan base within the electorate.  Second, if 
these parties fail to mobilize voters and develop a partisan base, then their stability and 
longevity is severely affected.39   
Anti-establishment parties emerge and contest their first elections in the early 
1970s; therefore, it can be argued that nearly forty years is sufficient time for these 
relatively new entrants to build a loyal partisan base.  Nonetheless, Van der Brug and 
Fennema (2003) argue that some anti-establishment parties garner their support merely 
as protest votes against the establishment.  If this is indeed the case, then the voter base 
for these new challengers is not stable in nature and previous support for anti-
establishment parties would not predict current support for these parties.  
                                                 
39
 It is important to note that the inclusion of a measure for previous support for anti-establishment parties 
does not significantly alter the results of the analyses reported below. 
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More to the point, the perceived nature of anti-establishment parties, particularly 
on the right, as single-issue protest movements, leads to instability.  For example, the 
controversial and charismatic Pim Fortuyn organized Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) just three 
months before the May 15, 2002 Dutch elections around a far-right, anti-immigrant 
platform.  The party gained support in public opinion polls quickly through Fortuyn’s 
forceful debating abilities and criticism of the government under Prime Minister Wim 
Kok.  However, on May 6, a militant animal rights activist, who claimed Fortuyn 
exploited Muslims as “scapegoats” in order to gain political power, assassinated Fortuyn.  
Despite this, the party gained twenty-six seats, becoming the second largest party in the 
Tweede Kamer entering into the first Balkenende cabinet.   
The fortunes of the party quickly changed as public opinion in favor of the party 
vanished within the year.  In the January 2003 elections, the party lost eighteen seats for 
a total of only eight in the Dutch parliament.  In 2006, following years of internal strife 
and a lack of leadership, the party failed to garner enough support to qualify for the 
parliament.  Following a vote of the general assembly, the party ceased national party 
operations on January 1, 2008.  In the span of four and a half years, Lijst Pim Fortuyn 
went from the second largest party in the Dutch parliament to extinction.  This is but one 
illustration of the unstable nature of anti-establishment parties.  The instability of these 
parties is both exacerbated by, and a product of, the instability of its base of support 
within the electorate.40   
                                                 
40
 By way of comparison, the electoral base for anti-establishment parties on the left appears to be more 
stable possibly due to the ideological diversity of these parties since their emergence in the late 1970s.  
Although associated with the environmental movement of the 1970s and 1980s, left libertarian parties 
have not been labeled as “single-issue” parties like their counterparts on the right.  Left libertarian parties 
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More importantly, a lagged dependent variable is not necessary given the 
theoretical basis on these analyses.  The hypotheses developed above are borne out of 
the theory that the opportunity structures created by current institutional arrangements, 
economic and social conditions, and the actions of establishment parties and the 
electorate allow for the electoral success of anti-establishment parties in the current 
election.  Previous support for anti-establishment parties may control for the opportunity 
structures during previous elections, but do not help explain the opportunity structures 
present for anti-establishment parties to garner electoral support in the current election.  
Thus, the exclusion of this variable should not lead to biased coefficients.   
Unified Analysis 
The findings from the unified analysis confirm several of the hypotheses 
delineated above.  The results from the static model, shown in the first column (Model 1) 
of Table 2.2, indicate that anti-establishment parties do take advantage of the political 
opportunity structures created by the electoral system, economic and social conditions, 
the party system, and the actions of establishment parties, and “voter availability” within 
the electorate.  The three variables utilized to test the opportunities created by the 
electoral system are all statistically significant at conventionally accepted levels and in 
the expected direction confirming the first two hypotheses delineated above.  The 
                                                                                                                                                
advocate postmaterialist issues policies concerning the environment, equality, and quality of life.  In turn, 
this ideological diversity has increased the diversity of their electoral base contributing to their stability.  
Analyses including a lagged dependent variable suggest that the electoral base for left-oriented anti-
establishment parties is more stable from election to election than for their counterparts on the right.  An 
examination of the overall R-squared for the analyses indicates that the amount of variance explained by 
previous electoral support is 0.77 for left-oriented anti-establishment parties and 0.18 for anti-
establishment parties on the right.  The difference in these two measures indicates that the stability of anti-
establishment parties significantly influences the stability of their electoral base.  That is, as the stability of 
the party increases, the more variance is explained by their previous electoral support.   
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electoral success of anti-establishment parties is hindered by disproportional electoral 
systems with higher “effective” thresholds.  Thus, these new, or less established, parties 
must overcome high electoral barriers in order to gain representation within the 
legislature.  These findings confirm the earlier works of Duverger (1963), Rochon 
(1985), and Jackman and Volpert (1996). 
 The number of “effective” parties within the system positively influences the 
amount of support for anti-establishment parties.  As the number of parties within the 
system increases, the likelihood of anti-establishment parties receiving support increases.  
Corroborating the conclusion of Jackman and Volpert (1996: 519) that “multipartism 
increasingly fosters parties of the extreme right with rising electoral proportionality,” 
multipartism provides the opportunity for leaders of all anti-establishment parties, 
regardless of their placement on the political spectrum to mobilize a base of electoral 
support.  From these three indicators, it should be apparent that anti-establishment 
parties are clearly affected by the characteristics of the electoral and party system. 
 The measures concerning economic conditions and level of affluence within the 
countries under analysis paint a similar portrait and confirm, at least in part, the related 
third and fifth hypotheses.  However, the findings are somewhat mixed.  Although the 
coefficient for inflation is in the expected direction, it does not reach statistical 
significance.  Whereas this does not conform to the expectations of this analysis, the fact 
that levels of inflation do not influence the voting behavior of the electorate is not 
surprising.  Palmer and Whitten (1999) argue that inflation does not affect voting 
behavior in the same manner as other economic conditions.  If economic actors have 
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rational expectations, inflation should not have real effects on personal economy due to 
the fact that it takes more time for the individual voter to feel the economic effects of 
inflation than other economic conditions such as unemployment (see Palmer and 
Whitten 1999).  Thus, we should not expect the electorate to punish or reward any 
political parties for increases or decreases in the level of inflation.   
In contrast, the level of unemployment significantly influences the level of 
support for anti-establishment parties in the expected positive direction.  As 
establishment parties struggle to solve the economic problems, including high levels of 
unemployment, within many Western European nations, the electorate becomes 
increasingly disillusioned.  In turn, this disillusionment translates into electoral support 
for anti-establishment parties as worsening economic conditions fuel a sense of 
insecurity within the electorate.  These findings are consistent with previous research 
that concludes, “higher rates of unemployment provide a favorable environment for 
these political movements” (Jackman and Volpert 1996: 519; see also Golder 2003b and 
Kitschelt 1995).      
 The social conditions within a country contribute to the electoral success of anti-
establishment parties.  Immigration significantly increases support for anti-establishment 
parties; however, higher levels of crime do not significantly influence electoral success 
of these new entrants into the political arena.  Along with unemployment, these results 
indicate that increased levels of immigration undermine feelings of security within the 
electorate (see Gibson 2002).  At least in part, anti-establishment parties benefit from the 
insecurity of voters created by the inability of established parties to solve the most basic 
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of social problems (see Betz 1994).  This result conforms to previous findings 
concerning the decline in trust, defined as “feelings about the ability of the economic and 
political system to deliver desired goods” (Eatwell 2003: 69), across Western Europe.  
The inability of establishment parties to cure the economic and social ills of society 
creates the structure, which provides anti-establishment parties the opportunity to 
succeed in the electoral arena. 
 For the most part, collusion between parties of the establishment does not lead to 
increased support for anti-establishment parties.  Although the coefficients are in the 
expected direction, the indicators for ballot restrictions and requirements for state 
support do not reach statistical significance.  The attempts of the political establishment 
to thwart the challenges of anti-establishment parties by restricting access to the ballot 
and state support during campaigns does not help these new parties to any significant 
degree as is argued by the sixth hypothesis above.  This suggests that voters are not 
supporting these new parties due to collusion between establishment parties.  The 
measure for the amount of polarization between parties of the establishment reaches 
significance and is in the expected direction.  As the amount of polarization between 
establishment parties decreases, anti-establishment parties are able to gain more electoral 
support.  This suggests that as the ideological profiles of the major established parties 
continue to mirror one another, voters are increasingly turning to the viable electoral 
alternatives embodied by anti-establishment parties.   
  The “electoral availability” of voters significantly influences anti-establishment 
party support in positive manner.  Increased levels of voter turnout and electoral 
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volatility lead to increased levels of electoral support suggesting that anti-establishment 
parties are indeed mobilizing new segments of the electorate and stealing votes from the 
establishment.  As anti-establishment parties continue to offer viable electoral 
alternatives to a disillusioned as well as seemingly disenfranchised electorate, 
establishment parties continue to lose their vote share within the electorate.  This has 
obvious implications for the establishment as well as the larger party system itself.   
Disaggregating the Electoral Success of Anti-Establishment Parties 
Although the above analysis demonstrates that various exogenous factors create 
the political opportunity structures anti-establishment parties need to succeed, it does not 
test the proposition that anti-establishment parties are a single phenomenon as asserted 
by Ignazi (1992), Taggart (1996), and others.  In order to test this assertion, the 
dependent variable for these analyses disaggregates the vote share for anti-establishment 
parties into support for these parties on the left and right, respectively.  The model for 
this analysis incorporates the same variables from the analyses above. 
Investigating the sources of electoral success for left anti-establishment, the 
analysis shown as Model 2 in Table 2.2 indicates that the level of disproportionality 
within the electoral system hampers support for these parties.  That is, in more 
disproportionate electoral systems, left anti-establishment parties find it harder to gain 
support. Consistent with the arguments of Inglehart (1971; 1977; 1990) and Kitschelt 
(1988), higher levels of affluence increase the amount of support for anti-establishment 
parties on the left.  Higher levels of crime also hamper support for left anti-establishment 
parties. This may be due to the fact that voters do not believe these parties can 
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effectively solve the social ills plaguing society. Finally, the amount of polarization 
significantly influences the amount of support left anti-establishment parties. As 
establishment parties converge towards the center, these new entrants gain electoral 
support.  This also suggests that establishment parties can counter the threat from anti-
establishment parties by shifting their position on the political spectrum.  As 
establishment parties move toward the position of left anti-establishment parties, these 
newer parties lose electoral support.        
Examining the support for anti-establishment parties on the right, one can clearly 
see that the opportunity structures that favored the anti-establishment left are not the 
same that favor their counterparts on the right.  As expected, higher “effective” 
thresholds dampen support for anti-establishment parties on the right.  Related to this, as 
the “effective” number of parties increases, the level of support for these parties also 
increases.  Thus, electoral system characteristics influence electoral support in the 
expected manner.  Economic and social conditions also influence, at least in part, 
electoral support in the expected direction.  Higher levels of unemployment and crime 
positively influence support for right-oriented anti-establishment parties.  The remaining 
variables do not reach statistical significance at conventional accepted levels.41  Finally, 
anti-establishment parties on the right benefit from stealing votes from their competitors.  
This is indicated by the significant positive coefficient for the measure of electoral 
volatility.  The results of this analysis are shown as Model 3 in Table 2.2.   
                                                 
41
 Unlike previous analyses of anti-establishment parties on the right (i.e., anti-immigrant parties), this 
analysis does not show that immigration is significant at the .05 level.  The coefficient for this indicator of 
immigration is significant at the .10 level.  The differences in these findings are probably due to 
differences in time periods under analysis as well as the inclusion of different variables. 
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Table 2.2: Determinants of Anti-Establishment Support – Random Effects Model 
 
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
Independent 
Variables  Unified Left Right 
   
 
 
Electoral System 
Characteristics “Effective” Threshold 
-0.47 
(0.26) 
0.05 
(0.18) 
-0.21 
(0.11) 
 
Disproportionality -0.46 (0.22) 
-0.67 
(0.15) 
0.18 
(0.16) 
 
“Effective” Number of Parties 1.29 (0.60) 
-0.27 
(0.41) 
1.35 
(0.41) 
 
    
Economic Conditions Inflation 0.05 (0.06) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
 
Unemployment 0.54 (0.26) 
0.24 
(0.18) 
0.36 
(0.18) 
 
GDP per capita 0.0002  (0.0001) 
0.0003 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
 
 
 
  
Social Conditions Immigration 0.51 (0.30) 
0.02 
(0.21) 
0.18 
(0.15) 
 
Crime 0.14 (0.35) 
-0.40 
(0.24) 
0.45 
(0.24) 
 
    
Collusion Ballot Restrictions 0.20 (2.41) 
0.30 
(1.73) 
0.25 
(0.89) 
 
State Support 0.80 (2.99) 
0.54 
(2.14) 
0.28 
(1.05) 
 
Polarization -10.23 (3.78) 
-8.27 
(2.59) 
-2.37 
(2.92) 
 
 
 
  
Electoral Availability  Turnout 0.18 (0.10) 
0.07 
(0.07) 
0.08 
(0.07) 
 Electoral Volatility 0.23 (0.07) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.16 
(0.05) 
 Constant -15.82 (13.07) 
-0.48 
(9.18) 
-16.89 
(6.83) 
Obs.   179 179 179 
R2 (overall)  0.23 0.02 0.41 
R2 (within)  0.45      0.30 0.40 
R2 (between)  0.18 0.0005 0.48 
Rho  0.84 0.85 0.48 
Note:  Coefficients in bold are significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test).  
           Standard Errors are listed in parentheses. 
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The opportunity structures are indeed different for these two sets of parties.  For 
each set, disproportional electoral systems serve as a detriment to their electoral support 
(although this is indicated by different measures for each).  However, only anti-
establishment parties on the right benefit from having a higher “effective” number of 
parties in the political system.  Left-oriented anti-establishments profit from more 
affluent societies and from less polarization between parties of the establishment.  At the 
same time right-oriented anti-establishment parties benefit from increased electoral 
volatility.  Higher levels of unemployment and crime help foster support for anti-
establishment parties on the right, but higher crime rates significantly dampen support 
for their counterparts on the left. Given the failure of establishment parties to solve the 
economic and social problems within society, voters are turning to electoral alternatives 
on the right. This indicator offers the clearest picture that the support for these two sets 
of parties does not have their bases in common factors.  Crime rates significantly 
influence each set of parties by in clearly opposite directions. 
Implications 
 There are numerous implications stemming from these results.  First, parties of 
the establishment can, for the most part, control the opportunity structures leading to the 
electoral success of anti-establishment parties.  If established parties wish to counter the 
threat from anti-establishment parties, they must limit the opportunities for anti-
establishment parties to garner support.  Establishment parties may alter the electoral 
system to stem the challenges from, or increase the obstacles for, new parties.  More 
disproportional electoral systems favor established parties with established reputations 
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within the electorate.  Duverger (1963) argued that, particularly in disproportional 
electoral systems, voting for non-mainstream parties becomes a fruitless act.  Electoral 
reform, instigated by more established parties, may hamper smaller or new parties from 
entering the electoral arena and gaining access to the political system. 
 Establishment parties may limit further opportunities for new parties by solving, 
or at least attempting to solve, the problems plaguing numerous countries within 
Western Europe.  Although changing international circumstances reduce the ability of 
political parties to pursue policy goals to solve the main economic and social problems 
(see Mair 1995), politicians within establishment parties must demonstrate their 
willingness to solve societal problems.  As Betz (1994) argues, a growing number of 
citizens believe party politicians are too self-absorbed to adapt to a rapidly changing 
world.  “A growing number of voters charge politicians with lacking the competence, 
integrity, and vision necessary to respond effectively to the most urgent problems, be 
they environmental degradation, soaring unemployment, rising crime, or mass 
immigration” (Betz 1994: 41).  The future electoral success of anti-establishment parties 
looks extremely bright as the inability of the establishment to cure the economic and 
social ills of society, in combination with the general decline in the trust of political 
parties, provides the opportunity to mobilize the electorate in favor of new electoral 
alternatives. 
 The actions of establishment parties also contribute to the “electoral availability” 
of voters, which, in turn, allows anti-establishment parties to make major inroads into 
the political marketplace.  As the ideological distance between establishment parties 
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decreases, voters are left without a clear choice between these parties.  Thus, the 
electorate may indeed switch their vote preferences to parties with distinct ideological 
profiles.  Established parties find it more difficult to maintain a distinct identity (see 
Caul and Gray 2000), increasing the availability of voters and fueling support for anti-
establishment parties, as indicated by the statistically significant, positive coefficient for 
the electoral volatility measure.   
In turn, these developments have implications for the larger party system itself.  
Although the effects of this electoral success is examined and discussed in greater detail 
in the next two chapters, several points need to be touched upon here.  Establishment 
parties must shift their placement on the ideological spectrum in order to counter the 
threat from anti-establishment parties providing clearer alternatives to the electorate.  
This also leads to increased polarization within the party system.  Moreover, there is the 
possibility that countering the threat from anti-establishment parties on the extremes of 
the political spectrum may lead to the emergence of new challengers as the established 
parties vacate the middle of the ideological space.  Thus, the electorate witnesses more 
electoral alternatives and increased volatility, which significantly alter the once “frozen” 
party systems of Western Europe.  In turn, this increase in the “effective” number of 
parties and the increased seat share of anti-establishment parties may decrease the 
stability of cabinet government within the legislature.   
Second, and more importantly, all anti-establishment are not created equally; that 
is, anti-establishment parties on the left do not have their bases in common factors with 
their counterparts on the right.  Both left-oriented and right-oriented anti-establishment 
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parties are affected by disproportional electoral systems (albeit by different indicators of 
disproportionality), but the number of “effective” parties only significantly influences 
right-oriented anti-establishment parties.  Thus, the characteristics of the electoral 
system affect different sets of anti-establishment parties in a distinctively dissimilar 
fashion. 
Social and economic conditions offer a similar conclusion.  High levels of 
unemployment significantly affect right anti-establishment parties, but not their 
counterparts on the left.  Similarly, higher levels of affluence, as measured by the level 
of GDP per capita, significantly affect the level of support for left-oriented in a positive 
manner; however, this benefit is not shared by their counterparts on the right.  High 
levels of crime arguably offer the greatest contrast between these two groups of anti-
establishment parties, and therefore, provide the best evidence that the support base for 
different sets of anti-establishment parties differs depending upon ideological 
orientation.  Higher crime rates significantly affect these new entrants, but in opposite 
directions; higher crimes rates reduce electoral support for left-oriented anti-
establishment parties and foster support for their equivalent on the right. 
Collusion between parties of the establishment and the “electoral availability” 
also paint a mixed portrait of anti-establishment party electoral success.  The amount of 
polarization between establishment parties significantly influences these non-mainstream 
parties on the left, but not the right.  The level of volatility within the electorate 
significantly affects these parties on the right, but not the parties on the left.  Once again, 
the opportunity structures created by the actions of establishment parties and the 
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electorate affect the different sets of anti-establishment parties in a distinct manner 
depending upon ideological orientation.    
Whereas these results do not dispute that anti-establishment parties emerge due 
to the same factors (see Chapter I), the factors that fuel their electoral success depend 
upon which side of the political spectrum the party is situated.  Thus, the assertions that 
anti-establishment parties are “the legitimate and unwanted children of the New Politics” 
(Ignazi 1992: 6) or that these parties of “have their bases in common factors” (Taggart 
1996: 49) must be made in reference to their emergence, not their electoral success.  
Given the political opportunity structure differs for parties on the left from parties on the 
right, one might argue that anti-establishment parties emerge due to the same catalyst or 
spark, but owe their electoral success to different types of fuel.     
Conclusion 
  
 Kitschelt (1986: 58) defines political opportunity structures as “specific 
configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for 
social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some 
instances and constrain them in others.”  The analyses in this chapter demonstrate that 
anti-establishment parties do indeed take advantage of the opportunity structures created 
by the configuration of resources (i.e., voter availability) and institutional arrangements 
(i.e., electoral system) within the countries of Western Europe.  These new entrants into 
the political arena benefit from poor economic and social conditions that encourage a 
disaffected electorate to search for electoral alternatives to the more established parties.  
Moreover, as these problems mount, parties of the establishment fail to offer voters a 
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clear choice, as witnessed by anti-establishment parties gaining support as establishment 
parties move closer together on the ideological spectrum.  Thus, anti-establishment 
parties garner support through opportunities that establishment parties can control to 
some extent. 
 The political opportunity structures for anti-establishment parties differ 
depending upon their placement of the ideological spectrum.  Left-oriented anti-
establishment parties garner more support within more proportionate electoral systems, 
more affluent societies, and when there is less ideological distance between the 
establishment parties.  Right-oriented anti-establishment parties gain more support 
within electoral systems with lower “effective” thresholds and more “effective” parties, 
in societies with higher levels of unemployment and crime, and when there is more 
electoral volatility.  Clearly, the conditions that allow anti-establishment parties to 
succeed are not common to both sides of the political spectrum.  Therefore, if the 
assertions that anti-establishment parties have their foundation in common factors 
pertain to their emergence, then they may indeed be correct.  However, if these previous 
assertions concern the electoral success of these new entrants to the political arena, then 
they are clearly wrong.  The political opportunity structures differ greatly depending 
upon which side of the political spectrum the anti-establishment party positions itself. 
 Given the factors for electoral success of anti-establishment parties, traditional, 
mainstream parties may attempt to counter this electoral success by limiting the 
opportunity structures available to these smaller, less-established parties.  The actions 
taken by establishment parties are only one possible consequence of the electoral success 
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of anti-establishment parties.  This electoral success may not only alter the 
organizational structures and policy positions of establishment parties, but the larger 
party system itself as establishment parties react to this growing, and now recognized, 
threat.  The following chapters examine the consequences of this electoral success for 
both individual parties within the same party system as well as the larger party system 
itself in greater detail. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES ON  
 
INDIVIDUAL PARTIES 
 
 
The previous chapters explored the emergence and investigated the factors 
leading to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties.  Despite the vast literature 
concerning the electoral success of anti-establishment parties, the consequences 
stemming from this electoral success remain grossly understudied.  Thus, this chapter 
shifts focus to the consequences of anti-establishment party electoral success.  In 
particular, this chapter examines the effects of anti-establishment parties on other 
political parties competing within their respective party systems.  The emergence of 
these new parties coincides with shifting value orientations of the electorate across 
Western Europe (see Chapter I).  With this change in values, anti-establishment parties 
push new issues and demands to the forefront of the political agenda changing the 
political debate within society. The electoral success of anti-establishment parties allows 
these parties to gain a foothold within the party system.  
This chapter argues that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties forces 
establishment parties to react or face further electoral consequences or worse. Anti-
establishment parties pose organizational and programmatic challenges that traditional 
mainstream parties must address in order to remain viable electoral alternatives in the 
political arena.  Parties – like all large organizations – are reluctant, and sometimes 
unable, to change.  Organizational inertia often makes adaptation difficult, if not 
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impossible.  However, by adapting concepts from organizational theory within the 
discipline of sociology, this chapter asserts that establishment party adaptation is a 
product of external stimuli (i.e., the electoral success of anti-establishment parties in 
combination with poor electoral performance) that threatens the very existence of these 
traditional parties. Utilizing elite interviews and evidence from party manifestos, I argue 
that parties of the establishment (i.e., traditional mainstream parties) alter their 
ideological profiles and organizational structures to counter the growing electoral threat 
from anti-establishment parties.  On relevant policy issues, traditional mainstream 
parties shift their policy position towards the policy positions of anti-establishment 
parties.  However, these analyses find that establishment parties are more reluctant to 
change their organizational structures and strategies in order to counter the anti-
establishment threat.   
The remainder of this chapter is divided into five sections.  The first section 
discusses previous research concerning the effects of anti-establishment parties on other 
competitors within the party system. The second section discusses the contribution this 
chapter makes to this burgeoning literature.  The third section details the theoretical 
orientation of this chapter.  I argue that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties, 
in combination with poor electoral performance, forces traditional parties, albeit 
reluctantly, to adapt or face further consequences.  The data and methods used to 
examine this theoretical orientation are described in the fourth section.  The fifth section 
outlines the results from the analyses conducted in this chapter.  The chapter concludes 
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with a discussion of the implications of this research with an eye toward future research 
concerning the effects of anti-establishment parties on more established parties.  
Previous Research: The Mainstream Reaction to New Parties 
 
 Previous research concerning the effects of anti-establishment parties on 
individual parties focuses on organizational and ideological adaptation of traditional 
mainstream parties.  This burgeoning literature argues that traditional parties react to the 
programmatic, electoral, and organizational challenges posed by these new parties.  
However, Rohrschneider (1993) argues that although established parties react to the 
programmatic and electoral challenges posed by anti-establishment parties, traditional 
parties are less successful in reacting to the organizational challenges of these parties.  
Historically, the emergence of hierarchical and rigid nature of organizational structures 
within Western European political parties is closely related to the evolution of mass 
parties (see Epstein 1980).  New social movements – including anti-establishment 
parties – question the hierarchical, and often oligarchic, leadership structure 
undermining the distribution of power within established parties.  Rohrschneider (1993) 
contends that established parties fail to meet the organizational challenges of these new 
parties because doing so would require traditional parties to devolve power from their 
leadership to rank and file members.  According to Rohrschneider (1993: 169), it is 
considerably easier to integrate new issues into party platforms than to “fundamentally 
reorganize the internal distribution of power” within established political parties. Thus, it 
is easier for traditional mainstream parties to meet the programmatic demands then the 
organizational demand of new social movements.   
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 The majority of previous research focuses on the effects of new parties on the 
policy preferences of established parties.  Harmel and Svåsand (1997) provide evidence 
of more established parties in Denmark and Norway altering their ideological identity to 
counter the electoral threat of anti-immigrant parties.  Focusing on several issues (i.e., 
individual freedoms, taxes, and scope of government), Harmel and Svåsand (1997) use 
evidence from party manifestos to demonstrate the Progress Party in Denmark 
influenced the Social Democrats and Conservatives to change their ideological positions 
on these issues.  Likewise, the Progress Party in Norway affected the Labour Party and 
Conservatives in the same manner.  This evidence supports the conclusion that anti-
establishment parties prompt change by proving to be an electoral threat to these 
traditional mainstream parties. 
 Downs (2001) argues that mainstream parties can react by ignoring these new 
“pariah” parties.  Established parties may also chose to contain these new parties by 
isolating then through legal and political means.  Legal means include outlawing the 
party completely, changing electoral laws (i.e., raising the threshold for representation), 
or controlling the voice of the party by restricting media or ballot access (Downs 2001).  
Political means of containing anti-establishment parties include “blocking” or “grand” 
coalitions “among most or all of the established parties to exclude the pariah from any 
share of executive authority is a frequent tactic” (Downs 2001: 27).  Thus, establishment 
parties form a “circle of isolation” around the anti-establishment party.     
 Downs (2001) further argues there are multiple options established parties may 
choose to engage anti-establishment parties.  First, established parties may co-opt anti-
  
84 
establishment policies expanding the programmatic agenda of the party to directly 
address the issues that allowed the anti-establishment parties to gain electoral success 
(e.g., immigration, taxes, environment, and crime).  Second, and more dramatically, 
established parties can overtly collaborate with anti-establishment parties.  This most 
often happens in the legislative arena with traditional and anti-establishment parties 
voting in support for or against particular pieces of legislation (Downs 2001).  The 
collaboration in the legislative arena may spill over into the executive arena if traditional 
mainstream parties agree to govern in coalition with anti-establishment parties.  
 Established parties deploy these strategies differently depending upon their own 
goals and ambitions.  Politicians seeking reelection in stable electoral markets will often 
ignore or isolate “pariah” parties in an attempt to disengage themselves from these 
parties (Downs 2001).  In more unstable electoral environments, traditional parties “face 
greater pressures to trade principle for expedience and pragmatism and thus seek more 
innovative, engaging tactics for dealing with the pariah party” (Downs 2001: 40).  Thus, 
the electoral fortunes of establishment parties or perceived electoral environment 
influence the reaction particular traditional mainstream parties have to the emergence of 
anti-establishment parties and their subsequent electoral success. 
 Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) argue that political parties shift their policy 
positions in the same direction that their opponents shifted in previous elections.  
Furthermore, parties are particularly responsive to policy shifts by members of their 
“ideological families” (i.e., left-oriented parties responded to other left-oriented parties 
whereas right-oriented parties reacted to other right-oriented parties).  Adams and 
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Somer-Topcu (2009) argue that parties are more responsive to ideological family 
member policy shifts then they are to the policy shifts of other parties within the system.  
Thus, established parties should react to the policy shifts of newer parties (i.e., anti-
establishment parties) on the same side of the political spectrum and vice versa.   
Contributions to the Literature 
 
This chapter aims to broaden the examination of political party adaptation by 
making several contributions to this growing literature.  First, these analyses utilize an 
interdisciplinary approach intertwining political science and sociology.  Using 
organizational theory from the discipline of sociology, this chapter argues that 
organizations must overcome structural inertia in order to adapt to their environment.  
By incorporating organizational theory, this chapter aims to broaden the study of 
political parties, providing a wider theoretical basis.  Organizational theories explain 
how organizations respond to their environment and how these organizations may alter 
that environment to improve their chances for survival.  Further, organizational theories 
help explain how internal and external stimuli affect organizational change.  Thus, by 
combining theories from political science and sociology, these analyses offer a broader 
insight into political party ideological and organizational adaptation in the face of 
external threats to their survival.  
 Second, these analyses broaden previous research concerning the effects of new 
parties on more established parties within Western Europe.  Previous quantitative 
research focuses on cross-national analysis of political party change in Western Europe.  
However, qualitative research of the same nature as these analyses rarely reaches beyond 
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two countries.  This chapter focuses on six countries in Western Europe using elite 
interviews and coding of election platforms of the parties.  Moreover, previous studies 
often utilize data originally meant to examine issue emphasis to examine issue position 
(i.e., Comparative Manifestos Project).  These analyses use original data collected for 
the sole propose of examining issue positions.  Thus, the data examined in this chapter 
measure issue positions not issue emphasis.42    
 In a similar vein, these analyses broaden the study of political change by 
including organizational change as well as programmatic change.  The majority of 
research focused on political party change addresses programmatic change in the face of 
internal and external stimuli (i.e., changes to the leadership or dominant faction, poor 
electoral performance, or the emergence of new competitors).  However, few studies 
focus on adaptation of the organizational structures of political parties in light of these 
stimuli.43  These analyses go beyond previous research by concentrating on both 
ideological and organizational change by political parties in response to the emergence 
and electoral success of anti-establishment parties.    
Theoretical Orientation 
 
 For a democracy to thrive, the interests and demands of its people must be 
satisfied.  The interests of the electorate are aggregated and articulated to the 
government through the vehicle of political parties.  Thus, if a democratic system is to 
                                                 
42
 This distinction is important given the following example:  Party A mentions education in 15 percent of 
their platform.  However, we do not know from the coding of the Comparative Manifestos Project whether 
this 15 percent called for a larger governmental role providing education or less of a governmental role in 
education.  We simply do not know if the party is for or against a particular issue or stance from the 
coding of the Comparative Manifestos Project.  Thus, we truly do not know the position of the party, 
merely the emphasis of the party for this particular issue.  
43
 One notable exception addressing organizational change is Rohrschneider (1993). 
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survive and remain stable, its political parties must remain vibrant and its party system 
stable.44  Without viable institutions meeting the demands of the public, democracy 
withers and decays (Easton 1957; Huntington 1965).  Within the development of 
political institutions, the importance of the political party for providing legitimacy and 
stability cannot be overstated (Huntington 1965).  Therefore, political parties are 
undeniably important for a democracy to function properly.  However, the environment 
in which democracy operates constantly changes prompting its institutions to adapt or 
face extinction.  Thus, it is the adaptation and reactionary nature of political parties that 
drives the stability of democracy.   
However, like all large organizations, political parties are reluctant to change. 
Taking from the discipline of sociology, structural inertia theory asserts that existing 
organizations frequently have difficulty changing strategy and structure quickly enough 
to keep pace with the demands of uncertain, changing environments (see Hannan and 
Freeman 1977 and Aldrich 1979).  Inertial pressures (i.e., age and accountability) may 
make organizations (i.e., political parties) risk averse in times when adaptation is 
necessary to avoid consequences (e.g., electoral defeat).   
Furthermore, population ecology theory argues that organizational forms with the 
best fit to environmental characteristics will be selected and proliferate.  Although this 
theory assumes environment determinism to some extent, this does not mean that the 
actions of particular individuals do not matter for organizational survival.45  Individuals 
                                                 
44
 The next chapter examines the effects of anti-establishment parties on the stability of the broader party 
system.  
45
 Scholars often argue that population ecology theory maintains that individual actors cannot affect or 
manipulate the environment for their advantage.  However, there are two reasons for this misconception.  
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(i.e., party leaders) can clearly influence their organization’s future; however, under 
conditions of uncertainty, there are severe constraints on the ability of party elites to 
formulate and implement changes that improve organizational success in the face of 
increased competition.  Therefore, in an environment with “high uncertainty, adaptive 
efforts by individuals may turn out to be essentially random with respect to future value” 
(Hannan and Freeman 1984: 150).  In addition, structural inertia theory holds that 
organizations that are accountable and reliable are favored by the environment and thus, 
can survive.  However, one negative consequence of this need for accountability and 
reliability is the high degree of inertia and a resistance to, or impossibility of, change. 
The process of change itself can be so unsettling as to result in organizational failure or 
demise; thus, political parties do not undertake the process of change haphazardly or 
without good reason.     
Yet, we do know that political parties change and that this change is oftentimes 
substantial.  However, political parties face a dilemma.  Political parties must adapt in 
pursuit of electoral support while remaining accountable and reliable to their base 
supporters and the electorate as a whole.  Any movement away from the current 
organizational structures or policy preferences of the party increases the risks and 
uncertainty about the outcomes of change because parties lack information about how 
                                                                                                                                                
First, determinism is mistakenly contrasted with probability.  Whether their actions are intelligent and 
thought out or foolish and poorly planned, individual actors can clearly influence the future of their 
organization. Yet, the uncertainty of the environment severely constrains the ability of individual to 
implement changes that improve organizational success.  Second, the confusion may concern the level of 
analysis (Baum 1996).  The actions of individuals matter more to their own organization than they do to 
the population of organizations as a whole.  The actions of particular individuals may not explain much of 
the diversity in organizational populations given the constraints on the influence of individual actions for 
variation in organizational properties (Baum 1996). 
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party members (or activists) will react to change or whether the party will lose 
credibility within the electorate.  Therefore, if we observe change in political parties, the 
catalyst for change must be significant.  In order to overcome this dilemma, parties seek 
information about public opinion through past election results – both their own 
performance and the performance of their competitors and rivals (see Janda 1990).  I 
argue that traditional mainstream parties take into account the performance of anti-
establishment parties as well as their own performance in part elections when deciding to 
adapt their ideological profiles or organizational structures. 
Building upon previous research, anti-establishment party electoral success acts 
as an external stimulus, in combination with previous electoral performance, prompting 
ideological and organizational adaptation within more established parties in the political 
system.  New political parties and social movements challenge the traditional role of 
established parties as mediators between the governed and the government 
(Rohrschneider 1993).  These new parties demand organizational changes and 
programmatic changes from the more established parties and are often adept at 
mobilizing the mass electorate to challenge traditional parties.  The emergence, and 
subsequent electoral success, of new parties and social movements despite the 
opposition of most established parties indicates a failure of traditional mainstream 
parties to “perceive citizen’s interests and channel them into the political system” 
(Rohrschneider 1993: 158).  Thus, anti-establishment parties force traditional 
mainstream parties to adapt to the changing environment or face electoral repercussions. 
Although there are many forms in which adaptation from establishment parties manifests 
  
90 
itself, organizational and ideological change is the particular focus of this chapter. In 
particular, establishment parties alter their ideological profiles by shifting their positions 
on issues advocated by anti-establishment parties and their organizational structures by 
modifying the power distribution structure within the party, giving rank and file 
members more of a voice. 
Programmatic Change  
 
Downs (1957: 127-128) contends, “some parties—founded by perfectly rational 
men—are meant to be threats to other parties and not means of getting immediate power 
or prestige.”  Arguably, the greatest influence new parties have on more established 
parties is to influence the very identity of other parties causing them to alter their 
ideological positions on key issues (Harmel and Svåsand 1997).  New parties have the 
greatest probability of accomplishing these goals if the party can garner enough electoral 
support and differ from establishment parties on the issues (Harmel 1997).   However, 
Downs maintains that getting a traditional party to alter its identity is no easy task: 
Ideological immobility is characteristic of every responsible party, 
because it cannot repudiate its past actions unless some radical change in 
conditions justifies this.  Therefore its doctrinaire policies alter slowly to 
meet the needs of the moment. Once more uncertainty is the decisive 
factor, because it may prevent the party from knowing what policies are 
most appropriate.  In the absence of this knowledge, responsibility makes 
it ideologically immobile, i.e., tends to encourage slow rather than rapid 
changes in doctrine. (1957: 110, emphasis in original) 
 
Therefore, as I argue above, establishment parties – in order to remain accountable and 
reliable to the electorate – do not undertake change in a haphazard or random manner.  
To do so may spark uncertainty within the party possibly alienating party members and 
provoking a credibility crisis within the electorate.  
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However, for new parties, whose own primary purpose is to influence the 
positions of more established parties, simply contesting elections is not likely to be 
sufficient cause to prompt to an established party to change.  Yet, new parties can reduce 
the uncertainty for established parties by garnering votes – especially if the established 
party is losing supporters to a new party –indicating shifts within the voting behavior of 
the electorate (Harmel and Svåsand 1997).  In their analysis of the effects of anti-
immigrant parties on traditional parties in Norway and Denmark, Harmel and Svåsand 
(1997) argue: 
A nearby, established party is likely to change its positions in a new 
party’s direction only (or at least, most dramatically) when (a) the new 
party is winning a significant number of votes and/or seats and (b) the 
established party itself is concurrently experiencing what it considers to 
be bad elections. (317) 
 
Furthermore, Harmel and Svåsand (1997) contend: 
 
In order for party A to be perceived as a relevant threat to party B, at least 
two conditions must hold.  First, party A (here, the new party) must win 
enough votes and/or seats to be clearly noticed.  Though any new 
formation may be a potential threat, of course, it is unlikely that another 
party will change itself—given the innate conservatism already noted—
until there is evidence (i.e., in votes and/or seats) that the threat is real.  
And second, for party B to perceive A as a threat to its own well-being, B 
must have reason to believe that A’s success is substantial a B’s expense 
(1997: 317, emphasis in original).   
 
This theoretical orientation is consistent with the “performance theory of party change,” 
which posits parties are conservative organizations, changing only in response to poor 
electoral performance (see Janda 1990 and Harmel and Svåsand 1997).46  It must be 
noted that a new party need not necessarily win seats to be perceived as a worthy threat.  
                                                 
46
 For critiques of this “performance” theory, see Deschouwer (1992) and Harmel and Janda (1994)  
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However, if the established party perceives that it is losing support due to the emergence 
of a new party, then it is not particularly important for the new party to win seats in the 
legislature.  From this brief discussion, I hypothesize the following:   
H3.1: The electoral success of anti-establishment parties will influence changes 
to the issue positions of establishment parties. 
 
I argue that in order to offset the possible threat from anti-establishment parties, 
traditional parties will change their identity by altering their issue positions (ideological 
adaptation hypothesis).  In particular, these changes should concern the issues on which 
anti-establishment parties of the left and right campaign.  For example, with the 
definition presented above, anti-establishment parties on the left campaign on 
environmental issues while anti-establishment parties on the right campaign on 
immigration issues.   
Organizational Change  
 
As mentioned above, Rohrschneider (1993) argues that establishment parties fail 
to meet the organizational demands of new social movements in Western Europe.  More 
specifically, Rohrschneider (1993) asks how the participatory demands of social 
movement activists affect the internal organization of established political parties.  These 
movements, particularly on the left side of the political spectrum, are decentralized 
organizations and attempt to maintain the least amount of centralized authority possible.  
However, Rohrschneider (1993) contends that these demands pose the biggest challenge 
for the establishment parties given their hierarchal organizational structure.  
The traditional mass parties within Western Europe developed hierarchical 
structures due to what Michels ([1915] 1962) termed the “iron law of oligarchy.”  Large 
  
93 
organizations (i.e., mass parties) experience some degree of oligarchy because these 
organizations need experts who are able to manage them skillfully, creating a division 
between leadership and rank and file party members (Michels [1915] 1962).  However, 
anti-establishment parties attempt to maximize the involvement the rank-and-file 
members within the party.  These parties attempt to minimize the dominance of party 
leadership and place more decision-making opportunities into the hands of ordinary 
members (Rohrschneider 1993).  In order to meet the organizational challenges 
presented by anti-establishment parties, traditional mainstream parties must alter their 
own organizational structures (organizational adaptation hypothesis).  Thus, it is 
hypothesized that: 
H3.2: The electoral success of anti-establishment parties will influence changes 
to the organizational structures of establishment parties. 
 
For Rohrschneider (1993), this is the most difficult challenge establishment 
parties face from anti-establishment parties since changing the organizational structures 
risks alienating either the leadership or rank-and-file party members.  Rohrschneider 
(1993: 168-169) argues: 
For instance, the organizational challenge questions the leadership of 
established oligarchies, thereby undermining the historical distribution of 
power among party functions. Meeting the organizational challenge 
would require devolvement of party power from the leadership to 
activists or even the local rank and file… Furthermore, meeting the 
organizational challenge would create its own electoral repercussion for 
parties. For example, if the programmatic appeal of a party to the 
electorate at large is placed second to activists’ interests, traditional 
constituencies may no longer feel integrated by their party, which may 
affect a party’s overall vote share.   
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It is easier for traditional parties to shift their policy positions or integrate new issues 
into their platforms than to fundamentally change their organizational power structures 
(Rohrschneider 1993).  Due to the difficulty in meeting the organizational challenge, 
traditional parties should be more resistant to changing their organizational structures in 
order to adapt to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties.  Furthermore, any 
change, whether a shift in policy or adaptation of the organizational structure, may 
alienate the traditional support base of the party. 
 In summary, I argue that establishment parties will adapt their ideological 
profiles and organizational structures to counter the threat from anti-establishment 
parties if their own electoral fortunes decline.  Ideological change should be more 
prevalent than changes to the organizational structures of these parties given the risk of 
alienating the leadership or support base of the party.  Thus, as anti-establishment parties 
steal votes from traditional mainstream parties, established parties must adapt in order to 
remain viable electoral alternatives. 
Data and Methods 
 
 I employ multiple methods to examine these hypotheses. First, I conducted 21 
interviews with party officials from 18 parties – both establishment and anti-
establishment parties – and two academics in six countries.47  I conducted these 
interviews with officials in various positions within these parties including party 
chairman, deputy party leader, general secretary (or secretary general), organizational 
                                                 
47
 I conducted these interviews in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway.  
Two officials were interviewed from the Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti) in Norway.  In 
addition, I conducted two interviews with leading academics in Denmark and Norway.  
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secretary, international secretary, members of the national board for the party, members 
of parliament, and directors of the research department or institute for the party.  These 
interviews asked open-ended questions related to organizational and ideological changes, 
and the stimulus for this change, within both establishment and anti-establishment 
parties.48 Moreover, interviews conducted with anti-establishment party officials asked 
questions pertaining to the impacts of the party on other competitors within the system 
and on the larger party system.  Thus, these interviews concentrated on party adaptation 
within both types of parties along with its causes and the effects of anti-establishment 
parties in particular.    
Second, I utilize coding schemes developed for the Party Change Project to 
determine issue positions from the text of party platforms.  Specifically, I measure, 
among a series of published election platforms for both anti-establishment parties and 
their closest (ideologically) establishment rival, stated policy positions for nineteen 
issues.  It must be noted that there is a legitimate distinction between parties’ stated 
positions and the actual behavior of these parties while in government (Harmel and 
Svåsand 1997).  For the purposes of these analyses, I am only interested in the former.49  
For each of these issues, there are 11 possible positions operationalized with each 
position assigned a value ranging from –5 (for extreme left) to +5 (for extreme right) 
                                                 
48
 These questions and confidentiality statement are provided in Appendix B. 
49
 I recognize, as other scholars have, that parties may choose to state more extreme positions within their 
platforms in order to placate or please some segment of the electorate or their base supporters.  However, 
the nature of coalitional politics often necessitates a moderation of stated policy positions in a party’s 
platform.  Regardless, election platforms are carefully constructed statements of party identity having 
strategic value and changes from one platform to the next reflect deliberate decisions of the party to alter 
their identity (Harmel and Svåsand 1997: 321, emphasis in original). 
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(see also Harmel and Svåsand 1997).50  Using these coding schemes, I assigned an 
appropriate value based upon reading the relevant content in the electoral platform of the 
party.  This process is repeated for all platforms during the time period under 
examination (1970-2005).51   
In order to identify changes within the platforms of establishment parties, it is 
first necessary to identity its position along the continuum of possible positions in the 
platforms covering the relevant time period.  Furthermore, it is necessary to determine 
the position of the anti-establishment party in order to ascertain which changes, 
undertaken by establishment parties, might be attributed to the effect of anti-
establishment party electoral success.  Finally, although it is possible to produce data on 
all nineteen issues, I analyze only issues that are most applicable (i.e., those issues most 
closely related to anti-establishment party support) given the theoretical orientation of 
this study.  These include, but are not limited to, issues that fit the left-right dimension of 
politics (i.e., taxes, social services, and the scope of government) as well as “narrower” 
issues such as the environment and immigration. 
Analysis and Findings 
 
 The analyses below demonstrate mixed support for these hypotheses.  In several 
of the countries, anti-establishment party electoral success, in combination with poor 
electoral performance, leads to programmatic and, albeit to a lesser extent, 
organizational adaptation within establishment parties within the party system.  However, 
                                                 
50
 The judgmental coding schemes were developed for the Party Change Project funded by the National 
Science Foundation (SES-91112491 and SES-9112357) with Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda as 
principal investigators.  These coding schemes are included in Appendix C.  
51
 For non-English platforms, I used both SYSTRAN translation software as well internet-based 
translation applications to translate these platforms.   
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in other countries the effects of anti-establishment parties are not quite as strong as 
would be expected given the strength of electoral support for these new countries.  In 
particular, organizational adaptation is not as prevalent as expected.  However, this may 
be due, in part, to the fact that it is easier for establishment parties to shift their 
ideological positions or integrate new issues into their platforms than to fundamentally 
change their organizational power structures as Rohrschneider (1993) points out.  Each 
category of change (i.e., programmatic and organizational) is discussed separately below. 
Analysis: Programmatic Change  
 
 In order to effectively present the findings concerning programmatic change, I 
report on each country in these analyses separately below. These analyses provide strong 
support for the hypothesis that anti-establishment parties are indeed a stimulus to change 
in the policy positions of traditional mainstream parties.  In countries where anti-
establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum garner significant electoral 
support, parties of the establishment are indeed shifting their policy positions 
particularly on issues central to anti-establishment party electoral success. Thus, for the 
most part, the ideological adaptation hypothesis (Hypothesis 3.1) is supported by the 
evidence from six Western European nations.  
 
Austria. Table 3.1 shows results for 11 Austrian parliamentary elections between 1970 
and 2002.  From these results, we can see the electoral success of anti-establishment 
parties on both sides of the political spectrum in Austria.  Given the theoretical 
orientation of this chapter, we should expect to see the Social Democratic Party of 
Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, SPÖ) and the Austrian People's Party 
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(Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) alter their ideological profiles especially during the 
1990s as both the Austrian Greens (Die Grünen, GRÜNE) and the Austrian Freedom 
Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) gained in electoral strength and these two 
establishment parties lose electoral support at the polls.  However, we should only 
expect ideological change if the SPÖ and the ÖVP believe Die Grünen and the FPÖ are 
challenging and stealing votes from these parties.   
 
 
Table 3.1: Austrian Election Results, Selected Parties, 1970-2002 
(Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats) 
Party 1970 1971 1975 1979 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999 2002 
            
ÖVP 44.7 43.1 43.0 41.9 43.2 41.3 32.1 27.7 28.3 26.9 42.3 
 79 80 80 77 81 77 60 52 53 52 79 
            
SPÖ 48.4 50.0 50.4 51.0 47.7 43.1 42.8 34.9 38.1 33.2 36.5 
 81 93 93 95 90 80 80 65 71 65 69 
            
FPÖ 5.5 5.5 5.4 6.6 5.0 9.7 16.6 22.5 21.9 26.9 10.0 
 5 10 10 11 12 18 33 42 40 52 18 
            
GRÜNE  -  -  -  - 1.9 4.8 4.8 7.3 4.8 7.4 9.5 
  -  -  - - - 8 10 13 9 14 17 
Key: ÖVP: Austrian People's Party; SPÖ: Social Democratic Party of Austria; 
FPÖ: Freedom Party of Austria; GRÜNE: The Greens 
 
 
 The interviews confirm that anti-establishment parties are seen as challenging 
traditional parties in Austria. When asked how the party challenges establishment parties 
with the system, an official with Die Grünen argued:  
Well, I think there is, of course, that the Greens take the voters from them, 
so we are in competition, so there’s a new player they have to be in 
competition with them…. And they also, what happened was that the 
bigger parties take some topics from the Greens in their identity…. So ten 
years ago nobody would talk about ecology.  And now also the other 
parties are taking some topics and think that they really may be important, 
so they changed in parts of their programmes. 
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Despite this influence from both sides of the political spectrum, establishment parties 
within the Austrian system (i.e., SPÖ and ÖVP) reacted differently to this challenge. A 
party official in SPÖ stated: 
The Greens attacked us from the left, and the Haider party [FPÖ] from 
the right.  The Greens were attractive for the young, educated people, 
more left.  And the Haider party, yes, they all were attracted for the 
workers, for the older people and for the lower educated people. We had a 
very difficult situation.  And that's the background of why we had many 
discussions about our future and our possibilities to handle this situation.  
The influence has gone down, but we have to see that it is finished…. I 
think we, we lost to the left and to the right.  The Green voters who were 
especially young people, first voters. 
 
However, the ÖVP, who faced a significant challenge on the right from the FPÖ, did not 
react to this challenge in the same manner.  An ÖVP official argued: 
The values, on which the party is considered to be built, didn’t change at 
all.  There may be, because of demographic changes, or maybe because of 
changes in society, like the standing of women or the importance of the 
Cold War ending, or because of the European Union, but there always has 
been ... the Christian social value system.   
 
Thus, the core values of the ÖVP did not change to counter the growing electoral threat 
of anti-establishment parties in Austria.   
Evidence from the election manifestos suggests that the electoral success of anti-
establishment parties in Austria forced establishment parties to alter their ideological 
profiles.  As we can see from Table 3.2, the SPÖ moved to the left on “key” issues, 
championed by the anti-establishment left, during the period of increased support for Die 
Grünen.  Given recent election results of SPÖ, the average net change of 1.375 (with a 
maximum change of 1.5) to the left across these eight issues conforms to the theoretical 
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expectations posited above.52  Combining this observation with support for Die Grünen, 
we see evidence confirming the “hybrid” performance hypothesis. 
 
 
Table 3.2: Selected Issue Positions of the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ), 
1970-2005 
Issue Change from Max. Change Net Change 
Individual freedoms -1 to -3 -2 -2 
Income taxes -1 (to -3) to -2 -2 -1 
Total taxes -2 to -2 0 0 
Scope of government  -2 to -3 -1 -1 
Social Services -2 to -3 -1 -1 
Environment  -1 to -3 -2 -2 
Women’s Rights -1 to -3 -2 -2 
Minority Rights -2 to -4 -2 -2 
 
 
 
Despite this tabular evidence of ideological adaptation, the best manner in which 
to demonstrate this change is graphically.  Figure 3.1 shows the movement of the SPÖ 
during this period on the issue of the environment.  As we can see, the SPÖ dramatically 
shift their position (-1 to -3) towards the position of Die Grünen on this issue.  Moreover, 
other establishment parties shifted their positions concerning the environment.  The 
effects of the electoral success of Die Grünen reach across the center to the right side of 
the political spectrum as the ÖVP shifts its position from a right-oriented +1 to a left-
oriented -1.   
 
 
 
                                                 
52
 Net change refers to the entire position change from the beginning to the end of the period under 
investigation for a particular issue for a particular party. Maximum change refers to the distance between a 
party’s two most extreme positions on a particular issue during the period under investigation. Thus, if a 
party moves from a +1 to a +4 during this period and then back to a +3 before the end of this period, then 
the net change would be a +2 whereas the maximum change would be +3.  
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Figure 3.1: Austrian party positions on environmental protection for Greens (G), Social 
Democrats (SPÖ), People’s Party (ÖVP), and Freedom Party (FPÖ)53 
 
 
Issue Position 
 
 
 
                                                 
53
 As with all of the figures presented in this chapter, the years on the left side represent election years for 
the particular country.  
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Despite information gathered during the interview with the ÖVP, evidence from 
the elections manifestos of the ÖVP does indeed provide support, although weaker than 
expected, for the ideological adaptation hypothesis.  Given the recent swings in electoral 
results for the ÖVP and the meteoric rise of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ),54 the 
average net change of 0.875 and an average maximum change of 1.00 to the right is less 
than expected given the theoretical orientation of this chapter.  Table 3.3 displays the 
movement of the ÖVP on seven issues. On two of the “key” issues (scope of government 
and immigration), the ÖVP dramatically shifted its policy position in the direction of the 
FPÖ.  However, on the issue of taxes, the party did not significantly shift its position.  
Figure 3.2 demonstrates the change of the ÖVP on the issue of immigration towards the 
position of the FPÖ.  As we can see, the ÖVP shifts its position to the right.  
Interestingly, the SPÖ also shifted its policy position on immigration slightly to the right 
during this period.  This suggests that the influence of the FPÖ reaches across the center 
of the political spectrum.   
 
Table 3.3: Selected Issue Positions of the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), 1970-2005 
Issue Change from 
Max. 
Change Net Change 
Individual freedoms +1 to +3 +2 +2 
Income taxes +2 to +3 +1 +1 
Total taxes +3 to +3 0 0 
Scope of government  +2 (to +4) to +3 +2 +1 
Social Services +2 to +2 0 0 
State Ownership +1 to +2 +1 +1 
Immigration +1 to +3 +2 +2 
                                                 
54
 The ÖVP experienced a sharp decline in electoral support in the 1990s at the same time the FPÖ 
experienced its greatest electoral success.  In 1990, the ÖVP garnered 32.1 per cent of the vote down 9.2 
per cent from 1986.  In the same election, the FPÖ gained 6.9 per cent (9.7 to 16.6) from the previous 
election.  In 1999, the ÖVP reach its electoral low point garnering the same amount of support as the FPÖ 
(26.9 per cent).    
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Figure 3.2: Austrian party positions on immigration for Greens (G), Social Democrats 
(SPÖ), People’s Party (ÖVP), and Freedom Party (FPÖ) 
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more electoral support than the Greens and the two traditional parties both lost support 
in numerous elections, SPÖ undertook more ideological change than the ÖVP.  Thus, the 
changes of the SPÖ strongly support the ideological adaptation hypothesis whereas the 
ideological change of the ÖVP lends support to this hypothesis to a lesser extent.   
 
Belgium. Like Austria, anti-establishment parties are successful on both sides of the 
political spectrum in Belgium.  On the left side of the spectrum, the Flemish Greens 
(GROEN!), along with their Walloon sister party Ecolo, gained steadily in the electoral  
 
 
Table 3.4: Belgian Election Results, Selected Parties, 1971-2003 
(Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats) 
 Party 1971 1974 1977 1978 1981 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 
            
VLD 16.7 15.2 15.5 15.5 12.9 10.7 11.5 12.0 13.1 14.3 15.4 
 34 30 33 37 28 22 25 26 21 23 25 
            
CD&V 30.0 32.3 36.0 36.3 19.3 21.3 19.5 16.8 17.2 14.1 13.3 
 67 72 80 82 43 49 43 39 29 22 21 
            
PS 27.2 26.7 27.0 25.4 12.7 13.8 15.6 13.5 11.9 10.2 13.0 
 61 59 62 58 35 35 40 35 21 19 25 
            
VB -  - -  - 1.1 1.4 1.9 6.6 7.8 9.9 11.7 
 - - - - 1 1 2 12 11 15 18 
            
ECOL
O -  - -  - 2.2 2.5 2.6 5.1 4.0 7.4 3.1 
 - - - - 2 5 3 10 6 11 4 
            
GROE
N! - - - - 2.3 3.7 4.5 4.9 4.4 7.0 2.5 
 - -  - -  2 4 6 7 5 9 - 
Key: VLD: Flemish Liberals and Democrats; CD&V: Christian Democratic and 
Flemish; PS: Socialist Party; VB: Flemish Bloc; ECOLO: Ecologists; GROEN! 
(1982-2003: Agalev, Live in Another Way); N-VA: New Flemish Alliance (1954-
1999: People's Union, VU); FN: National Front.  
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arena peaking with seven per cent of the vote in the 1999 parliamentary elections.  On 
the right of side of the spectrum, Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang, formerly Vlaams 
Blok, VB) continues to increase its vote share despite being isolated by the establishment 
parties in the political system.   
Table 3.4 displays the results from 11 parliamentary elections in Belgium 
between 1971 and 2003.  As we can see from these election results, establishment parties 
on both sides of the spectrum have seen declines in electoral support since the late 
1980s. This is due, in no small part, to the emergence and electoral success of anti-
establishment parties that challenge the establishment, according to an official with the 
Flemish Greens who contends:  
The entrance of Green parties in parliament has had quite an impressive 
effect on the party system and mainly the topics that were discussed in 
parliament and politics in general. I think that Green parties had an 
impact on the political agenda by putting things like ecology, 
environment on the agenda…. The effect was actually quite big; all the 
parties have changed their party programme. They had to introduce 
chapters on environment, on ecology, on energy, and I think this has to do 
with the presence of Greens in parliament and local councils and in 
several governments as well…. I think that the main influence we had 
maybe it was not so much on the organization of other parties, but mainly 
on agenda setting, introduction of new, relatively new themes, in political 
debates in parliament and in local councils. 
 
When asked specifically if the Flemish Greens challenged the establishment in Belgium, 
the official stated:  
We are a challenger.  And I think, let’s say up to some years ago, we were 
more than we are now an anti-establishment party… so that can play a 
role as well, but we have been an anti-establishment party and I think we 
are still perceived more or less this by the issues we promote, by the other 
parties, because I think in a way they know that what we are saying is 
correct, but they are not willing to know it because it threatens what they 
are standing for.  If you really want to change a society in an ecological 
  
106 
way, it’s a serious change, of course, and you see it as well when you 
look at the history of concepts like sustainable development or 
sustainability. Again and again the concepts have been, how shall I say, 
taken over and pacified, in a sense, so made less dangerous for the 
system… And that, of course, is the strategy of the established party, of 
the established order… to try to minimize the message we have been 
carrying along all these years.  I think if you see the political agenda in 
Europe let’s say the past ten, 20 years on the environmental and 
ecological issues, we have had quite an impact on mainstream politics.   
 
 On the right side of the spectrum, Vlaams Belang remain isolated within the 
political system in what has been labeled as a “cordon sanitaire” or “quarantine line” put 
in place by an agreement among establishment parties.  A party official within the 
Vlaams Belang stated: 
In the beginning of the nineties all Belgian political parties signed sort of 
treaty that they will never do business with Vlaams Blok.  It’s very 
undemocratic.  It would be unthinkable.  In fact, it is always unbearable 
to democracy… now it would be unthinkable but it existed and it still 
exists.  And it damages us as a political party.   
 
Despite the quarantine, Vlaams Belang challenge the establishment in terms of ideology 
and specific ideologically stances.   
We forced the established parties to take positions towards some thorny 
social issues and moreover, succeeded in making them outline a more 
right-wing policy. We pay a lot of attention to the actual realization of 
this policy and we will not hesitate to judge them on their pledges… 
Flemish political parties are moving over to the right. This evolution is 
more in accordance with the average political preference in Flanders, 
which is moderate right-wing... We challenge the ideological consensus 
of a political practice and… the ideological merger to the center. 
 
From these two interviews, it would appear that anti-establishment parties on both sides 
of the spectrum challenge the establishment prompt ideological adaptation from 
establishment parties. 
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 Indeed, establishment parties in Belgium reacted to the emergence of successful 
anti-establishment parties. In discussing the effect of the Flemish Greens, a prominent 
party official from the Christian Democratic and Flemish (Christen-Democratisch en 
Vlaams, CD&V) stated: 
If we go to environmental policy, and show that it is an issue now for our 
party, it was hardly one in 1999.  Is that because of standpoints that the 
Greens took? Probably yes.  But at least, because they were first, they are 
first, and at a certain point of time, not only because they take this point 
of view, but we can see that in a way that they were [quicker] than us 
seeing that we have to do something about environmental policies.  So all 
these things helped to a certain point in time to realize that this is 
something where we have to make standpoints and where we have to 
come up with solutions for problems that actually are presenting 
themselves.  And I think the Greens were first.  So it’s difficult to say it is 
because of what the Greens told us, but we have to admit that they were 
first, and that in a way on some point of view we have been followers. 
 
However, the Vlaams Belang also concerns the Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams party: 
 
But of course Vlaams Belang taking twenty-five percent of it, or about 
twenty percent now of the voters, is not good, and it has taken away 
voters from us… So we know that if Vlaams Belang now is on twenty 
percent, twenty-five almost, I think who lost votes to Vlaams Belang, 
Socialist Liberals and us, all traditional parties lost voters to Vlaams 
Belang… not just VLD, because you could say that they are closer, but 
certainly we lost a lot of voters to Vlaams Belang.   
 
In addition, changes within Belgian society contributed to the adaptation of election 
manifestos.  This party official argued, “of course there is an influence from the change 
in society on programmes. Some parties on some topics are quicker and faster to respond 
to some problem and other parties will follow and have different standpoints.”  Thus, as 
anti-establishment parties respond to the discontent within the electorate (see Chapter I), 
these parties continue to threaten parties of the establishment. 
 
  
108 
Table 3.5: Selected Issue Positions of the Socialist Party of Belgium (PS), 1970-2005 
Issue Change from 
Max. 
Change Net Change 
Individual freedoms -1 (to-3) to -2  -2 -1 
Income taxes -1 to -2 -1 -1 
Total taxes -2 to -3 -1 -1 
Scope of government  -2 (to -4) to -3 -2 -1 
Social Services -2 to -3 -1 -1 
Environment  -2 to -3 -1 -1 
Women’s Rights -1 to -3 -2 -2 
Minority Rights -2 to -4 -2 -2 
  
 
 
Table 3.5 shows the movement of the Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste, PS) in 
Belgium. Given the decline in electoral support for the party since the 1980s and the 
steady electoral support of the Flemish Greens, the changes within their party manifestos 
confirm the ideological adaptation hypothesis.  The average net change of 1.25, with an 
average maximum change of 1.5, to the left across these eight issues demonstrates the 
movement of the Socialist Party towards the position of the Flemish Greens.  However, 
on the key issues of taxes, social services and the environment, the movement of the 
Socialist Party was not as pronounced.  This may be due, in part, to the fact that the 
Flemish Greens fail to garner more than seven per cent of the vote.  Thus, while the 
Flemish Greens push left-oriented anti-establishment issues onto the agenda challenging 
the mainstream traditional parties, they fail to garner significant electoral support or 
representation in parliament.   Figure 3.3 displays the movement of the establishment 
parties in Belgium on the issue of the environment protection.  Interestingly, the right-
center Christian Democrats experienced the most dramatic shift on this issue.  Thus, the 
influence of the Flemish Greens reaches across the center of the political spectrum. 
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Figure 3.3: Belgian party positions on environmental protection for Greens (G), 
Socialist Party (PS), Christian Democrats (CD), and Flemish Interest (VB) 
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Table 3.6: Selected Issue Positions of the Christian Democrats and Flemish in Belgium 
(CD&V), 1970-2005 
Issue Change from 
Max. 
Change Net Change 
Individual freedoms +1 to +2 +1 +1 
Income taxes +2 to +3 +1 +1 
Total taxes +2 to +3 +1 +1 
Scope of government  +1 to +3 +2 +2 
Social Services +2 to +3 +1 +1 
State Ownership +1 to +2 +1 +1 
Immigration +1 (to +3) to +2 +2 +1 
 
  
  
The CD&V shifted their policy positions in response to anti-establishment parties.  
On average, the party shifted its positions 1.14 (net change) to the right (1.285 average 
maximum change).  Thus, as the CD&V slipped at the polls since the mid-1980s and 
Vlaams Belang made electoral gains during the same period, the party shifted its 
positions to the right on these seven issues.  Furthermore, on the “key” issues of scope of 
government and immigration, the party dramatically shifted its position towards Vlaams 
Belang.55  Table 3.6 shows the results of this analysis.  Figure 3.4 demonstrates the 
movement of traditional mainstream parties on the issue of immigration.  The figure 
shows that establishment parties shift their policy positions to the right on this issue.  
Interestingly, Vlaams Belang shifts its policy slightly to the left in the mid-1990s.   
This shift in their ideological position, taken from their election programme, 
confirms the interview conducted with an official in Vlaams Belang: 
Since the mid-nineties the repatriation policy for non-European Union 
foreigners has been replaced by the watchword “assimilation or 
                                                 
55
 On the issue of immigration, the CD&V moderated its position in the late 1990s. Thus, this shift towards 
the position of Vlaams Belang does not appear as dramatic in Table 3.6.  Figure 3.4 offers a better 
graphically display of the party’s shift in this issue.  
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repatriation”. It’s not that we adapted our program to reality; on the 
contrary, we think a political programme needs to be practically 
attainable. That explains why we replaced the policy of unexceptional 
repatriation with a firm discourse pleading for an integration policy. 
 
Figure 3.4: Belgian party positions on immigration for Greens (G), Socialist Party (PS), 
Christian Democrats (CD), and Flemish Interest (VB) 
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Denmark. Table 3.7 displays the results from 14 Danish parliamentary elections from 
1971-2005.  These results show that anti-establishment parties are very successful in 
Denmark.  On the left, the Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti, SF) carries 
the anti-establishment flag pressing an environmentalist agenda.  On the right, the 
Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet, FRP) exploded onto the political scene in 1973 
garnering 15.9 per cent of the vote.  However, the FRP split in 1995 after a long internal 
fight for power. As a result, many members, most notably Pia Kjærsgaard, the leader of 
the Progress Party at that time, left and formed the Danish People's Party (Dansk 
Folkeparti, DF).  Since the split, the Danish People’s Party steadily increased their 
electoral share whereas the FRP failed to garner more than one per cent of the vote in 
2001 parliamentary elections and did not run candidates in the 2005 parliamentary 
elections.  Thus, much like the establishment parties in Austria and Belgium, the 
traditional mainstream parties in Denmark must protect themselves from electoral threats 
on both sides of the political spectrum. 
The Socialist People's Party challenges establishment parties particularly on the issue 
of the environment. A high-ranking party official stated:  
The way we have run the issues of climate change and on the 
environmental question have been undoubtedly adopted by the other 
parties… Quite often, if other parties shift to our standpoint, or hear our 
point of view, then we take it as a victory. 
 
On the right side of the spectrum, the Danish People’s Party challenges the traditional 
mainstream parties particularly, as most extreme right parties in Western Europe do, on 
the issue on immigration and the issue of Denmark’s relationship with the European 
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Union (EU).  A Member of Parliament (MP) representing the Danish People’s Party 
argued: 
In the beginning, we had two goals; that was a change to the policy 
concerning immigration in Denmark and also to protect ourselves from 
transferring power from the Danish Parliament to Brussels. The two goals 
have in some way both been reached, but I think the greatest success is 
the immigration laws… [the] new immigration law …concerning 
asylum – the amount [of immigrants] getting asylum in Denmark but also 
the amount of family reunifications which was a big problem in 2001 and 
the years before that.  So, I think if you ask me this is the biggest success.  
Because now we have a number of immigrants that we can control and 
where we can start integrating many people who come to Denmark. 
 
 
 
Table 3.7: Danish Election Results, Selected Parties, 1971-2005 
(Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats) 
Party 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005 
                              
SD 37.3 25.6 29.9 37 38.3 32.9 31.6 29.3 29.8 37.4 34.6 36.0 29.1 25.8 
  70 46 53 65 68 59 56 54 55 69 62 63 52 47 
                              
V 15.6 12.3 23.3 12 12.5 11.3 12.1 10.5 11.8 15.8 23.3 24 31.3 29.0 
  30 22 42 21 22 20 22 19 22 29 42 42 56 52 
                              
KF 16.7 9.2 5.5 8.5 12.5 14.5 23.4 20.8 19.3 16.0 15.0 8.9 9.1 10.3 
  31 16 10 15 22 26 42 38 35 30 27 16 16 19 
                              
DF  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 7.4 12.0 13.3 
   -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 13 22 24 
                              
SF 9.1 6 5 3.9 5.9 11.3 11.5 14.6 13 8.3 7.3 7.5 6.4 6.0 
                              
  17 11 9 7 11 21 21 27 24 15 13 13 12 11 
                              
RV 14.4 11.2 7.1 3.6 5.4 5.1 5.5 6.2 5.6 3.5 4.6 3.9 5.2 9.2 
  27 20 13 6 10 9 10 11 10 7 8 7 9 16 
                              
FRP  - 15.9 13.6 14.6 11 8.9 3.6 4.8 9 6.4 6.4 2.4 0.6 - 
   - 28 24 26 20 16 6 9 16 12 11 4 - - 
Key: SD: Social Democrats; V: Left - Denmarks Liberal Party; KF: Conservative 
People's Party; DF: Danish People's Party; SF: Socialist People's Party; RV: Radical 
Left; FRP: Progress Party. 
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 The electoral success of the Danish People’s Party caught the eye of academia as 
well.  A leading scholar on political parties in Denmark argued: 
The party turned Danish politics upside down because it’s always been 
the center parties and more of this moderate force… and now you have on 
your right side a party with a very explicit agenda and a very narrow 
defined issue.  [The government] majority had to cooperate with the 
Danish People’s Party and it was very clever and very good at saying, it 
okay, we support you on this part, but we have to have this and this and 
this conversation.  Danish parties have changed rather dramatically since 
2001. 
 
The consequences of this electoral success reach across the center of the political 
spectrum as the party steals voters from the left-oriented Social Democratic Party 
(Socialdemokratiet, SD).   
The voters, many of the Social Democratic voters actually vote for the 
Danish People’s Party.  And that’s the part of the Social Democratic Party, 
which always has been there, intolerance in their perspective, very narrow 
in their perspective… So that section of the Social Democratic Party, they 
left the party and voted for the Danish People’s Party and they are still 
there.  No doubt about it.  Because the Danish People’s Party is clever on 
that… many people say that they are the Social Democratic Party of the 
fifties. 
 
Thus, the influence of the Danish People’s Party is wide ranging within the political 
system in Denmark.  
 Despite this influence, officials in the Conservative People's Party (Konservative 
Folkeparti, KF), the closest rival to the Danish People’s Party on the right side of the 
spectrum, argue that this new competitor exerts more influence on the Social Democrats.  
Officials in the party argued: 
We can defend the discussion about our values. We have switched them 
from more traditional right/left discussions to a discussion about values.  
And, if you said, is that our change to a more right wing party, I don’t 
think so because we take the more traditional issue like taxation… instead 
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of talking left and right on an economical scale, certainly you have this 
value scale… that adds a different dimension to the debate.  [T]he Danish 
People’s Party have been able to sort of like grab the left voters who tend 
to have a critical view about immigrants or some would say xenophobic 
and the Liberal Party has been very good or taking those swing voters 
back to the Liberal Party.   
 
A prominent member of the Social Democrats echoed these sentiments: 
 
We have adopted some political issues from the right side.  To actually 
use some of the foreign issues and it is mostly those two issues [taxation 
and immigration] that we have adopted – adopted some of the right 
political party issues. The immigration issues, I think that is because of 
the Danish Peoples Party. It seems like that. 
 
As can be seen in Table 3.5, the Social Democrats experienced two consecutive elections 
in which the party lost significant support.  When asked whether this support was lost to 
anti-establishment parties, the party official stated: 
We lost to the Socialist People’s Party mostly. And five years ago, it was 
to the Danish People’s Party. But I think we have lost what we should 
lose to those parties.  And it was on the immigration issue that we lost 
there.  The members and voters who were afraid of what is going to 
happen with the organization and mostly elderly people who didn’t think 
that we could deal with that properly – with immigration and whether it 
would be safe to go out in the evenings, and all those things like that.  
And I think five years ago we lost, you know, that way.  Now, we are 
losing to the Socialist People’s Party.  And that is, I think, because we 
have turned a little to the right or towards the middle. 
 
Anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum attacked the 
Social Democrats.  The Danish People’s Party stole working class and elderly voters 
from the party whereas the Socialist People’s Party stole support as the Social 
Democrats attempted to move right to counter the threat from the Danish People’s Party. 
Table 3.8 displays the movement of the Social Democrats on eight issues.  The evidence 
presented confirms the information gather from the interviews.  The Social Democrats 
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moved to the right on several issues and to the left on others. When we consider the 
decline in electoral support for the party since the 1990s, this suggests that the party was 
indeed under attack from anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political 
spectrum.  The average net and maximum change for the party was 0.5 to the left.  Thus, 
the party shifted slightly more to the left overall.  On the “key” issue of the environment, 
the Social Democrats moved considerably towards the position of the Socialist People’s 
Party.  In addition, Figure 3.5 shows that the Conservative People’s Party (KF) 
dramatically shifted its position to the left crossing the centrist position.   
 
 
Table 3.8: Selected Issue Positions of the Social Democrats in Denmark (SD), 1970-
2005 
Issue Change from 
Max. 
Change Net Change 
Individual freedoms -3 (to-4) to -3 +2 0 
Income taxes -3 to -2 +1 +1 
Total taxes -5 to -5 0 0 
Scope of government  -5 (to -4) to -3 +1 +2 
Social Services -5 (to -4) to -5 -1 0 
Environment  -1 (to -3) to -4 -3 -3 
Women’s Rights -3 to -5 -2 -2 
Minority Rights -1 (to -2) to -3 -2 -2 
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Figure 3.5: Danish party positions on environmental protection for Socialist People’s 
Party (SF), Social Democrats (S), and Conservative People’s Party (KF) 
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Table 3.9 displays the ideological adaptation of the Conservative People’s Party 
(KF).  The average net and average maximum change was 2.00.  Given the rise of the 
Danish People’s Party and the decline of party support in the 1990s, one might expect 
the KF to adapt or shift their policy position more than they did during this period.  
However, the Danish Conservatives moved considerably to the right on several of the 
“key” issues championed by the anti-establishment right.  On the issue of the scope of 
the government, the KF shifted its position dramatically to the right towards the position 
of the Danish People’s Party.  
 
 
Table 3.9: Selected Issue Positions of the Conservative People’s Party of Denmark (KF), 
1970-2005 
Issue Change from 
Max. 
Change Net Change 
Individual freedoms -1 to -1 0 0 
Income taxes +1 to +1 0 0 
Total taxes 0 to +1 +1 +1 
Scope of government  -3 to +2 +5 +5 
Social Services -5 to -1 +4 +4 
State Ownership 0 to +2 +2 +2 
Immigration +1 to +3 +2 +2 
 
  
 
Figure 3.6 demonstrates the movement of Danish political parties on the issue of 
immigration.  From this, we can see that the influence of the Progress Party and the 
Danish People’s Party reaches across the center of the political spectrum.  The 
Conservative People’s Party shifted their position towards the position on the Progress/ 
Danish People’s Party in the late 1980s.  The Social Democrats move to counter this 
electoral threat by shifting their position on the issue of immigration in the early 1990s.  
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Furthermore, the Social Democrats dramatically shifted their position from the left to the 
right side of the political spectrum.  This confirms the information gathered from the 
interview with the Social Democrats.  The party has indeed adopted “some political  
 
 
Figure 3.6: Danish party positions on immigration for Socialist People’s Party (SF), 
Social Democrats (S), Conservative People’s Party (KF), and Progress/ Danish People’s 
Party (P/DF) 
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issues from the right side.”  The influence of the Progress/ Danish People’s Party reaches 
anti-establishment parties on the left side of the spectrum as well.  The Socialist People’s 
Party shifted their position slightly to the right in the late 1990s. Thus, on the issue of 
immigration, the Progress Party and now the Danish People’s Party reach across the 
political spectrum forcing establishment parties to adapt and change their policy 
positions.            
 
Germany. Table 3.10 shows the results of ten parliamentary elections in Germany from 
1972-2005.   Within the German party system, the anti-establishment movement has 
arguably the most successful Greens party (Die Grünen, GRÜNE) in Western Europe; 
however, the anti-establishment movement on the right has never organized effectively 
to challenge the traditional mainstream parties of the establishment.  More recently, a 
new left-oriented anti-establishment party Die Linke (LINKE) emerged creating another 
challenge to the establishment.  Given the theoretical orientation of this chapter and 
these election results left-oriented establishment parties are more likely to alter their 
ideological profiles than establishment parties on the right.   
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Table 3.10: German Election Results, Selected Parties, 1972-2005 
(Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats) 
Party 1972 1976 1980 1983 1987 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 
           
SPD 45.8 42.6 42.9 38.2 37.0 33.5 36.4 40.9  38.5  34.2 
 242 224 228 202 193 239 252 298  251  222 
           
CDU 35.2 38.0 34.2 38.2 34.5 36.7 34.2 28.4 29.5 27.8 
 186 201 185 202 185 268 244 198 190 180 
           
CSU 9.7 10.6 10.3 10.6 9.8 7.1 7.3 6.7 9.0 7.4 
 48 53 52 53 49 51 50 47 58 46 
           
FDP 8.4 7.9 10.6 7.0 9.1 11.0 6.9 6.2  7.4  9.8 
 42 40 54 35 48 79 47 43  47  61 
           
GRÜNE  -  - 1.5 5.6 8.3 5.0 7.3 6.7  8.6  8.1 
  -  - - 28 44 8 49 47  55  51 
           
LINKE 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2  - 2.4 4.4 5.1  4.0  8.7 
 - - - -  - 17 30 36  2  54 
           
REP  -  -  -  -  - 2.1 1.9 1.8 0.6 0.6 
  -  -  -  -  - - - -  -  - 
Key: SPD: Social Democratic Party of Germany; CDU: Christian 
Democratic Union of Germany; CSU: Christian-Social Union in Bavaria; 
FDP: Free Democratic Party; GRÜNE: Federation 90/The Greens; 
LINKE: The Left; REP: Republicans 
 
 
 
 The interviews with two establishment parties in Germany confirm this 
expectation.  An official with the Social Democratic Party of Germany 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) confirmed that the party focused more 
on environmental issues after the emergence of Die Grünen in the 1980s. 
As the Greens came up, the SPD focused much more on environmental 
issues.  One could say that [we changed] in a programmatic way but in a 
very practical way as well when we were in power until ’82.  
 
The SPD does not see Die Grünen as an anti-establishment party, but does view the 
party as a competitor and ally within the system. 
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[T]he Greens have been our closest ally since I would say the mid-
eighties or since the beginning of the nineties, so that’s the reason why 
we were in government with them for seven and a half years…. So, of 
course they are our main competitors within the political system, but in a 
way they are part of a left alliance within the German political system. 
 
However, the SPD reacted to the emergence and electoral success of Greens by adopting 
their issues and attempting to forge alliances with this new challenger.   
We mainly reacted by adopting Green issues.  We did it in a credible way 
for some voters, not for all the voters, but if you look at the polls, most of 
the people, or most of the electorate, says that the SPD is more competent 
than, for example, the Conservatives in questions of the environment and 
all the other Green issues… So the first reaction was, as I said, that we 
adopted a couple of Green issues in a pretty successful way.  And the 
second point is that we tried to forge alliances with them…  
 
Like the anti-establishment right in Denmark, the influence of Die Grünen 
reaches across the center of the political spectrum.  A department head within the center-
right Christian Democratic Union of Germany (Christlich Demokratische Union 
Deutschlands, CDU) argued that Die Grünen presented a problem for the party: 
From my perspective, we have a problem with the Greens in that the 
values people supporting the Greens [have]… they are close to the values 
of supporters of [the] CDU.  So we are thinking about nature and 
environmental protection in a very close way… And so, and we are 
looking at the same pool of people from where we can get support.  And 
then we are in competition with the Greens. 
   
Thus, the Greens may influence the CDU, but the CDU does not have an effective anti-
establishment challenger on the right t side of the political spectrum.  
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Table 3.11: Selected Issue Positions of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), 
1970-2005 
Issue Change from 
Max. 
Change Net Change 
Individual freedoms +4 to +1 -3 -3 
Income taxes -3 to -2 +1 +1 
Total taxes -2 to -3 -1 -1 
Scope of government  -3 to -4 -1 -1 
Social Services -5 (to -3) to -5 -2 0 
Environment  -2 to -4 -2 -2 
Women’s Rights -1 to -3 -2 -2 
Minority Rights 0 to -2 -2 -2 
 
 
 
Table 3.11 displays the policy positions of the SPD on eight issues from 1970 to 
2005. On these eight issues, the party had an average net change of 1.25 to the left and 
an average maximum change of 1.5 to the left.  On the “key” issues of the scope of 
government and environment, the party moved towards the position of the Greens.56  
This magnitude of change is expected given the decline in party support in the 1990s and 
the steady support for the Greens during this time.  The influence of the Greens can be 
seen in Figure 3.7.  On the issue of environmental protection, the SPD gradual shifted its 
position to the left during this time.  This shift demonstrates the reaction of the SPD to 
the anti-establishment threat by “adopting Green issues.”  The gradual nature of this shift 
also points to the party adopting this issue in a “credible way” instead of drastically 
shifting their positions from one election to the next.  On the right side of the party 
system, the CDU dramatically shifts its position in 1990 towards the position of the 
                                                 
56
 On the issue of social services, the SPD moved to the right only to return to the position of the Greens 
later during the period under examination. 
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Greens.  Thus, the traditional mainstream parties in Germany shifted their positions on 
this issue in the direction of an anti-establishment party.  
 
 
Figure 3.7: German party positions on environmental protection for Greens (G), Social 
Democrats (SPD), and Christian Democrats (CDU) 
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 Table 3.12 shows the ideological movement of the CDU along the political 
spectrum.  As expected, the CDU has not significantly altered their ideological positions.  
The average net change, as well as average maximum change, was 0.86 on these seven 
issues.  With no credible anti-establishment threat on the right, the CDU shifts to the 
right on only two of these issues.   The party shifted to the left on three of the issues 
while not changing its positions on two of these issues.  Thus, the CDU shifted more 
towards the position of the Greens during the period than towards any anti-establishment 
threat on the right.  To some extent, this finding corresponds to the hypothesis posited 
above. Although the CDU lost electoral support in the 1990s, the lack of a significant 
anti-establishment threat to the party has not prompted the party to shift its positions in 
that direction.  Instead, as the interview suggested, the party faced a challenge from the 
anti-establishment left.  Therefore, the party shifted more to the left to counter this anti-
establishment threat.     
 
 
Table 3.12: Selected Issue Positions of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany 
(CDU), 1970-2005 
Issue Change from 
Max. 
Change Net Change 
Individual freedoms 0 to (to -1) to +1 +2 +1 
Income taxes -2 to -3 -1 -1 
Total taxes -3 to -3 0 0 
Scope of government  +3 (to +2) to +3 -1 0 
Social Services -4 (to -3) to -5 -2 -2 
State Ownership +3 to -3 -6 -6 
Immigration -1 to +1 +2 +2 
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The Netherlands. The electoral success of anti-establishment parties in the Netherlands 
fluctuates during this period.  Table 3.13 shows results from 11 Dutch parliamentary 
elections from 1971 to 2003. On the left side of the spectrum, the GreenLeft 
(GroenLinks, GL) campaign on an environmental agenda and average 5.4 per cent of the 
electoral vote.  On the other side of the spectrum, the anti-establishment right enjoyed 
recent electoral success with List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF).  During its brief 
existence, the party pushed for tougher action against immigrants who did not assimilate 
into Dutch culture, tougher measures to fight crime, and for a smaller role (or scope) of 
government.  Days before the 2002 election, the leader of the party, Pim Fortuyn was 
assassinated following a radio interview.  Despite this, the LPF gained 17 per cent of the 
vote.  However, following this electoral breakthrough, the party only gained 5.7 per cent 
of the vote in the 2003 parliamentary elections.  In the 2006 general elections, the party 
failed to receive enough votes to secure a seat in parliament.  Despite the steady electoral 
success of the anti-establishment left and the “flash-in-the-pan” meteoric rise of the anti-
establishment right, traditional mainstream parties have not lost significant electoral 
support (one exception being the 2002 election for the Labour Party, PvdA).  Thus, 
given the theoretical underpinnings of the ideological adaptation hypothesis, we should 
not expect the parties of the establishment to alter their ideological profiles.       
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Table 3.13: Dutch Election Results, Selected Parties, 1971-2003 
(Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats) 
Party 1971 1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 
            
CDA  -  - 31.9 30.8 29.3 34.6 35.3 22.2 18.4 27.9 28.6 
  -  - 49 48 45 54 54 34 29 43 44 
            
PvdA 24.6 27.4 33.8 28.3 30.4 33.3 31.9 24.0 29.0 15.1 27.3 
 39 43 53 44 47 52 49 37 45 23 42 
            
GL  -  -  -  -  -  - 4.1 3.5 7.3 7.0 5.1 
  -  -  -  -  -  - 6 5 11 10 8 
            
D66 6.8 4.2 5.4 11.1 4.3 6.1 7.9 15.5 9.0 5.1 4.1 
 11 6 8 17 6 9 12 24 14 7 6 
            
SP  -  -  0.2  0.3  0.5  0.3 0.4 1.3 3.5 5.9 6.3 
  -  -  -  -  -  - - 2 5 9 9 
            
LPF  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 17.0 5.7 
  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 26 8 
Key: CDA: Christian Democratic Appeal; PvdA: Labour Party; GL: GreenLeft; 
D66: Democrats 66; SP: Socialist Party; LPF: List Pim Fortuyn; 
 
 
 
 According to the interviews, the influence of the GreenLeft reaches across the 
center of the political spectrum.  An official within the GreenLeft argued that the Dutch 
green movement affects the Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA) on the left and 
the Christian Democrats (Christen Democratisch Appèl, CDA) on the right.  In his 
opinion, these establishment parties have a choice: 
And now they have to choose between those two groups [labor unions 
and intellectuals], and it’s very difficult because their traditional focus is 
more conservative and the new voters are more progressive.  And that’s 
why we came with our new ideas; we can influence maybe… the Social 
Democratic Party, then we have the most impact.  And on some issues, 
for instance, the environment, we influence the Christian Democrats, too, 
because they want to keep the Earth as a gift from God, and because we 
stress that you’re only here in the world and you are only one person.  
That’s an issue that attracts many Christian Democrats too. 
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Thus, the GreenLeft believes its influence, particularly on the environment, extents 
across the center of the political spectrum possibly leading to the attraction of Christian 
Democratic voters. 
However, the CDA did not echo the sentiments of the GreenLeft.  The CDA 
reacted to anti-establishment parties on either side of the political spectrum in a 
calculated and calm manner. When asked how the party reacted to the LPF, an official 
with the CDA stated:  
[Prime Minister] Jan Peter Balkenende in the election campaign, he did 
not try to isolate Fortuyn, the others did… He said, “You are right with 
your problems, but we have better solutions.”  So he did not demonize 
Fortuyn as the others did. 
 
Moreover, this CDA official argued that any change on the issue of the environment had 
“nothing to do with the Greens; it was more to do with societal changes.”  Thus, the 
CDA reacted to societal changes more than the emergence of anti-establishment 
parties.57   
 Table 3.14 shows the ideological movement of the Dutch Labour Party between 
1970 and 2005.  On these eight issues, the average net change was 0.5 to the left with an 
average maximum change 0.875 in the same direction.  On the “key” issues of the 
environment, scope of government, and social services, the party only moved slightly to 
the left. At the same time, the party did not experience a loss of electoral support, with 
the exception of the 2002 election, during this period.  Thus, despite the consistent 
showing for the GreenLeft at the polls, the GreenLeft does not threaten the PvdA.  
                                                 
57
 This may lead to the question of whether establishment parties react to the societal changes addressed in 
the first chapter regardless of the success of anti-establishment parties or do traditional mainstream parties 
react to these problems only after the success of the these new parties. 
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Therefore, the lack of ideological adaptation for the PvdA is consistent with the 
theoretical underpinnings of this chapter. 
 
 
Table 3.14: Selected Issue Positions of the Labour Party of the Netherlands (PvdA), 
1970-2005 
 Change from 
Max. 
Change Net Change 
Individual freedoms -1 to -2 -1 -1 
Income taxes -2 to -2 0 0 
Total taxes -2 to -3 -1 -1 
Scope of government  -3 to -4 -1 -1 
Social Services -2 (to -4) to -3 -2 -1 
Environment  -2 to -3  -1 -1 
Women’s Rights -2 to -2 0 0 
Minority Rights -1 (to -2) to -1 -1 0 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.8 displays the policy positions for Dutch political parties on the issue of 
environmental protection.  The influence of the GreenLeft does indeed reach across the 
center of the political spectrum. However, the influence of the party is not as prevalent 
as the interviews would indicate.  The Labour Party moved slightly more to the left.  
Likewise, the CDA moves slightly to the left but maintains its right-oriented position on 
the issue of the environment.  This movement may be due to the influence of the 
GreenLeft or, as was indicated in the interview with an official from the CDA, this 
movement may be due to societal changes within the electorate.  Given the emergence of 
the environmental movement in the 1970s and the relatively recent shift in the policy of 
the CDA, this indicates that the CDA reacted more to the electoral success of the 
GreenLeft than to the emergence of the environment movement.  This finding offers 
limited support for the ideological adaptation hypothesis posited above. 
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Figure 3.8: Dutch party positions on environmental protection for the Democrats 66/ 
GreenLeft (GL), Labour Party (PvdA), and Christian Democrats (CDA) 
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Table 3.15 shows the ideological movement of the CDA on seven issues.  The 
average net change for the party was 1.00 and the average maximum change 1.285.  
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Given the lack of a credible threat to the party from the anti-establishment right as well 
as consistent support (with the exception of the 1998 election) for the party, these 
changes do not correspond with the hypotheses of this chapter.  On the “key” issue of 
immigration, the party shifted its position significantly to the right.  This finding 
contradicts the ideological adaptation hypothesis. However, on other “key” issues (i.e., 
taxes and scope of government), the party has not altered its ideological positions, 
offering some support for the hypothesis.  Thus, there are contradictory findings 
concerning the effects of anti-establishment parties on the Dutch CDA. 
 
 
Table 3.15: Selected Issue Positions of the Christian Democratic Appeal in the 
Netherlands (CDA), 1970-2005 
 Change from 
Max. 
Change Net Change 
Individual freedoms -1 to +2 +3 +3 
Income taxes +2 to +3 +1 +1 
Total taxes +3 to +3 0 0 
Scope of government  +2 to +2 0 0 
Social Services +2 (to +4) to +2 +2 0 
State Ownership +2 to +3 +1 +1 
Immigration +2 to +4 +2 +2 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.9 graphically demonstrates the movement of Dutch political parties on 
the issue of the immigration.  As the figure indicates, the Dutch political parties have not 
significantly altered their positions on immigration. Even after the meteoric rise of the 
LPF in 2002, the traditional mainstream parties did not shift their position on 
immigration.  Instead, the establishment parties altered their positions in the mid-1990s 
before the emergence and sudden electoral success of the LPF.  Thus, we can assume  
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       Figure 3.9: Dutch party positions on immigration for the Democrats 66/ GreenLeft 
(GL), Labour Party (PvdA), Christian Democrats (CDA), and List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) 
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anti-establishment parties is not as widespread as indicated by the interviews.  The effect 
of anti-establishment parties in the Netherlands provides limited support for the 
ideological adaptation hypothesis. 
 
Norway. Table 3.16 displays the results of nine Norwegian parliamentary elections from 
1971-2005.  On the left side of the political spectrum, the Socialist Left (Sosialistisk 
Venstreparti, SV) pushes a socialist environmentalism agenda challenging the 
establishment on issues of equality, social welfare, and the environment.  On the right, 
the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP) challenges the establishment championing 
an anti-immigration, anti-tax platform.  Each of these anti-establishment parties garners 
significant support in the electoral arena creating a credible threat to establishment 
parties on both sides of the political spectrum.  This threat most often manifests itself to 
the Conservative Party (Høyre, H).  The Conservative Party experiences a steady decline 
in electoral support since the early 1980s, with the exception of the 2001 elections. At 
the same time, the FRP continues to rise in the polls.  The Norwegian Labour Party (Det 
norske arbeiderparti, A) remains steady at the polls, with exception of the 2001 general 
election, despite the electoral success of the Socialist Left.  From these election results  
and given the hypothesis above, we should expect the Conservatives to react more to the 
anti-establishment threat than the Labour Party.    
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Table 3.16: Norwegian Election Results, Selected Parties, 1971-2005 
(Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats) 
Party 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 
          
A 35.4 42.2 37.1 40.7 34.4 36.9 35.1 24.3 32.7 
 62 76 66 71 63 67 65 43 61 
          
H 17.4 24.8 31.7 30.4 22.1 17.0 14.3 21.2 14.1 
 29 41 53 50 37 28 23 38 23 
          
SV 11.2 4.2 4.9 5.5 10.0 7.9 6.0 12.5 8.8 
 16 2 4 6 17 13 9 23 15 
          
FRP 5.0 1.9 4.5 3.7 13.0 6.3 15.3 14.6 22.1 
  4 - 4 2 22 10 25 25 38 
Key: A: Norwegian Labour Party; H: Right (Conservative); V: 
Left; SV: Socialist Left Party; FRP: Progress Party. 
 
 
 
 However, the interviews point to the influence of both of these anti-establishment 
parties.  In two interviews with officials from the Socialist Left, each official pointed to 
the influence of the party within the party system, particularly on the issue of the 
environment. An official with the party argued: 
By being the first party taking it, we influenced the other parties.  And of 
course we had an influence in addition to these arguments and these 
debates by [being an] electoral threat.  So even if they didn't have it in 
their programmes, they saw this as an opportunity to come out with a 
better profile…  But it’s because [of] our strength… and our strength 
could lead to leftist policies. 
 
A member of the party leadership suggested that the Socialist Left plays a larger role 
within the Norwegian party system in addition to challenging the Labour Party. 
Traditionally our role has been, of course, to be a force of opposition 
from the left, bringing in new ideas, giving voice to various grass root 
movements, and putting pressure on the Labor Party especially to 
implement more radial reforms.  Historically, the reforms and the 
proposals of the Labor Party have been suggested by our party first and 
then later adopted by the Labor Party.     
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Furthermore, this official argued that the party alters the characteristics of the larger 
party system by providing an electoral challenge to the traditional mainstream parties.  
In answering a specific question pertaining to challenging the establishment, the official 
responded: 
We definitely do.  The Norwegian party system for the last 20 or 30 years 
has been a lot of parties crammed in the middle and the Socialist Left and 
the Progress Party on two different sides.  There is no doubt that we’ve 
been able to – in that position you have a lot of possibilities to set the 
agenda for the parliament – so we have been able to influence policy.  So 
there’s no doubt that the Labor Party, for instance, will always have to 
watch their back in a way if they know that if they go to far to the right, if 
they slip up on policies important for core lateral groups, then there’s 
actually an alternative there that might grow there and that would cost 
them dearly.  So we, I think we influence the other parties both directly 
and indirectly in those ways.   
 
Speaking about their impact of the specific issue of the environment, the party official 
argued: 
 
I think we’ve had a lot of impact on that issue. Norway is one of the very 
few countries in Europe that doesn’t have a Green Party of any 
considerable size, which is because we, along with Denmark, adopted 
those positions correctly… The Socialist Party adopted that position quite 
early in the mid-80s, when the Green Party started to grow.  The 
Socialists became the Green Party of Norway in many ways… So there’s 
no doubt that we’re influencing the other parties.  Along with quite a 
strong environmentalist we [influenced] putting environmental issues on 
the political agenda in Norway  
 
Thus, the Socialist Left, through its electoral success, place pressure upon the traditional, 
mainstream parties. 
 On the right side of the political spectrum, the Progress Party also affects 
establishment parties within the Norwegian party system.  The Progress party steals 
votes from both sides of the political spectrum.  When asked whether the party is 
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stealing votes from the Labour Party or the Conservatives Party, a high-ranking official 
within the leadership of the Progress Party responded:  
Both.  But I think mostly, and I don’t have the statistics to prove it, but 
when I see where our voters come from, … we take a lot of voters from 
the Labor Party, we take a lot of voters from the Conservative Party, but 
we also take a lot of voters from the couch, people who won’t vote, but 
they come and vote for us.  And I think that is also the fact when it comes 
to membership.  We have a lot of members and lot of politicians who 
have been active members of other parties, and also a lot of members who 
have never been active before.   
 
The influence of the Progress Party continues to grow as they push an anti-immigration 
stance in Norway.  This stance leads to a shift in the policy positions of traditional 
mainstream parties. Furthermore, their policy stances specifically affect the Conservative 
party. 
[I]t’s slowly dragged the other parties in the right direction on several 
political issues…. and, of course, immigration politics. I have to say that 
as well, because when we started to criticize the way immigration politics 
in Norway was felt, we were laughed at, of course. And their big problem 
is that they are conservative… I think you know what I mean when I say 
they are still conservative. They are stuck somewhere and they have 
never come down from there.  And they are struggling, and… their 
biggest problem is our existence.  They have never accepted or, and they 
don’t like it of course, but I don’t think they have realized that the 
Progress Party is twice as big them, nearly.  And that makes us the 
greatest party of opposition in Norway, [the] leading party of opposition; 
they still behave like they are the big star on our side of politics. 
 
 According to the interviews, the specific effects of the anti-establishment 
movement in Norway impact the establishment parties differently. Despite recognition 
of the challenge from the Progress Party, the Conservative Party did not dramatically 
react to the increased electoral support of this new threat. 
We have had discussions in the leadership of the Conservative Party 
about the rising, of course, of the Progressive Party and how we should 
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adapt to the challenge.  And from the grassroots of the Conservative Party 
of course… you’ve got messages about something has to be done and 
therefore this is much discussed.  But have these discussions force the 
Conservative Party into some dramatic shift of politics, no.  It’s very 
much discussed, it is on both the leadership and the grassroots, but when 
it comes to …should we tighten up the immigration policy just to 
compete with the Progressive Party when it comes to immigration and 
integration?  When we are finished discussing, our people say, well, we 
think immigration is good…. We have moved, but not dramatically when 
it comes to some fields of the integration and immigration politics… We 
have tightened a bit, but not dramatically. 
  
Thus, the Conservative Party altered its position on the issue of immigration, but not 
dramatically in the direction of the Progress Party.  
 The Labour Party, on the left side of the spectrum, argues that the influence of 
the Progress Party has diminished, but the threat remains.  A member of the Labour 
Party leadership hierarchy, speaking about the issue of immigration, stated: 
I think they [the Progress Party] have had an effect, forced the other 
parties to discuss it.  But now I think the Labor Party and also other 
parties are, we are more mature to discuss it, but maybe we would frame 
the debate differently.  Because it is also, there’s acceptance for 
discussing problems related to immigration, but there is also acceptance 
related to possibilities and opportunities that you have due to integration.  
We’re finally able to discuss immigration and integration as two different 
issues, really.  We think of the Progress Party as our most important, one 
of the most important rivals along with the Conservative Party, but we 
think of those as two conservative parties… and we take them seriously 
and we take their politics seriously.   
 
An interview with two scholars on Norwegian party politics confirmed the responses 
regarding the Progress party from party elites.  The Progress Party does indeed challenge 
establishment parties, both the Conservatives and the Labour Party, in terms of votes and 
policy issues, particularly immigration. 
It’s been the most important mobilization issue for [the] Progress Party 
and there has sort of been a consensus among the other parties about 
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immigration.  The Progress Party has been an alternative and, to some 
extent, all the other parties have had to adjust their immigration policy to 
meet the pressures.  And of course voters, most voters have traveled 
between the Progress Party and the Conservative Party, and the Progress 
Party always takes more votes from the Conservative Party.  They take 
votes from everybody, but mostly from the Conservatives.  They 
[Conservatives] were challenged by the Progress Party on these issues, … 
and the Labor party, the Progress Party really challenged them on these 
issues.  In the 2001 election, the Labor Party lost a percentage of votes 
and they had to adjust their course. 
 
Thus, similar to other party systems in Western Europe, the anti-establishment right 
challenges establishment parties on both side of the political spectrum. 
 
 
Table 3.17: Selected Issue Positions of the Labour Party of Norway (A), 1970-2005 
Issue Change from 
Max. 
Change Net Change 
Individual freedoms -2 to -3 -1 -1 
Income taxes -3 to -3 -0 0 
Total taxes -5 to -5 0 0 
Scope of government  -4 to -3 +1 +1 
Social Services -5 to -5 0 0 
Environment  -2 to -4 -2 -2 
Women’s Rights -3 to -5 -2 -2 
Minority Rights -2 to -4 -2 -2 
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The evidence from the party manifestos confirms much of the information 
gathered during these interviews.  Table 3.17 displays the ideological movement on 
eight issues.  The average net and maximum change for the party was 0.75.  Given the 
steady nature of the Labour Party, the lack of adaptation, despite the steady electoral 
showing for the Socialist Left, is expected.  On the “key” issues of taxes and social 
services, the party did not shift their policy positions.  Surprisingly, the party shifted its 
position on the issue of the scope of government towards the right calling for a slightly 
smaller role for the government. 
However, on the issue of environment protection, the Labour Party significantly 
shifted its policy position towards the position of the Socialist Left.  This is shown in 
Figure 3.10.  The Labour Party shifts its position in 1993 following a breakthrough 
election for the Socialist Left in 1989.  Interestingly, the influence of the Socialist Left 
stretches across the center of the political spectrum pulling the right-oriented anti-
establishment FRP from a decidedly right position to a left-of-center position by the end 
of the period under examination.  Furthermore, although the Conservative Party started 
the period already on the left side of the spectrum, the party shifted its position slightly 
more to the left.  Thus, the influence of the Socialist Left on the issue of environmental 
protection spreads to all parties with the Norwegian party system.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
140 
Figure 3.10: Norwegian party positions on environment protection for Socialist Left 
(SV), Labour Party (A), Conservative Party (C), and Progress Party (FRP) 
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one of these seven issues.  On average, the party’s net change was 2.86 and the 
maximum change was 3.14 to the right.  On the “key” issues of taxes, scope of 
government, and immigration, the party shifted its positions at least two positions to the 
right towards the position of the Progress Party.  Given the decline in electoral support 
for the party and the rise of the Progress Party, these significant changes are expected 
and warranted in order for the party to counter this growing electoral threat.    
 
 
Table 3.18: Selected Issue Positions of the Conservative Party of Norway (H), 1970-
2005 
Issue Change from 
Max. 
Change Net Change 
Individual freedoms +2 to +3 +1 +1 
Income taxes -3 to +2 +5 +5 
Total taxes -2 (to +3) to +2 +5 +4 
Scope of government  -3 to +1 +4 +4 
Social services -5 to -3 +2 +2 
State ownership +1 (to +4) to +3 +3 +2 
Immigration +1 to +3 +2 +2 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.11 graphically displays the movement of Norwegian political parties on 
the issue of immigration.  As the figure shows, the parties moved, in some cases 
significantly, to the right.  The Conservative Party gradually shifts their position from +1 
to a +3 moving closer to the position of the Progress Party.  The Labour Party undertakes 
the most significant shift in position on the issue of immigration.  Following the 
breakthrough election for the Progress Party in 1989 in which the party garnered 13  
percent of the vote and 22 seats in parliament), the Labour Party shifted dramatically to 
the right from a left-oriented -2 to a +1 position right-of-center.  If the Progress Party is 
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indeed stealing votes from the Labour Party, this shift in a “key” electoral issue for the 
Progress is expected by the ideological adaptation hypothesis.  The Labour Party, in an  
 
 
Figure 3.11: Norwegian party positions on immigration for Socialist Left (SV), Labour 
Party (A), Conservative Party (C), and Progress Party (FRP) 
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effort to stem the tide of the Progress Party, would shift their position on the issue of 
immigration.  However, the party has not experienced a decline in the polls that would 
warrant such a shift in policy.  Thus, the party attempted to counter the threat based on 
the mere perception that the Progress Party was stealing votes.        
 
In summary, establishment parties in Austria – the SPÖ and, to a lesser extent, 
the ÖVP – altered their ideological profiles to offset the threat from anti-establishment 
parties.  The Belgian establishment altered their ideological position on numerous issues 
championed by anti-establishment parties.  In Denmark, the electoral success of anti-
establishment parties led to dramatic shifts in the policy positions of the traditional 
mainstream parties.  In Germany, without a credible anti-establishment threat on the 
right, the influence of Die Grünen on the anti-establishment left pulled the establishment 
towards its position on numerous issues.  Anti-establishment parties in the Netherlands 
are not as successful as their counterparts in other Western European countries.  The 
Dutch establishment did not shift its policy positions despite slipping at the polls during 
this period.  Finally, the traditional mainstream parties in Norway shifted their 
ideological positions on many of these “key” issues as a reaction to the electoral success 
of anti-establishment parties. Therefore, the ideological adaptation hypothesis finds 
abundant support in these six countries.      
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Analysis: Organizational Change  
 
 The analysis of the organizational adaptation hypothesis (Hypothesis 3.2) finds 
little, if any, support in these six countries.58  In Austria, an official with the SPÖ 
acknowledged that the party discussed altering its organization due to the electoral 
success and structure of the Greens; however, these changes have not taken place.    
Yes, we know from several discussions, about our structure and how to 
change our structure, but our members like to have more possibilities to 
have more influence on the course of the party, at the federal level as well 
as on the state level…  We had very, many discussions about opening the 
party… about changes in the party, in the 1990s…in the late 90s. 
 
When asked specifically if the Greens were a catalyst for these discussions, the official 
offered: 
 
The Greens, oh my, yes, of course.  We had a new party with the Greens 
and we have a special situation in Austria where we have great problems, 
and the 80s and 90s with the SPÖ and the higher party organization. 
 
However, despite the electoral success of the FPÖ on the right, the ÖVP did not alter its 
organizational structures or even hold discussions to this effect.  Establishment parties 
did not alter their organizational structures to grant more power to rank-and-file 
members.  Although, the SPÖ held discussions concerning the impact of the Greens on 
the party’s organization, the party has not implemented any changes to date.  Meanwhile, 
the ÖVP has not adapted its organizational in any noticeable fashion.  Therefore, unlike 
                                                 
58
 There is no reason to suggest that these party officials would be less than truthful as it relates to 
organizational changes within the party.  Given that these officials admitted to no adaptation within the 
organizational structures of the party, but cited numerous occurrences of ideological change provides some 
validity to the indicator for organizational adaptation.  One reason for the lack of evidence of 
organizational adaptation may be that organizational changes are harder to recognize unless these changes 
are dramatic and occur over a short period of time. If these changes are gradual over a long period of time, 
they may be less noticeable to party officials.   
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the ideological adaptation hypothesis, the organizational adaptation hypothesis does not 
hold in Austria.     
 In Belgium, establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum adapted 
their structures due to a reorganization of the federal election structure.  An official with 
the CD&V argued, “it’s not a coincidence that the party structure went together with the 
structure for elections.”  Thus, as the federal election structure changed, the parties were 
forced to adapt their structures accordingly.  Furthermore, according to the official with 
the CD&V, the grassroots structure of the party and the ability of rank-and-file members 
to vote on party decisions have been in place for nearly fifty years.  Thus, there was no 
need for the party to alter or adapt its organizational structures devolving power to the 
rank-and-file members to counter the electoral threat from anti-establishment parties.  
Therefore, like in Austria, anti-establishment parties do not influence establishment 
parties in terms of organizational adaptation as they do in terms of ideological adaptation.  
As such, the organizational adaptation hypothesis does not find support. 
 The organizational adaptation hypothesis does not receive support from the 
interviews conducted in Denmark.  A leading scholar on Danish political parties argued, 
“I think that the smaller parties do not have that influence on organizations, not at all.  
Actually it’s been the other way around…. they [anti-establishment parties] had an 
organization like all the established parties”  An official with the Social Democrats 
confirmed these sentiments when asked about the catalyst for several organizational 
changes stating, “we made these changes before the emergence of the Green movement 
or the Socialist People’s Party.”  This official further noted, “elections may have been a 
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catalyst for these changes, but the Socialist People’s Party did not influence this.” A 
prominent member of the Socialist’s People Party leadership maintained, “I think the 
other parties respect our organization, but I do not think that we have influenced their 
organization.”  Thus, although the establishment parties in Denmark altered their 
organizational structures during this period, these changes were not due to the 
emergence or electoral success of anti-establishment parties.   
 The establishment parties in Germany altered their organizational structures due 
to reunification in 1990.  An SPD official stated, “I think the most significant change in 
the organizational structure of the SPD was after the reunification in 1990….  But the 
changes that took place were due to the reunification, not due to the membership 
wanting change or the party leadership wanting change; it was due to the society 
change.”  Moreover, the official declared:  
There has been a discussion about reorganizing the party, but it’s been a 
reform regarding our party statutes, but these haven’t been very 
significant changes in the organization of the party itself.  It has been 
much more like a technical approach, to technical and legal questions, 
party organizations, but it hadn’t anything to do with new emerging 
parties. 
 
When asked specifically about the influence of the Greens’ party organization, this 
official noted similarities between the role of members in Die Grünen and the SPD, but 
the party does not have the same grassroots movement parallel to Die Grünen.   
There are possibilities for all members to initiate resolutions at the party 
congress.  There is a possibility for them, so there are similarities with the 
Greens; however, we never had the grassroots movement and I’m not 
sure if we had any discussion about this.  
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The power distribution of the party has not changed towards the decentralization of Die 
Grünen. Instead, the party moved towards more centralization due to new media 
technology.  “I would say there was trend toward more centralization.  The executive 
board became more powerful, which has something to do with media and new media 
trends.” 
 Without a significant anti-establishment threat on the right, the CDU discussed 
adapting their organization, but these changes have yet to take place.  A CDU official 
acknowledged, “it was the idea to get the normal member more possibilities to 
participate in the party life.  It’s a thing we can’t implement from the top, so the decision 
has to be made from the bottom up.”  However, when asked if these discussions 
followed the emergence and electoral success of the Greens, the party official stated, “I 
would say not directly.  We have nothing to do directly with new parties or--but I think 
the idea to strengthen the membership in the way that they can participate more often is 
an idea that the Greens came up with in the 1980s.”  Thus, the organization of Die 
Grünen influences establishment parties; however, this influence is not direct or 
significant enough to confirm the organizational adaptation hypothesis.     
  In the Netherlands, the GreenLeft argues that establishment parties learn from the 
organizational structures of the party. A prominent member of the party leadership 
contends: 
I think some parties may have learned from the way we have our roots in 
those movements. Some parties, they are learning. They try to find the 
same way to modernize. For instance, the Socialist Party is using their 
members in all sorts of social movements to establish their power there.   
 
  
148 
However, the CDA disagreed with this assessment arguing that all organizational 
changes undertaken by the party reflect societal changes within the Netherlands.  A 
CDA official contends, “Our changes had nothing to do with the Greens. These changes 
came from within to adapt to changes within society.”  Therefore, anti-establishment 
parties in the Netherlands do not affect organizational change within the parties of the 
establishment.   
 Arguably the greatest influence of anti-establishment parties on the 
organizational structures of establishment parties occurs in Norway.  A member of the 
Labour Party leadership confirmed the party adopted a new strategy since 2001 to bring 
members closer to the party. This new strategy employs new technologies to better 
connect members to the leaders of the party and to re-educate members about the party.  
I would say the party has been brought closer together due to new 
technological developments.  The internet is playing a central part of the 
every day running of politics and also in the platform process.  We have 
made changes to involve the most people in it … you can be on the 
websites, and there are certain websites for the platform process.  And it 
means also that it’s easier to get in contact with the party leadership or the 
central board, it’s easier to give your opinion on a certain issue…. The 
most important thing is that it’s easier to get in contact with the 
Norwegian Labor Party and say what you mean.  Along those lines, in the 
last five years, we have had a lot of effort on education of the members 
and also of politicians, so all kinds of education and study groups, certain 
programs for different people, for women’s program or leadership 
program or minority programs, as well as ordinary schooling for both the 
elected and also the party officials. 
 
Furthermore, the party continues to discuss the role of membership and how to get the 
ordinary member more involved in the decision-making process within the party. 
And when it comes to the rules [statutes], it’s been a continuous debate 
on how each member could be more involved in the party … there is a 
value to the membership in itself.  It’s been a continuous debate and it’s 
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not just about the elected officials being able to say what they mean, but 
ordinary members that hold no positions, not in the party, not in any 
official government arenas, that they can decide more, be more involved. 
 
When asked specifically what caused these changes, this official acknowledged that poor 
electoral performance was a catalyst for these changes within the party’s organization. 
The 2001 parliamentary elections were the worst elections for the Labour Party since 
1926.  
I think one, a clear cause is the election of 2001. It was a wakeup call to 
the Norwegian Social Democrats, and it was a clear message both from 
members, from the unions, and the union members, which is part of the 
party in itself, which is an important force in Norway.  The members of 
the unions decided not to vote for the Labor Party, and we had great 
motivational problems with our own members as well.  And this--well, it 
affected the electorate, of course.  And I think the party has realized that 
we got away from the people.  We were governing and making decisions 
and running Norway but we didn’t do it with the Norwegians. So I think 
that is one of the clearest reasons why we have had to change, an obvious 
reason. 
 
Given the rise of anti-establishment parties threatening the Labour Party from both sides 
contributing to this poor electoral performance, these changes can be, at the very least, 
indirectly attributed to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties.  In other words, 
this is the evidence one would expect to see if anti-establishment parties are indeed 
influencing organizational changes within establishment parties.  Thus, of the six 
countries analyzed, Norway presents the best evidence, albeit limited, of the effects of 
anti-establishment parties on the organizational structures of establishment parties. 
 
 In summary, the organizational adaptation hypothesis does not receive support 
from these six countries.  For the most part, the electoral success of anti-establishment 
parties led to discussions concerning changes to the organizational structures; however, 
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these changes have yet to be implemented by traditional parties.  At the most, anti-
establishment parties have an indirect effect on organizational structure changes 
undertaken by establishment parties.  Perhaps the best evidence supporting the 
organizational adaptation hypothesis comes from the Labour Party in Norway, which 
undertook changes to better educate and connect to their members following their worst 
election in 75 years.  Thus, there is simply not enough evidence to support the second 
hypothesis concerning organizational change.       
Limitations 
 
 It must be noted that there are limitations to this method of data collection and 
that these limitations may contribute to the lack of evidence of organizational change.  
As with any survey instrument, the questions that you ask may dictate the answers you 
receive.59  The adaptation hypothesis focused on the organizational power structures of 
the more established parties as result of the electoral success of anti-establishment 
parties. In order to obtain data concerning the particular organizational changes, both 
broad and specific organizational questions were asked of the various party officials.  In 
particular, one question asked of establishment party officials concerned the 
implementation of primary elections for the selection of party candidates. This question 
concerns the distribution of power within the party and whether party members were 
given more organizational power as a consequence of anti-establishment party electoral 
success.   
                                                 
59
 This is akin to the selection bias argument made by Geddes (1990) in which the cases you select may 
dictate your findings. 
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However, questions concerning other forms of organizational change may not 
have been asked.  If the proper follow-up questions were not asked, it is entirely possible 
that the proper information regarding other types of organizational change was not 
gained from these interviews.  This may account for the lack of evidence of 
organizational adaptation from the established political parties in these six countries.  It 
is possible that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties prompts different 
organizational changes not under investigation within this dissertation.  
Another concern of this method of data collection concerns whether the party 
officials were able to recognize organizational changes.  Organizational change can 
occur in a slow, incremental process or at a rapid, frenzied pace.  Changes that occur at a 
faster pace may be easier to recognize by party officials.  Slow, incremental change may 
not catch the attention of party leaders.  Having not recognized organizational change, 
party officials may not offer this information during the interviews regardless of the 
questions asked.  Furthermore, given the tenure of the official with the party, the party 
officials may not be able to offer information concerning changes that occurred before 
their time with the party.  As such, changes that are a reaction to the electoral success of 
anti-establishment parties early in the period under investigation may be missed by these 
interviews.    
Implications and Conclusion 
 
 There are numerous implications of the analyses in this chapter.  First, although 
parties are conservative organizations, parties do indeed adapt to the environment 
created by the emergence and electoral success of anti-establishment parties.  
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Establishment parties adapt their ideological profiles on numerous issues in order to 
counter the growing electoral threat from anti-establishment parties.  In particular, 
establishment parties shift their ideological position on the issues of the environment and 
immigration (as shown in Figures 3.1 – 3.11), two issues championed by anti-
establishment parties on different sides of the spectrum.  This movement confirms earlier 
research from Downs (2001).  Traditional parties engage anti-establishment parties by 
co-opting anti-establishment policies expanding the programmatic agenda of the party 
by directly addressing these issues.  Thus, in order to remain in power in the unstable 
environment created by the emergence of anti-establishment parties, traditional parties 
trade principle for pragmatism and seek more innovative, engaging tactics to counter the 
threat from anti-establishment parties (see Downs 2001).          
However, traditional mainstream parties do not alter their organizational 
structures to adapt to this new electoral environment.  Despite the lack of support for the 
organizational adaptation hypothesis, the analyses in this chapter confirm earlier work 
by Rohrschneider (1993).  For Rohrschneider (1993), the most difficult challenge for 
establishment parties in countering the threat from anti-establishment parties is changing 
their organizational structures.  As mentioned above, it is easier for traditional parties to 
shift their policy positions and integrate new issues into their platforms than to 
fundamentally change their organizational power structures (Rohrschneider 1993).  
Therefore, as the analysis demonstrates, establishment parties are more resistant to 
changing their organizational structures than their ideological profiles in order to adapt 
to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. 
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 Second, by instigating movement among parties of the establishment, anti-
establishment parties may hinder their own electoral fortunes.  By moving away from 
the center of the spectrum, as is indicated by these analyses, traditional mainstream 
parties are creating more distinct ideological profiles and more polarization within the 
system.  In turn, this may help stem the tide of anti-establishment party electoral success 
in these countries.  Anti-establishment parties campaign on the notion that all 
establishment parties are the same.60  If establishment parties are more ideologically 
distant and distinct, this argument made by anti-establishment parties may fall on deaf 
ears.  Moreover, from the analyses in the second chapter, the electoral support for anti-
establishment parties decreases as the amount of polarization between establishment 
parties increases.  Thus, as anti-establishment parties continue to gain electoral support, 
they sow the seeds of their own destruction.  Clearly, the circular relationship between 
polarization and anti-establishment parties warrants further research. 
 Third, the movement of establishment parties alters the dynamics of the party 
system, particularly the process of coalition formation.  As establishment parties distant 
themselves from each other, the likelihood of “grand” coalitions between establishment 
parties decreases.  Establishment parties must look for new coalition partners as 
traditional coalition alliances no longer remain viable options.  The movement of 
traditional mainstream parties forces these parties to look for alliances with parties closer 
to their ideological placement including anti-establishment parties.  Therefore, the 
                                                 
60
 See the definition of anti-establishment party detailed in the second chapter. 
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electoral success of anti-establishment parties may lead to the inclusion of these parties 
in coalitional governments across Western Europe.61 
 Finally, the movement of establishment parties may lead to governing coalitions 
introducing new legislation or implementing new policies favored by anti-establishment 
parties.  The analyses in this chapter examine the issue positions of establishment parties; 
however, these issue positions may become implemented policies if these parties enter 
into government.  In order to remain in power, establishment parties must deliver on 
their campaign promises or face the electoral consequences.  In Denmark, the electoral 
success of the Danish People’s Party (and the earlier electoral success of the Progress 
Party) led to arguably the most stringent immigration laws in the European Union.  Thus, 
the influence of anti-establishment parties can lead to changes to governmental policies 
creating greater electoral success for these less established parties.                
 These implications guide several avenues of research.  First, does the adaptation 
of traditional mainstream parties help or hinder the electoral fortunes of these parties? 
Does the decision to alter their ideological profiles or organizational structures help the 
party counter the threat from anti-establishment parties or further fuel the decline of the 
party?  Do voters punish parties for moving too far from their core ideology or base 
supporters? Although it is possible, to some extent, to see if establishment parties 
increase their vote share in elections following these changes from these analyses, 
further research could shed light on the consequences of these changes for establishment 
parties. In a similar vein, future research may demonstrate the effects of these 
                                                 
61
 The next chapter examines the effects of anti-establishment parties on the duration of cabinet 
governments.  
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adaptations on the electoral fortunes of anti-establishment parties.  Do these changes 
allow establishment parties to limit or reverse the electoral successes of anti-
establishment parties?   
 Second, how does the movement of establishment parties influence other 
traditional mainstream parties within the system?  Traditional mainstream parties 
compete against each other for the ability to form cabinet governments.  Thus, 
establishment parties’ main rivals in pursuing governmental offices are other 
establishment parties.  In order to be in position to form governments, establishment 
parties must balance between reacting to threats from anti-establishment parties as well 
as their closest establishment rivals.  In turn, there are consequences for the larger party 
system.  If establishment parties move too far from the center in the process of adapting 
to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties, then new parties may emergence in 
the center of the spectrum filling the void created by the movement of the traditional 
parties.  This may further the instability created by the emergence of anti-establishment 
parties.  The next chapter examines, in great detail, the effects of anti-establishment 
party electoral success on the larger party system.  However, future research must 
consider the effects the movement of traditional mainstream parties has on similar 
parties within the system.  Does the electoral success of anti-establishment parties 
initiate a chain reaction creating ripples throughout the entire party system?      
Third, does the movement of establishment parties lead to changes in 
governmental policies favored by anti-establishment parties?  As mentioned above, the 
electoral success of anti-establishment parties in Denmark led to tougher immigration 
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laws.  Anti-establishment parties on the left often campaign on an environmentalist 
agenda.  Does the electoral success of these anti-establishment parties lead to changes to 
the environmental policies of different governments across Western Europe?  Have other 
anti-establishment parties on the right seen similar electoral success in other countries 
and other issues (i.e., welfare policies)?  These questions deserve greater attention 
through future research to fully appreciate the consequences of anti-establishment parties. 
Finally, how has the electoral success of anti-establishment parties affected these 
parties themselves? In some instances, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties 
leads to the inclusion of these parties in governing coalitions throughout Western Europe.  
In these instances, the party ceases to be an anti-establishment party.  However, after the 
collapse of the coalition or new elections, the party oftentimes will continue its anti-
establishment rhetoric or campaigning.  Do voters punish anti-establishment parties for 
being part of the establishment or continue to support them in subsequent elections?  Do 
the electoral fortunes of anti-establishment parties wane after being in a governing 
coalition?  Given the electoral success of these parties, do anti-establishment parties 
attempt to become part of the establishment by moderating their extreme positions?  Do 
anti-establishment parties become victims of their own electoral success?              
The next chapter explores the effects of anti-establishment parties on the broader 
party system.  Does the movement of establishment parties lead to increased volatility 
and polarization within the party system?   Do voters abandon establishment parties to 
vote from anti-establishment parties leading to increased volatility within the system?  
Does the movement of establishment parties increase the amount of polarization within 
  
157 
the system?  Does the electoral success of anti-establishment parties further destabilize 
the party system by decreasing the length of cabinet governments?  Does the amount of 
seats garnered by anti-establishment parties limit the opportunities establishment parties 
have to form viable governing coalitions in parliament? These research questions 
stemming, in part, from the analyses in this chapter are addressed in greater detail in the 
next chapter.    
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES ON THE  
 
BROADER PARTY SYSTEM 
 
The last chapter examined the effects of anti-establishment parties on the 
organizational structures and ideological profiles of the more established parties within 
the party systems of Western Europe.  This chapter investigates the consequences of 
anti-establishment party electoral success on the broader party system.  New parties may 
serve to reinvigorate or destabilize an institutionalized party system (Harmel 1997).  
Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck (1984) argue new parties are a result and contributor to the 
realignment that has occurred within the once “frozen” party systems of Western Europe.  
Furthermore, Harmel (1985: 414) contends “new parties may be seen as part of a 
solution to what has generally been viewed as decline in the importance of parties.”  The 
environment in which representative democracy operates is ever changing prompting its 
institutions to adapt or face extinction.  As the theoretical expectations of the second 
chapter indicate, if the electorate does not feel that establishment parties meet their needs 
and interests, the voting public can, and indeed does, look elsewhere.  Thus, in the forty 
years since Lipset and Rokkan (1967:50) concluded that the “party systems of the 1960s 
reflect, with few significant exceptions, the alignments of the 1920s,” the party systems 
of Western Europe have undergone numerous changes.   
Despite the possible effects of anti-establishment parties, the literature 
concerning their consequences on the larger party system has merely scratched the 
surface (for example, see Powell 1986).  Previous qualitative research demonstrates that 
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anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum increase the amount of 
polarization with the party system (Bale 2003; Mair 2001).  Yet, other important aspects 
of the party system remain unexamined. By pushing new issues and gaining electoral 
support, anti-establishment parties activate new voters, force parties to alter their 
ideological positions (see Chapter 3), and stealing votes from traditional mainstream 
parties, anti-establishment parties alter the stability of their respective party systems.  
Utilizing quantitative analyses, this chapter argues anti-establishment party electoral 
success increases voter turnout and electoral volatility by activating new voters and 
offering viable electoral alternatives to traditional parties.  Furthermore, I argue that the 
electoral success of anti-establishment increases polarization between establishment 
parties, as these parties shift their positions on the ideological spectrum, and within the 
party system.  Moreover, I contend that anti-establishment parties alter the coalitional 
dynamics within the party systems of Western Europe leading to increased instability.  
The remainder of the chapter is divided into six sections.  The first section 
discusses previous research concerning the effects of anti-establishment parties on the 
broader party system.  The second explains the contributions to the literature made by 
the analyses in this chapter.  The theoretical orientation of this chapter is outlined in the 
third section.  The next section details the data and methods utilized for the different 
analysis contained in this chapter. The results and implications of these analyses are 
discussed in the fifth and sixth sections, respectively.  Finally, the chapter concludes 
with a discussion of future avenues of research concerning the effects of anti-
establishment parties.  
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Previous Literature: Anti-Establishment Parties and Party System Stability 
 
 Despite the extensive literature concerning the effects of new parties on the 
broader party systems (see, for example, Downs 1957, Sartori 1976, Harmel and 
Robertson 1985, and Hug 2001), a specific focus on the effects of anti-establishment 
parties is lacking.  Anti-establishment parties, regardless of their placement on the 
political spectrum, may destabilize or reinvigorate the party systems in which they 
compete.  Despite the possible consequences stemming from the electoral success of 
anti-establishment parties, literature concerning this topic merely scratches the surface.  
The majority of research investigating the effects of anti-establishment parties focuses 
on the relationship between electoral success and the amount of polarization within the 
party system (see Mair 2001 and Bale 2003).  In addition, studies examining cabinet 
stability in Western Europe use support for anti-establishment parties as a proxy measure 
for system or parliamentary polarization (see Sanders and Herman 1977 and King et al. 
1990).   
Recent scholarly work on the effects of anti-establishment parties argues that the 
electoral success of these parties leads to increased polarization within the party systems 
of Western Europe.  Mair (2001) contends that the emergence of the Greens parties 
serves to polarize the left side of the political spectrum in many party systems.  Mair 
(2001: 111) states, “Green parties have not simply joined governments, but they have 
also provided the necessary extra weight to the left to allow for the possible emergence 
of a sustained bipolar pattern of competition.”  Thus, political competition, which is 
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largely center based, shifts to a more polarized environment.  Mair (2001: 112) further 
maintains that across Western Europe, coalitional support from Greens parties may:  
prove necessary to maintain what has been a traditional pattern of 
bipolarism and to prevent a new drift towards centrist coalition-forming. 
In other words, although the Greens may end up by joining an 
establishment against which they were mobilised, their presence may be 
sufficient to permit a shift away from a consensual, centre-based, 
coalitional style of politics and towards the sort of competitive bipolar 
pattern. 
 
Moreover, Greens parties help to change the political character of the mainstream parties, 
and hence breathe new life into an otherwise moribund political world (Mair 2001).  
Mair (2001) argues that these anti-establishment parties on the left do not necessarily 
need to achieve major electoral breakthroughs to play this role.  However, “they may 
prove substantial enough to make the crucial difference between the continuation of 
centrist coalitional politics, on the one hand, or the emergence of a more bipolar pattern 
of competition, on the other” (Mair 2001: 112). 
Bale (2003) argues that the emergence and mainstreaming of the anti-
establishment parties on the right affects the right side of the political spectrum in the 
same manner.  By adopting many of the policy positions of the far right, the mainstream 
parties legitimize the far right (Bale 2003; see also Downs 2001).  With the expansion of 
the right bloc, traditional mainstream parties help to prime far-right issues and, in some 
cases, deliver upon far-right campaign promises, particularly on the issue of immigration. 
Thus, the right side of the political spectrum in many of the party systems of Western 
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Europe expanded to include the anti-establishment right.62  Combined with the findings 
of Mair (2001), these findings suggest that the electoral success (or even emergence) of 
anti-establishment parties, on both sides of the political spectrum leads to a more 
polarized party system.  
The literature also examines, albeit in a cursory manner, the effects of anti-
establishment parties on the stability of coalitional government in Western Europe. 
Utilizing the proportion of seats occupied by anti-system parties as a proxy measure for 
polarization, Sanders and Herman (1977) found anti-system parties shorten the lifespan 
of coalitional governments.  In a similar vein, for their examination of cabinet duration, 
King et al. (1990) uses electoral support for extreme parties to measure the amount of 
polarization in the party system.  These authors find this measure to have a negative 
significant influence of the duration of cabinet governments.  Furthermore, Warwick 
(1979) argued that the ideological cleavage within the cabinet itself significantly affects 
the tenure of the government.63    
Contributions to the Literature 
 
Despite these studies examining the effects of anti-establishment parties on the 
broader party system, I contend that there are at least three omissions from this literature.  
First, this literature fails to address how the electorate reacts to the emergence, and 
subsequent electoral success, of anti-establishment parties.  Has the electoral success of 
                                                 
62
 Bale (2003: 85) argues that this increased polarization does not help far-right parties as this coalition 
“leads not to mutually sustaining relationships but rather to unceremonious cannibalisation of a junior 
partner swiftly seen to have outlived its usefulness.” 
63
 This finding suggests that the inclusion of extreme (i.e., anti-establishment) parties shortens the duration 
of coalitional governments. However, the effects of anti-establishment parties as coalitional members are 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
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the anti-establishment activated new voters leading to an increase in voter turnout?  Do 
anti-establishment parties steal votes from parties of the establishment or increase the 
amount of volatility within the party system?  Intuitively, if these parties serve as voice 
of discontent, then it is reasonable to assume that anti-establishment will influence the 
electorate in some manner.  Yet, the literature neglects to asks and examine these 
questions.   
Second, this literature fails to quantitatively examine the effect of anti-
establishment party electoral success on the level of polarization between parties of the 
establishment and within the party system itself.  The studies conducted by Mair (2001) 
and Bale (2003) suggest that anti-establishment parties increase the amount of 
polarization both between traditional mainstream parties and, in turn, within the party 
system.  However, these studies utilize qualitative methods.  Using quantitative methods, 
this study asks the question, do anti-establishment parties increase the amount of 
polarization between parties of the establishment and within the party system?  In other 
words, do the qualitative findings of Mair (2001) and Bale (2003) hold using 
quantitative measures for polarization?64  Third, and finally, previous research fails to 
directly investigate the effect of anti-establishment parties on the duration of coalitional 
governments while controlling for the level of polarization. As mentioned above, 
previous studies use support for, or seats occupied by, anti-establishment parties as a 
                                                 
64
 By asking this question, I do not mean to suggest that qualitative research leads to invalid or 
insignificant findings. Single case or small-N studies can be beneficial to the development of generalizable 
theories if executed properly (see Lijphart 1971 and Mayer 1989).  Indeed, many of the generalizable 
theories concerning the electoral success of anti-establishment parties were first tested using single case or 
small-N studies.  Lijphart (1971, 692) argues that these “theory building” case studies are necessary in the 
understanding of political phenomena.  In analyzing this question, I am examining these claims using new 
quantitative measures of polarization. 
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proxy for polarization. Does support for anti-establishment parties affect the duration of 
coalitional governments while controlling for polarization in a different manner.   
Theoretical Orientation  
 
  As discussed in the first two chapters, changes in the value orientation of the 
electorate, weakened partisan loyalties and disaffection with the traditional parties over 
the past four decades have manifested themselves in the amount of electoral support for 
parties that challenge the traditional parties within the system (i.e., anti-establishment 
parties) and allowed these parties to gain a foothold and thrive in the electoral arena (see 
also Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000 and Poguntke 1996).  Anti-establishment 
parties alter the political landscape of their respective party systems instigating 
instability.  However, previous research fails to systematically and quantitatively 
examine the consequences to the larger party system stemming from the electoral 
success of anti-establishment parties.   
As argued in the last chapter, for a democratic system to survive and remain 
viable, its institutions (i.e., political parties) must remain vibrant and its party system 
stable.  Without viable institutions meeting the demands of the public, democracy 
withers and decays (Easton 1957; Huntington 1965).  Thus, party systems must adapt 
and change as new competitors emerge and threaten the established order. But how do 
anti-establishment parties alter the party system?  I argue that electoral success of anti-
establishment parties alters party systems by increasing voter turnout, electoral volatility, 
and the amount of polarization between establishment parties and within the larger party 
system.  In addition, anti-establishment parties, by gaining seats within parliament, upset 
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coalitional dynamics increasing cabinet instability within the party systems of Western 
Europe.  Therefore, instability begets instability, albeit in a different form. 
First, anti-establishment parties increase voter turnout and electoral volatility 
within the party system by bringing new voters into the political arena. Anti-
establishment parties often campaign on new issues or issues long neglected by 
traditional parties challenging the status quo of the political system. These new parties 
emphasize the fundamental division between parties of the establishment and the 
electorate. Moreover, anti-establishment parties campaign on the assertion that a 
fundamental divide exists between themselves and traditional, mainstream parties.  If the 
electorate does not believe that establishment parties are articulating their interests and 
meeting their needs and demands, the voting public can, and indeed does, look 
elsewhere.  With the electorate “shopping” within the electoral marketplace, anti-
establishment parties offer viable electoral alternatives to the traditional parties.   
Three hypotheses arise from this argument.  First, by campaigning on new or 
long neglected issues, we should expect anti-establishment parties to activate and attract 
new voters to the political arena.  Thus, anti-establishment party electoral success 
increases voter turnout.  In addition, as the electorate becomes increasingly disillusioned 
with traditional, mainstream parties, we should expect anti-establishment parties to steal 
votes from other competitors in the party system.  Therefore, anti-establishment parties 
increase the amount of electoral volatility within the party system.  From this argument, 
the following is hypothesized:  
H4.1: The electoral success of anti-establishment parties will significantly 
increase the turnout in subsequent elections 
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H4.2: The electoral success of anti-establishment parties will significantly 
increase the amount of electoral volatility within the party system 
 
The electoral success of these new parties, as measured by the percentage of 
votes received in national parliamentary elections, leads to increased instability.  
However, this second hypothesis does not provide a direct test of the notion that the 
electoral volatility experienced during the 1970s and 1980s was a result of anti-
establishment parties stealing votes from parties of the establishment.  This hypothesis 
tests the argument that anti-establishment parties increase the overall volatility of vote 
shares within their respective party systems.  It is entirely possible that the volatility of 
these party systems is merely a result of traditional parties switching vote shares with 
other traditional parties.  Similarly, anti-establishment parties may steal electoral support 
from other anti-establishment parties. To examine whether anti-establishment are 
stealing electoral support from traditional, mainstream parties, I hypothesize: 
H4.3: The electoral success of anti-establishment parties will significantly 
increase the amount of electoral volatility for establishment parties 
 
If the vote share received by anti-establishment parties, on both sides of the political 
spectrum, significantly influences the amount of electoral volatility of establishment 
parties, then one may assert that anti-establishment parties are indeed offering viable 
electoral alternatives. Thus, anti-establishment parties are stealing votes from 
establishment parties increasing the amount of electoral volatility. 
 As noted in the third chapter, established political parties must adapt to electoral 
threats from new entrants into the political arena.  In turn, this has important 
implications for the amount of polarization between establishment parties and within the 
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party system.  Traditional, mainstream parties shift their ideological positions to counter 
the electoral success of anti-establishment parties increasing the amount of polarization 
between establishment parties.  Moreover, political parties shift their policy positions in 
response to policy shifts of their closest rival (see Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009).  Thus, 
I argue that anti-establishment parties shift their ideological profiles to maintain a 
distinct identity (see Harmel, Janda and Tan 1995) from parties of the establishment.  In 
turn, the degree of polarization within the party system increases as anti-establishment 
parties distant themselves from traditional, mainstream parties.  From this discussion, I 
posit a second set of hypotheses:  
H4.4: The electoral success of anti-establishment parties will significantly 
increase the amount of polarization between establishment parties in 
subsequent elections 
  
H4.5: The electoral success of anti-establishment parties will significantly 
increase the amount of polarization within the party system in subsequent 
elections  
 
Couched in these terms, parties of the establishment become more polarized as a 
reaction to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. At the same time, anti-
establishment parties react to the movement of established parties increasing the amount 
of polarization in the party system.    
Finally, I argue that anti-establishment parties upset the coalitional dynamics 
within the party systems of Western Europe.  Previous studies of the effects of anti-
establishment parties on cabinet stability utilize support for these parties as a proxy 
measure for polarization.  Yet, these studies fail to examine the effects of anti-
establishment parties on the duration of cabinet governments while controlling for the 
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amount of polarization within the parliament. The electoral success of anti-establishment 
parties, as measured by the number of seats occupied by these parties in parliament, 
decreases the bargaining space available to traditional mainstream parties in forming and 
sustaining coalitional governments.  Logically, the number of seats occupied by anti-
establishment decreases the size of possible governing coalitions since anti-
establishment parties, by definition, do not have a realistic chance of participating in 
government due to their challenge to “the status quo in terms of major policy issues or 
the nature of political activity” and are not seen as suitable coalitional partners by the 
parties of the establishment (Mackie 1995: 174-175).65  Thus, the following is 
hypothesized: 
H4.6: As the proportion of seats anti-establishment parties occupy within 
parliament increases, the duration of coalitional governments decreases  
 
With increases in the proportion of seats occupied by anti-establishment parties, 
the number of viable governing coalitions decreases.  Thus, winning parties experience 
difficulty in merely forming coalitional governments and may be forced to form 
coalitions with unreliable or reluctant partners.  In turn, this increases the likelihood of 
government failure.  Additionally, the percentage of anti-establishment party seats 
decreases the size of winning coalitions, which increases the likelihood of these 
coalitions facing opposition challenges.  This proliferation in opposition challenges 
increases the likelihood that coalitional governments will dissolve.  As such, the 
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 There are numerous examples of anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum 
entering into governing coalitions.  However, the consequences of anti-establishment party participation in 
coalitional governments are beyond the scope the current research. 
  
169 
electoral success of anti-establishment parties, translated into to seats in parliament, 
leads to more instability within the party systems of Western Europe.  
In summary, by campaigning on new or long neglected issue and activating new 
voters, anti-establishment parties increase voter turnout.  In turn, this increases the 
amount of electoral volatility between establishment parties and within the larger party 
system.  Furthermore, anti-establishment party electoral success increases the amount of 
polarization between parties of the establishment as these parties attempt to counter this 
new electoral threat. This electoral success also increases the amount of polarization 
within the system as anti-establishment parties attempt to maintain a distinct identity 
from their closest mainstream rival.  Finally, I expect the proportion of seats garnered by 
anti-establishment parties to decrease the bargaining space and the number of viable 
governing coalitions available to establishment parties when forming and maintaining 
coalitions.  In turn, this leads to increased instability within the party system as the 
duration of coalitional governments is shortened.    
Data and Methods 
 
The distinct nature of these hypotheses requires multiple datasets.  The first of 
these datasets examines the first hypothesis and utilizes voter turnout as the dependent 
variable.  Voter turnout is measured as the percentage of eligible voters casting a ballot 
in an election.  For this hypothesis, the major explanatory variable is the percentage of 
votes received by anti-establishment parties in the previous national parliamentary 
election.  In order to make valid causal inferences or, at the very least, a temporal link, 
the electoral support for anti-establishment parties is lagged one election. Thus, I argue 
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that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties will lead to increased turnout in 
the subsequent election.  To control for other factors that help explain voter turnout, this 
analysis includes indicators for the level of disproportionality within the electoral system, 
the “effective” number of parties, type of electoral system, compulsory voting, economic 
conditions (i.e., inflation and unemployment), and turnout in the previous election.66  
The second and third hypotheses utilize a second dataset.  For the second 
hypothesis, the dependent variable, electoral volatility, is measured using the indicator 
developed by Pedersen (1979).  Electoral volatility measures the net electoral change 
within the party system resulting from individual vote transfers.67  This measure captures 
the amount of electoral volatility for all parties competing in two consecutive elections.  
For the third hypothesis, the dependent variable is a modification of this indicator.  This 
modification accounts for the electoral volatility for only establishment parties 
competing in two consecutive elections.  Thus, this variation captures the amount of 
electoral support lost by establishment parties from one election to the next.   
                                                 
66
 These institutional and economic variables are described in greater detail in the second chapter.  The 
least squares index measures the level of disproportionality of any electoral outcome (i.e., election), or the 
difference between the percentage of votes received and the percentage of seats any party gets within the 
legislature.  The “effective” number of parties is measured using the index developed by Laakso and 
Taagepera (1979).  Compulsory voting is measured as a dichotomous variable (1 if voting is compulsory).  
The type of electoral system is measured as a dichotomous variable (1 for proportional representation 
system, 0 if otherwise).   
67
 This measure of electoral volatility is derived in the following manner: If we let pi,t stands for the 
percentage of the vote, which was obtained by party i at election t, then the change in the strength of i 
since the previous election will be: ∆pi,t = pi,t - pi,t- 1 and if we do not consider sign differences, the 
following relation exists for the party system: Total Net Change (TNCt) = it
n
i
p∆Σ
=1
, 0 ≤ TNCt ≤ 200 where 
n stands for the total number of parties competing in the two elections. Logically, the net gains for winning 
parties are numerically equal to the net losses of the parties that were defeated in the election. Thus, one 
may use another indicator which is slightly easier to calculate and to interpret, namely: Volatility (Vt) = ½ 
x TNCt , 0 ≤ TNCt ≤ 100 where Vt is simply the cumulated gains for all winning parties in the party system 
or, if you prefer, the numerical value of the cumulated losses for all losing parties. Its range has a 
straightforward explanation and it can be expressed in terms of percentage (Pedersen 1979). 
 
  
171 
The major explanatory variable for this analysis is support for anti-establishment 
parties in the national parliamentary elections.  However, given that parties fight for the 
same voters during the same election, the amount of support for anti-establishment 
parties has an immediate effect on the amount of volatility within the party system and 
for establishment parties.  As with the previous dataset, this dataset includes measures 
for the level of disproportionality within the electoral system, the “effective” number of 
parties, economic conditions, and the amount of volatility in the previous election to 
control for other factors, which influence the amount of volatility. 
In order to calculate the most accurate volatility score, careful investigation was 
undertaken to follow the historical development (i.e., name changes) of these parties.  In 
many instances, the volatility scores reflect continuous parties although the names of the 
parties have changed from election to election.  For example, numerous parties 
underwent name changes ahead of the Belgian parliamentary elections in 1981, however, 
these do not constitute new parties and therefore, their previous vote share is factored 
into the calculation for the volatility index.   
The third dataset examines the two hypotheses concerning the amount of 
polarization between parties of the establishment and within the party system.  To 
measure the amount of polarization, this analysis utilizes the polarization measure 
developed by Maoz (2006).   As noted in the second chapter, polarization is a complex 
measure that must take into account the number, structure, cohesion, size, and amount of 
overlap between various groups within a given population.  Previous measures of 
polarization fail to account for the fact that these attributes may interact; therefore, 
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changes in polarization are not linear in nature (Maoz 2006).  The measure of 
polarization utilized by these analyses integrates all of these properties into a single 
measure of polarization.  For this reason, Maoz (2006) argues, and demonstrates, that 
this index offers the best measure for polarization.68  
As with the measure for electoral volatility, the indicator for polarization has two 
distinct variations.  For the fourth hypothesis, this measure takes into account the amount 
of polarization (i.e., ideological distance) between parties of the establishment.  For the 
fifth hypothesis, this measures accounts for the amount of polarization within the 
broader party system.  As with the analysis concerning voter turnout, the variable of 
interest is electoral support for anti-establishment parties in the previous election.  
Therefore, I argue that previous support for these parties leads to increased polarization 
between establishment parties and within the party system in subsequent elections.  This 
dataset includes controls for the level of disproportionality within the electoral system, 
the “effective” number of parties, the type of electoral system, economic conditions and 
the amount of polarization from the previous election. Table 4.1 displays the descriptive 
statistics for the analyses of voter turnout, electoral volatility, and polarization.   
For each of these three datasets, the unit of analysis is national parliamentary 
elections.  These datasets cover the time period 1970-2005 for eighteen countries within 
Western Europe. Because standard regression models assume fixed intercepts across 
states and uncorrelated error terms, these models are inadequate for analyzing cross-
sectional data.  Rather than attempting to specify a laundry list of additional country-
                                                 
68
 This measure takes into account the thirteen policy categories with both positive and negative positions 
from the Comparative Manifesto Project.  For a more detailed discussion of this index, see Maoz (2006). 
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specific factors that may affect the estimates, I employ a panel-estimated approach 
utilizing a random effects model which accounts for country-specific effects that are 
likely to be present in the error term (Wooldridge 2001).   
 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics – Voter Turnout, Electoral Volatility, and 
Polarization 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Minimum  Maximum 
Anti-Establishment Party  
Support 12.21 10.10 0 77.4 
Anti-Establishment Party  
Support (Lagged) 12.16 10.38 0 77.4 
Voter Turnout 79.88 11.18 42.2 96.3 
Establishment Party Volatility  6.63 4.54 0.3 22.6 
System Volatility 11.10 7.36 0.85 46.65 
Establishment Party Polarization 0.31 0.10 0.05 0.71 
System Polarization 0.46 0.11 0.24 0.80 
“Effective” Number of Parties  3.91 1.45 1.73 9.05 
Disproportionality 4.58 4.35 0.41 25.25 
Inflation 7.81 8.84 0.14 76.2 
Unemployment 6.11 4.30 0 22.7 
Compulsory Voting 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Unicameralism 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Prop. Representation System 0.84 0.37 0 1 
Note: N = 164 for analyses with lagged variables  
 
 
 
For the final hypothesis above, I constructed a monthly dataset of government 
duration for eighteen countries in Western Europe.  For this analysis, the dependent 
variable is the time, as measured in months, until government failure.69  Given the 
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 A government fails if any of the following occur: “1) a change in Prime Minister; 2) a change in the 
party composition of the Cabinet; or 3) resignation in an inter-election period followed by re-formation of 
the government with the same Prime Minister and party composition” (Woldendorp, Keman and Budge 
2000: 10).  This is indicated as a dichotomous measure (1 if failure occurs in that month, 0 if otherwise). 
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availability of data, the timeframe for this analysis is 1970-2005.  Duration models are 
the appropriate estimation techniques for modeling temporally dependent observations 
and pose many advantages over traditional approaches such as ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).70  Duration or survival 
models allow researchers to test many theories that, at their core, have implicit or 
explicit interests in the notions of timing and change (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 
2004).  The advantages to using survival models to test the hypotheses developed above 
rather than ordinary least squares (OLS) have been well documented (see Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).   
The major explanatory variable for this analysis is the proportion of seats 
garnered by anti-establishment parties within the national parliament for each specific 
country. The measure is calculated by dividing the number seats occupied by anti-
establishment parties by the total number of seats in parliament and is expressed as a 
percentage.  In addition, this dataset includes control variables measuring economic 
conditions (i.e., inflation, unemployment (both lagged) and GDP growth) and 
institutional factors (i.e., the amount of polarization in parliament), which may influence 
the duration of coalitional governments.71  First, I control for the type of government.  
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 The other principle advantage to using duration analysis over OLS is that OLS is unable to deal with the 
naturally occurring time dependence of a process like government tenure.  I assume that the probability of 
a government failing depends partially on whether the government was in office in the previous period.  
This assumption leads to the natural conclusion that any omitted variables will lead to autocorrelation, 
which OLS cannot deal with satisfactorily.  Further, logistic regression analyses fail because “an indicator 
variable cannot capture the variability in duration time a state spends prior to adoption—precisely the 
effect we are trying to understand” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997: 1417).  This causes inefficient 
estimates with large variances.   
71
 For the analysis of cabinet duration, the variables for inflation and unemployment are lagged one month 
to establish “causality” or, at the very least, a temporal link between economic conditions and cabinet 
stability.  Missing data for the measure of GDP growth were interpolated using STATA. 
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For this analysis, there are six types of government, which are broken down into two 
categories: majority governments and minority governments.72  These variables are 
coded as a dichotomous measure, one (1) for presence and (0) if not.  Majority 
governments (i.e., single-party, minimal winning coalitions, and surplus coalitions) and 
the minority governments (i.e., single-party minority, multi-party minority government, 
caretaker governments) are coded together.  In this analysis, the majority variable is 
tested with minority status being the baseline category.   
Moreover, this analysis controls for the “effective” number of government parties, 
partisanship of the government, the constitutional inter-election period, and type of 
governmental system as well as the rules of the government formation process, which 
might serve as constraints to the durability of cabinet governments.  The “effective” 
number of government parties is derived from the index created by Laakso and 
Taagepera (1979).  The measure for partisanship of the government takes the left-right 
score for each party from the Comparative Manifestos Project data (Klingemann et. al. 
2006) and weights this score by the percentage of government seats.  This measure 
ranges between -100 (far left) and 100 (far right). The constitutional inter-election period 
(CIEP) indicator measures the time left (in months) before the next constitutionally 
mandated election and is obtained from Kurian (1997).  Presidential systems are coded 1 
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 The six types of government identified by Muller-Rommel et al. (2004) are as follows: (1) single-party 
government (one party holds majority of parliamentary seats and all government positions), (2) minimal 
winning coalition (all parties in government are necessary to form a majority government), (3) surplus 
coalition (coalition governments that exceed the minimal winning coalition criteria), (4) single-party 
minority government (the party in government does not hold majority of seats in parliament), (5) multi-
party minority government (the parties in government do not hold majority of seats in parliament), and (6) 
caretaker government (temporary cabinet).   
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if there is a directly elected president who is not accountable to the parliament.73  Further, 
I also coded whether a vote of investiture is required for the formation of the cabinet 
government (1 if required), whether parliament has the power to pass a vote of no 
confidence against the government (1 if possible), and whether the prime minister has 
the power to dissolve parliament (1 if allowed).  These variables were collected from 
Strøm, Müller, and Bergman (2003).  Finally, to control for the amount of polarization 
within the system, I use the measure developed by Maoz (2006).  Table 4.2 shows the 
descriptive statistics for the analysis of cabinet stability. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics – Cabinet Stability  
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Minimum  Maximum  
Anti-Establishment Party Seat 
Share 9.18 10.40 0 79.52 
Inflation (Lagged) 0.46 0.87 -6.19 10.4 
Unemployment (Lagged) 6.30 3.86 0 20.6 
GDP Growth 1.93 0.56 -0.02 5.72 
“Effective” Number of  
Government Parties 1.90 0.98 1 5.48 
Government Partisanship -3.04 17.85 -58 61.07 
Polarization 0.47 0.12 0.24 0.8 
Type of System 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Majority 0.75 0.43 0 1 
CIEP (Months) 28.87 14.74 0 60 
Investiture 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Prime Minister Dissolution 0.10 0.30 0 1 
No Confidence Vote  0.94 0.23 0 1 
 
 
                                                 
73
 From Shugart and Carey (1992), Switzerland and France (5th Republic) are coded as presidential 
regimes. 
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This hypothesis is tested using a Cox proportional hazard model (Cox 1972).  
The underlying logic to the Cox model is to provide a truly flexible duration model 
where one “could obtain estimates of the covariates of interest, and leave the particular 
form of the duration dependency unspecified” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 48, 
emphasis in original).  Choosing the proper model specification may be difficult; 
however, the Cox model does not require that you specify the underlying hazard rate.  If 
the wrong distribution is specified, this will cause the inferences “regarding the 
relationship between the covariates and the duration time [to] be misleading since 
covariate estimates can be sensitive to the distribution function specified” (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 21).  The baseline hazard rate is assumed to be unknown 
and is left unparameterized; therefore, Cox models are often referred to as a “semi-
parametric” model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 49).  Given the nature of the 
dependent variable, the Cox model provides the best test for these hypotheses.   
Analysis 
 
The analyses confirm support for five of the six hypotheses stated above.  The 
results indicate that anti-establishment parties do not increase voter turnout in 
subsequent elections.  However, anti-establishment party electoral success does lead to 
instability within the party system by significantly increasing electoral volatility and 
polarization – both for establishment parties and for the broader party system – as well 
as upsetting traditional dynamics shortening the duration of coalitional governments.  
Table 4.3 shows the results of the analysis regarding the relationship between voter 
turnout and the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. The coefficient for anti-
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establishment party support is negative.  This suggests that anti-establishment party 
support negatively influences voter turnout in subsequent elections. However, this 
relationship is not statistically significant.74  
The control variables – the measures for disproportionality, compulsory voting, 
and the previous level voter turnout – significantly affect voter turnout. Each of the 
coefficients for these variables is in the expected direction.  Disproportional electoral 
systems dampen voter turnout whereas compulsory voting increases voter turnout.  
Furthermore, higher levels of turnout in the previous election lead to increased voter 
turnout in subsequent elections.  The remaining control variables – the “effective” 
number of parties, unemployment, inflation, and unicameral legislatures – do not reach 
conventional levels of statistical significance.      
Table 4.4 shows the results concerning the effects of anti-establishment party 
electoral success and electoral volatility.  The electoral success of anti-establishment 
parties significantly increases the amount of volatility within the party system in 
subsequent elections (Hypothesis 4.2).  This finding implies that the electoral success of 
anti-establishment parties furthers the continued decline of partisan attachments within 
the party systems of Western Europe (see Chapter I).  Furthermore, the results indicate 
that economic conditions are most influential as it relates to the amount of system 
volatility.  The remaining control variables fail to reach statistical significance.   
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 This finding that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties does not significantly affect voter 
turnout may be due to model misspecification.  It is entirely possible that the success of anti-establishment 
parties produces significant changes in voter turnout that are not witnessed through aggregate totals of 
voter turnout.  In order to capture whether anti-establishment parties are mobilizing voters, future research 
should develop measures and control for changes (increases or decreases) in the number of first-time 
voters.  Furthermore, future research should considering controlling for changes in voting age population.  
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Table 4.3: The Effects of Anti-Establishment Party Support on Voter Turnout –
Random Effects Model 
 
Voter 
Turnout 
Anti-Establishment Party Support 
(Lagged)  
-0.02 
(0.03) 
Disproportionality -0.17 (0.08) 
“Effective” Number of Parties -0.04 (0.23) 
Inflation 0.01 (0.03) 
Unemployment 0.05 (0.07) 
Compulsory Voting 1.86 (0.87) 
Unicameralism -0.11 (0.65) 
Turnout (Lagged) 0.94 (0.03) 
Constant 4.22 (2.83) 
Obs. (elections) 164 
R2 (overall) 0.90 
R2 (within) 0.48 
R2 (between) 0.99 
Rho 0 
Note: Coefficients in bold are significant at the .05 level  
(one-tailed test). Standard errors shown in parentheses 
 
 
The second column in Table 4.4 shows the results for the analysis of volatility 
between establishment parties.  Anti-establishment party electoral success increases the 
amount of volatility within the vote shares for establishment parties (Hypothesis 4.3).  
This suggests that anti-establishment parties are indeed creating more instability within 
the party system by stealing votes from traditional, mainstream parties and influencing 
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individual vote choice. As for the control variables, the level of disproportionality and 
inflation significantly increase the amount of volatility between establishment parties.  
The remaining control variables do not significantly affect establishment party volatility.   
 
 
Table 4.4: The Effects of Anti-Establishment Party Support on Volatility – Random  
Effects Model 
 
System  
Volatility 
Establishment 
Party Volatility  
Anti-Establishment Party Support  0.25 (0.06) 
0.11 
(0.04) 
Disproportionality 0.19 (0.14) 
0.18 
(0.09) 
“Effective” Number of Parties 0.41 (0.43) 
0.28 
(0.27) 
Inflation 0.14 (0.06) 
0.11 
(0.04) 
Unemployment 0.23 (0.14) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
System Volatility (Lagged) 0.08 (0.08)  
Establishment Party Volatility (Lagged) 
 
0.12 
(0.08) 
Constant 2.28 (2.33) 
1.20 
(1.46) 
Obs. (elections) 164 164 
R2 (overall) 0.19 0.17 
R2 (within) 0.16 0.09 
R2 (between) 0.34 0.47 
Rho 0 0 
Note: Coefficients in bold are significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test).  
Standard errors shown in parentheses 
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Table 4.5: The Effects of Anti-Establishment Party Support on Polarization –
Random Effects Model 
 
Establishment  
Party Polarization  
System  
Polarization 
Anti-Establishment Party Support  
(Lagged)  
0.002  
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.001) 
Disproportionality -0.005 (0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
“Effective” Number of Parties -0.014 (0.004) 
-0.013 
(0.004) 
Proportional Representation  -0.046 (0.017) 
-0.033 
(0.018) 
Inflation -0.0004 (0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Unemployment 0.001 (0.0002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Establishment Party Polarization 
(Lagged) 
0.619  
(0.054)  
System Polarization (Lagged) 
 
0.575 
(0.057) 
Constant 0.216  (0.036) 
0.240 
(0.039) 
Obs. (elections) 164 164 
R2 (overall) 0.62 0.64 
R2 (within) 0.35 0.26 
R2 (between) 0.89 0.89 
Rho 0 0 
Note: Coefficients in bold are significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test).  
Standard errors shown in parentheses 
 
 
 
The results shown in Table 4.5 demonstrate support for the fourth and fifth 
hypotheses posited above.  First, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties leads 
to establishment parties distancing themselves from one another in subsequent elections.  
The coefficient for anti-establishment party support indicates that support for these 
parties in the previous election leads to increased polarization between parties of the 
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establishment.  This suggests that establishment parties alter their ideological positions 
along the political spectrum to counter the electoral threat from anti-establishment 
parties (see Chapter III).   
The control variables indicate mixed results.  The measures for the “effective” 
number of parliamentary parties and proportional representation systems significantly 
influence the amount of polarization between establishment parties in a negative 
direction.  As the number of parties increases in proportional representation systems, the 
ideological distance between establishment parties decreases.  This may indicate an 
overcrowding of the political spectrum where there is simply no room for establishment 
parties to spread out across the political spectrum if they wish to maintain a distinct 
identity.  However, the amount of polarization between traditional mainstream parties 
also decreases in more disproportionate electoral systems.  Although these findings seem 
at odds, in disproportionate systems (e.g., the United States), parties often place 
themselves at the middle of the political spectrum in order to attract as many voters as 
possible – i.e., the median voter (see Downs 1957).  Thus, the polarization between 
parties of the establishment decreases.  The variables measuring the economic conditions 
within a country do not reach statistical significance, whereas the previous amount of 
polarization between establishment parties proves to be significant predictor.  
The second column of Table 4.5 demonstrates that anti-establishment party 
support in previous elections leads to increased polarization within the party system.  
This suggests that anti-establishment parties increase the ideological space along the 
political spectrum.  These quantitative empirical findings confirm the conclusion from 
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the qualitative work of Mair (2001) and Bale (2003).  Anti-establishment parties alter the 
landscape of the political spectrum by providing the “necessary extra weight” to create 
“a sustained bipolar pattern competition” (see Mair 2001: 111).   
Like the analysis of establishment party polarization, the control variables offer 
some interesting results. As the number of parliamentary parties increases in 
proportional representation systems, the amount of polarization within the system 
decreases.  Whereas this finding seems counterintuitive, there may be a reasonable 
explanation.  In political systems in which smaller parties are “drafted” into government 
and opposition groups, the amount of polarization within the system decreases (see 
Schneider 2004).  This is most likely to happen in proportional representation systems in 
which coalitional governments of three or more parties are necessary to form a majority.  
Thus, smaller, possibly extreme, parties are co-opted in order to form majority coalitions 
and opposition groups.  In turn, this may decrease the amount of polarization within the 
system as these smaller parties lessen their extreme stances and shift their position on the 
ideological spectrum to form a more cohesive coalitional, whether in government or in 
opposition.   
However, higher levels of disproportionality decrease the amount of system 
polarization.  Duverger (1963: 226) argues that in disproportional systems, voting for 
minor parties becomes a fruitless act as “electors soon realize that their votes are wasted 
if they continue to give them to the third party, whence their natural tendency to transfer 
their vote to the less evil of its two adversaries” (Duverger 1963: 226).  Thus, voters 
support traditional mainstream parties, which have a greater opportunity to gain 
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governmental office, decreasing the amount of polarization within the system.  Higher 
levels of unemployment lead to increased system polarization.  This suggests that during 
poor economic conditions, voters may look at electoral alternatives at the extremes of 
the political spectrum in order to solve economic difficulties.  Previous system 
polarization is also a significant predictor of system polarization. 
Table 4.6 shows how anti-establishment party electoral success affects the 
duration of cabinet governments in Western Europe. Hazard rates above one decrease 
the lifespan of coalitional governments, whereas a hazard rate below one increases the 
lifespan.  From this, one can see that anti-establishment parties are threats to the stability 
of coalitional governments.  For every one percent of seats occupied by anti-
establishment parties, the hazard rate increases by one percent.  Thus, anti-establishment 
party electoral success decreases the duration of cabinet governments.  As the proportion 
of seats garnered by anti-establishment parties grows, traditional parties are increasingly 
limited in their opportunities to form stable governing coalitions. This leads to smaller 
winning coalitions, which face larger opposition groups and thus, more opposition 
challenges.  Therefore, the duration of cabinet governments is shortened as a larger 
opposition group, gaining support from anti-establishment members of parliament (MPs), 
challenges these smaller governing coalitions. 
The control variables, with the exception of unemployment, all behave in the 
expected manner although some do not reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance.  Higher levels of inflation increase the hazard rate decreasing the duration 
of the government. Higher levels of GDP growth decrease the hazard rate increasing the 
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duration of the cabinet.  These findings confirm the conclusions of previous research that 
better economic conditions improve the probability of government survival.  However, 
higher levels of unemployment actually increase the duration of coalitional governments.  
Although, this finding is not consistent with Warwick (1994), this may be due to the 
preponderance of left-oriented governments in this analysis. Warwick (1994: 92) 
suggests that left-oriented governments do not terminate when unemployment rates are 
higher due to their favorable reputation on the issue.75 
Furthermore, as the “effective” number of governmental parties increases, the 
duration of a coalitional government increases.  Moreover, the amount of polarization 
significantly decreases the hazard rate increasing the lifespan of cabinet governments.  
Although these findings may seem counterintuitive, this implies that coalitions with 
more parties and more polarized systems promote compromise in order for coalitional 
governments to remain in power.  Majority coalitions have a greater probability of 
remaining in government longer.  The variables for the rules of the government 
formation process and institutional constraints (i.e., a vote of investiture, dissolution of 
parliament by the prime minister, and a vote of no confidence) do not significantly affect 
the duration of coalitional governments.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
75
 For this analysis, the mean for government left-right position is -3.04 and the median is -3.58.  These 
measures indicate the preponderance of left-oriented governments in the sample.  Warwick (1994) argues 
that economic conditions interact with the partisanship of the government. During times of high 
unemployment, left-oriented governments are more likely to remain in office. However, right-oriented 
governments are more likely to survive during periods of high inflation.    
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Table 4.6: The Effect of Anti-Establishment Party Electoral Success on Cabinet 
Duration – Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
 Hazard 
Rate 
Coefficient 
Anti-Establishment Party 
Seat Share 1.01 
0.01  
(0.01) 
Inflation (Lagged) 1.29 0.26 (0.13)  
Unemployment (Lagged) 0.85 -0.16 (0.03) 
GDP Growth 0.45 -0.80 (0.23) 
“Effective” Number of  
Government Parties 0.81 
-0.22 
(0.09) 
Government Partisanship 0.99 -0.01 (0.004) 
Polarization 0.28 -1.26 (0.74) 
Type of System 0.16 -1.81 (0.32) 
Majority 0.66 -0.42 (0.16) 
CIEP (Months) 1.04 0.04 (0.005) 
Investiture 0.87 -0.14 (0.17) 
Prime Minister 
Dissolution 0.88 
-0.12 
(0.28) 
No Confidence Vote  0.92 -0.08 (0.49) 
Number of Subjects 6522  
Number of Failures 281  
Log Likelihood -2048.36  
LR Chi-squared 226.79  
Note: Hazard rates in bold are significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test).  
Standard errors shown in parentheses 
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Implications 
 
There are several implications stemming from these analyses. First, and foremost, 
the emergence, and subsequent electoral success, of anti-establishment parties alters the 
party systems in which they compete. Although it is debatable whether anti-
establishment parties reinvigorate or destabilize, there can be little debate that these 
parties alter the political landscape in Western Europe.  Anti-establishment party 
electoral success increases the amount of volatility and polarization, both between 
traditional mainstream parties and within the system.  Moreover, these new entrants into 
party system further contribute to the instability experienced by these party systems 
since the 1970s by garnering seats in parliament and upsetting traditional coalitional 
dynamics.  The party systems examined by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in the 1960s look 
drastically different forty years later due, in no small part, to anti-establishment parties 
altering the political landscape 
Second, the emergence and electoral success of anti-establishment parties cannot 
stem the tide of declining voter turnout in Western Europe.  Although Gray and Caul 
(2000) highlight the importance of group mobilization in increasing voter turnout, anti-
establishment parties cannot reverse the trend of declining turnout.  At the same time, 
this finding suggests that parties of the establishment, or the voters themselves, are not 
mobilizing groups against the anti-establishment movement.  Furthermore, if anti-
establishment parties are not significantly increasing voter turnout, then their electoral 
support must be coming from voters that previously supported other competitors within 
the party system. This furthers the claim that anti-establishment parties are stealing votes 
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from other parties.  Finally, the argument can be made that as anti-establishment parties 
gain electoral support, more and more of the electorate, which participated in previous 
elections, are no longer participatory in the electoral process (i.e., voting). This implies 
that previous studies of declining partisan attachments in Western Europe are correct.    
Third, if they wish to remain viable electoral competitors, traditional mainstream 
parties must counter the electoral threat of anti-establishment parties.  The emergence 
and electoral success of anti-establishment parties provides the electorate with viable 
alternatives, which leads to increased volatility and “vote switching” within the electoral 
system.  Furthermore, these findings suggest that this increased volatility and “vote 
switching” comes at the expense of establishment parties as anti-establishment parties 
steal votes from traditional mainstream parties.  In turn, this may force traditional parties 
to shift their policies, organizational structures, or campaign strategies in order to 
counter the threat from anti-establishment parties and regain lost electoral support (see 
also Chapter III).  Traditional mainstream parties must learn to adapt to the new 
environment produced by anti-establishment party electoral success.  If the 
establishment fails to change, these parties face the possibility of not regaining these 
votes and losing their viability in the electoral market.  Thus, it is the traditional parties 
within these democratic systems, and not necessarily the system itself (see also Crozier, 
Huntington, and Watanuki 1975, Dalton 1999, Norris 1999, Dalton and Wattenberg 
2000a, and Putman, Pharr, and Dalton 2000), which are under attack from anti-
establishment parties.   
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Fourth, despite electoral system factors that significantly decrease the amount of 
polarization, both between establishment parties and within the larger party system, the 
electoral success of anti-establishment parties significantly increases polarization.  Thus, 
the effects of anti-establishment parties counteract the effects of the electoral system.  
Furthermore, this suggests that other competitors within the system are reacting to the 
electoral success of anti-establishment parties and to the segment of the electorate that 
support these new entrants into the political arena. If the needs of citizens are not 
satisfied, then the institutions of the democratic system may decay (Easton 1957; 
Huntington 1965).  Political parties, as vehicles for the people to articulate and aggregate 
their demands, must remain vibrant.  In order to do so, political parties must adapt to this 
new environment.  These results suggest that the parties of the establishment are indeed 
shifting their positions along the political spectrum to meet this electoral challenge. This 
confirms earlier work concerning the movement of traditional parties particularly on the 
issues upon which anti-establishment parties campaign (see Harmel and Svåsand 1997).  
Thus, it appears that the establishment parties are attempting to meet the demands of 
those voters who are either mobilized by anti-establishment parties or feel abandoned by 
establishment parties in favor of these new parties.  
These findings also suggest that the electoral success of anti-establishment 
parties has indeed increased the ideological space within the party systems of Western 
Europe.  This confirms the findings of Mair (2001) and Bale (2003).  This does not 
confirm that parties of the establishment are co-opting anti-establishment parties into 
government or opposition coalitions; however, from these findings, one can conclude 
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that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties is “substantial enough to make the 
crucial difference between the continuation of centrist coalitional politics, on the one 
hand, or the emergence of a more bipolar pattern of competition, on the other” (Mair 
2001: 112).  The combination of these findings leads to the conclusion that anti-
establishment parties produce the latter patterns of competition rather than the former. 
Finally, anti-establishment parties upset the traditional dynamics of coalition 
formation and coalitional duration. By gaining seats and reducing the opportunities 
available for traditional parties to form coalitional governments, anti-establishment 
parties significantly shorten the length of cabinet governments within parliament.  What 
remains to be seen is how the establishment (i.e., traditional parties) attempts to counter 
this threat.  As mentioned in the last chapter, traditional parties may choose to alter their 
policy positions, organizational structures, or campaign strategies to counter the anti-
establishment threat to the stability of the party system.  However, countering the threat 
to the coalitional dynamics within parliament may require different tactics.  In order to 
counter this threat, traditional parties may to choose to establish new, non-traditional 
coalitional ties by co-opting anti-establishment parties or traditional enemies in 
governing coalitions.  Therefore, we may see the advent of “grand” coalitions or 
coalitions between traditional enemies or fundamentally different parties.  If this is 
indeed the case, anti-establishment parties may serve to usher in a new era of party 
competition within the party systems of Western Europe.   
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Conclusion 
 
Recent scholarly work demonstrates that anti-establishment parties on both sides 
of the political spectrum alter the patterns of party competition with the political systems 
of Western Europe.  These new parties help to foster a bipolar pattern of political 
competition (Mair 2001; Bale 2003).  However, the analyses conducted in this chapter 
demonstrate that anti-establishment parties do much more that this to alter the political 
landscape within these systems.  Anti-establishment parties, through their electoral 
success, increase volatility and polarization within the party system and increase the 
instability of coalitional governments.  In turn, traditional mainstream parties must adapt 
in order to stabilize the party system.   
This does not suggest that democracy itself is under attack, but rather, that 
establishment parties and the party systems in which they compete must adapt to a new 
environment.  Anti-establishment parties contribute to, and take advantage of, a 
“thawing” of the once “frozen” party systems of Western Europe (see Lipset and Rokkan 
1967).  This is due, in no small part, to the new or long neglected issues that anti-
establishment parties bring to the forefront of the political landscape.  In addition, the 
shift in values across Western Europe since the early 1970s (see Inglehart 1971, 1990) 
creates the environment for anti-establishment parties to thrive and challenge the 
traditional parties.  However, the adaptation of establishment parties allows these 
vehicles for the people to remain viable, continue to meet the demands of their citizens, 
and counter the electoral threat of anti-establishment parties.  Thus, the stability of the 
democratic system endures even as these party systems become more fluid.    
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What remains is whether anti-establishment parties influence other aspects of the 
political system.  How does the electoral success of anti-establishment influence policy 
and the policymaking process?  Does the support garnered by anti-establishment parties 
lead to new policies or changes to old policies?  Anti-establishment parties on different 
sides of the spectrum campaign on environmental, law and order, and welfare 
retrenchment.  Do governmental policies shift leading to more or less expenditures in 
these areas?  Furthermore, on rare occasions, anti-establishment parties enter into 
governing coalitions with traditional, mainstream parties. Although these parties would 
be considered part of the establishment, does their inclusion into the governing coalitions 
alter governmental policies?  Have these new parties altered the policymaking process 
by entering into governing coalitions?  These questions, which must be left to future 
research, can further our understanding of the complete anti-establishment party 
phenomenon.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Anti-establishment parties alter the political landscape within the party systems 
of Western Europe.  This dissertation seeks to explain the emergence, electoral success 
and consequences of anti-establishment to provide the most complete portrait of this 
phenomenon.  The emergence of these parties coincides with the shift in the value 
orientations of the European electorate towards postmaterialism.  The vast literature 
investigating the electoral success of anti-establishment parties offers a broad yet 
incomplete analysis of the institutional, sociological and economic factors that account 
for the electoral success of these new parties.  Despite the accumulation of literature 
focusing on the electoral success of anti-establishment parties, there remains a dearth of 
literature concerning the consequences of this electoral success.  This dissertation 
overcomes various deficiencies within the literature regarding the electoral success and 
consequences of anti-establishment parties.        
This examination of anti-establishment parties leads to several broad conclusions.  
First, the party systems examined by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) were not “frozen” or, at 
the least, “thawed” soon after their seminal work.  Within a decade of their observation 
that the “party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few significant exceptions, the 
alignments of the 1920s” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 50), Denmark experienced a 
“landside election” or Jordskredsvalget in which new parties capturing over thirty-four 
per cent of the votes cast.  The anti-establishment Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet) 
gained 15.9 per cent and twenty-eight seats in the Danish legislature, Folketing.  In 1983, 
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the German Green Party, Die Grünen, garnered 5.6 percent of the vote and twenty-seven 
seats in the Bundestag becoming the first successful party of its kind. Thus, shortly after 
the work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), new entrants into the party system altered the 
landscape of party politics in Western Europe.   
Second, the lack of a definitional consensus hinders the study of anti-
establishment parties.  The electoral success of anti-establishment parties across Western 
Europe sparked the interest of political scientists prompting extensive examination of 
these new parties.  However, these studies reach different, often contradictory, 
conclusions concerning the factors favoring the electoral success of anti-establishment 
parties.  The lack of a consensus on a clear operational definition of anti-establishment 
parties further exacerbates this problem.  Various studies claiming to examine the same 
subset of anti-establishment parties (i.e., left-libertarian or far right) actually examine 
different parties due to the use of different definitions.  This dissertation remedies these 
problems by offering a definition that overcomes the pathologies from which previous 
definitions suffer.  This definition allows for an examination of anti-establishment 
parties, regardless of their placement on the political spectrum in a single theoretical 
framework. 
Finally, although there is a developing literature concerning the consequences of 
anti-establishment parties, the effects of these parties remain understudied.  Depending 
upon one’s viewpoint, anti-establishment parties may reinvigorate or destabilize the 
broader party system.  This dissertation examines the manner by which anti-
establishment parties alter the individual parties and party systems of Western Europe.  
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These new parties influence ideological change within individual parties and alter party 
systems by increasing electoral volatility, increasing polarization, and upsetting the 
traditional coalitional dynamics within these parties.  Despite this effort, future research 
must do more to appreciate the full consequences of anti-establishment parties.    
The remainder of this concluding chapter focuses on the specific conclusions 
about the emergence, electoral success and, finally, the consequences of anti-
establishment parties derived from the analyses in this dissertation.  The focus then shifts 
to a discussion of future research concerning anti-establishment parties.  In other words, 
this chapter asks two questions: What have we learned from these analyses and where do 
we go from here in the study of the anti-establishment party phenomenon?     
The Emergence of Anti-Establishment Parties 
 Anti-establishment parties changed the face of the “frozen” party systems of 
Western Europe.  These new parties seized upon the emergence of a new set of values 
that led to the decline of traditional cleavage structures (i.e., culture, region, class and/or 
religion) that shaped the party systems of the 1960s.  Value orientations shifted from 
materialist (i.e., material well-being and physical security) to postmaterialist (i.e., 
quality of life) values and a tolerance for a variety of life styles (Inglehart 1971, 1977; 
see also Flanagan 1982a, 1982b).  The emergence of this new set of values gave rise to 
what scholars refer to as the “new politics” (Inglehart 1984; Dalton 1988).  This shift 
towards postmaterialism affected partisan preferences and alignments producing the 
need for, and allowing for, new parties (e.g., anti-establishment parties) to emerge and 
gain support based on these new values.   
  
196 
Moreover, several studies point to rising discontent and disenchantment within 
the electorate towards more established political parties (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000a; 
Poguntke and Scarrow 1996) or unhappiness with the workings of the broader party 
system (Norris 1999; Pharr and Putnam 2000).  Another sign of discontent with 
established political parties is the decline of partisanship within many industrialized 
democracies.  If partisan ties are weaker and voters are making their electoral choices 
based on campaign issues instead of partisan loyalties, this allows for new parties, 
campaigning on new issues, to emerge and garner electoral support (see Dalton 2000 and 
Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000).  Furthermore, more and more citizens are 
unhappy with the internal workings of the party system.  Trends in public opinion within 
Europe show “the basic picture is one of spreading disillusionment with established 
political leaders and institutions” (Putman, Pharr, and Dalton 2000: 10, emphasis added).  
These patterns of cynicism towards political institutions accelerated over the last twenty 
years since the European electorate possesses a “skeptical attitude” toward the reality of 
democracy (Klingemann and Fuchs 1995: 440-441).  Norris (1999: 26) advances these 
claims stating, “in established democracies, during the last decades of the twentieth 
century, growing numbers of citizens have become increasingly critical of the major 
institutions of representative government.”  Disillusionment with the established parties 
and eroding public support for essential representative institutions in many Western 
European democracies are both catalysts for the emergence of anti-establishment parties 
and allow for these parties to gain a foothold within the political arena. 
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Finally, in a similar vein, electoral volatility increases within these party systems 
over the last forty years.76  Several scholars note shifts in the stability of voter 
alignments by the end of the 1970s (Pedersen 1983; Maguire 1983; Dalton, Flanagan 
and Beck 1984; Crewe and Denver 1985; Franklin et al. 1992).  Franklin et al. (1992: 
404) note that “the electoral impact of social cleavages may well have been already in 
decline before the 1960s.”  Thus, the party systems observed by Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967) were already changing as political cleavages became more irrelevant to party 
electoral success.  More recently, Schmitt and Holmberg (1995) found partisan 
attachments waning in many Western European countries (see also Klingemann and 
Fuchs 1995).  
Despite the fact that anti-establishment parties emerge from these changes, 
research on these new parties dismisses the fact that these parties, regardless of their 
placement on the political spectrum, are part of the same phenomenon.  Ignazi (1992:6) 
argues that anti-establishment parties are “the legitimate and unwanted children of the 
New Politics” as “common problems and common concerns coalesced in partisan 
organizations at different ends of the political spectrum” (Ignazi 1997: 318).  Thus, the 
rise of anti-establishment parties is a by-product of the postmaterialist value system as 
well as the disenchantment and disillusionment with established political parties and the 
larger political system taking advantage of, and contributing to, the growing discontent 
and increased volatility within the party systems of Western Europe. 
                                                 
76
 There remains a vigorous debate regarding claims of increased electoral volatility in Western European 
party systems. For a discussion of these claims, please see Rose and Urwin (1970) and Bartolini and Mair 
(1990). However, from the analyses in the fourth chapter, it is clear that anti-establishment parties increase 
the level of volatility within their respective party systems.   
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However, previous studies treat anti-establishment parties of the left (i.e., left-
libertarian) as a different phenomenon from anti-establishment parties on the right (i.e., 
far-right, populist).  Although anti-establishment parties of the left are distinctly different 
from anti-establishment parties of the right in terms of ideology, organizational structure, 
and bases of support, anti-establishment parties are part of the same phenomenon.  All 
anti-establishment parties emerge from the same root causes.  Mackie (1995) argues that 
parties challenging the establishment are born from the same phenomenon due to the fact 
that left-libertarian parties and “new populist” parties share the same electoral fortunes 
and the same “enemy” within the same countries.  “To some extent the new populist 
parties are the mirror-image of the parties of the libertarian left.  They too inveigh 
against the democratic leviathan” (Mackie 1995: 177).  Taggart furthers the “mirror 
image” argument that all anti-establishment parties are indeed one phenomenon by 
concluding:  
Through examining their ideology, it is clear that their commonality lies 
in the fact that they are reactions to recent developments in West 
European politics.  They are united in what they oppose. They stand in 
opposition to what they see as the failed post-war settlement. In their 
actions and organisations there is a self-conscious effort to contrast 
themselves with ‘old’ established parties. (1996: 45) 
 
The “symmetrical pattern in ideological, organizational and electoral features of parties” 
demonstrates that these parties “represent two sides of the same coin” (Taggart 1996: 46).  
Each of these parties challenges the political establishment providing an outlet for the 
voting public to voice their disenchantment with “politics as usual” in Western Europe.  
Anti-establishment parties provide alternatives to those among the electorate that wish to 
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vote against the establishment.  Thus, contrary to previous studies, it would be somewhat 
foolish not to put these parties into the same category. 
The Electoral Success of Anti-Establishment Parties 
 
There are several conclusions and implications drawn from the analyses in the 
second chapter. First, anti-establishment parties do take advantage of the political 
opportunity structures created by the electoral system, economic and social conditions, 
the party system, and the actions of establishment parties, and “voter availability” within 
the electorate.  Anti-establishment parties benefit from more proportional electoral 
systems with lower “effective” thresholds and higher “effective” number of political.  
These new parties are clearly affected by the characteristics of the electoral and party 
system.  Economic conditions and level of affluence affect electoral support for anti-
establishment parties. Higher levels of unemployment lead to increases in anti-
establishment party support.  At the same time, higher levels of affluence lead to higher 
levels of support for these parties.  Each of these findings conforms to expectations. 
However, higher levels of inflation do not affect support for anti-establishment 
parties as expected.   Although this does not conform to the expectations of this analysis, 
there may be a logical explanation for this finding.  As noted in the second chapter, 
Palmer and Whitten (1999) argue that inflation does not affect voting behavior in the 
same manner as unemployment or other economic conditions.  If economic actors have 
rational expectations, inflation should not have real effects on personal economy due to 
the fact that it takes more time for the individual voter to feel the economic effects of 
inflation than other economic conditions such as unemployment (see Palmer and 
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Whitten 1999).  Thus, we should not expect the electorate to punish or reward any 
political parties during periods of high or low inflation.    
 The social conditions within a country further contribute to the electoral success 
of anti-establishment parties.  Immigration significantly increases support for anti-
establishment parties. Surprisingly, however, higher levels of crime do not significantly 
influence electoral success of these new entrants into the political arena.  Thus, the 
“physical insecurity” argument finds support (see Gibson 2002).  At least in part, anti-
establishment parties benefit from the insecurity of voters created by the inability of 
established parties to solve the most basic of social problems (see Betz 1994).  These 
result confirm previous findings regarding the decline in trust, defined as “feelings about 
the ability of the economic and political system to deliver desired goods” (Eatwell 2003: 
69), across Western Europe.  The inability of establishment parties to cure the economic 
and social ills of society creates the opportunity for anti-establishment parties to succeed 
in the electoral arena. 
 Surprisingly, collusion between establishment parties does not increase support 
for anti-establishment parties.  Ballot restrictions and requirements for state support do 
not influence anti-establishment parties; therefore, attempts of the political establishment 
to thwart the challenges of anti-establishment parties by restricting access to the ballot 
and state support during campaigns does not significantly help or hinder these parties.  
However, as the amount polarization between establishment parties decreases, anti-
establishment parties are able to gain more electoral support.  This suggests that anti-
establishment parties gain traction in the electoral arena from the argument that all 
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establishment parties are the same. Thus, as the ideological profiles of the more 
established parties continue to mirror one another, voters are increasingly turning to the 
viable electoral alternatives embodied by anti-establishment parties.   
 The “electoral availability” of voters affects the electoral success of anti-
establishment parties as increased levels of voter turnout and electoral volatility 
significantly increases electoral support for these new parties.  This suggests that anti-
establishment parties are indeed mobilizing new segments of the electorate and stealing 
votes from the establishment.  As anti-establishment parties continue to offer viable 
electoral alternatives to a disillusioned and seemingly disenfranchised electorate, 
establishment parties continue to lose their vote share within the electorate.   
 However, when we disaggregate the analyses of the second chapter, we find that 
the exogenous factors that create the political opportunity structures for one subset of 
anti-establishment parties do not create the same opportunities for their counterparts on 
the opposite side of the political spectrum.  While some factors influence support for 
both left-oriented and right-oriented anti-establishment parties, there are factors that 
affect left-oriented anti-establishment which have not effect of their right-oriented 
counterparts and vice versa.  Thus, the opportunity structures are indeed different for 
these two sets of anti-establishment parties.   
Several implications are drawn from these findings.  First, establishment parties 
can, for the most part, control the opportunity structures leading to the electoral success 
of anti-establishment parties.  If established parties wish to counter the threat from anti-
establishment parties, they must limit the opportunities for anti-establishment parties to 
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garner support.  Establishment parties may alter the electoral system to stem the 
challenges from, or increase the obstacles for, new parties.  More established parties 
might limit further opportunities for new parties by solving, or at least attempting to 
solve, the problems plaguing numerous countries within Western Europe.  The actions of 
establishment parties also contribute to the “electoral availability” of voters, which, in 
turn, allows anti-establishment parties to make major strides into the political 
marketplace.     
In turn, these developments have implications for the larger political system.  
Parties of the establishment must shift their placement on the ideological spectrum in 
order to counter the threat from anti-establishment parties providing clearer alternatives 
to the electorate.  Increased polarization within the party system from the movement of 
establishment parties may lead to the emergence of new challengers as the established 
parties vacate the middle of the ideological space.  Thus, the electorate witnesses more 
electoral alternatives and increased volatility, which significantly alter the once “frozen” 
party systems of Western Europe.  This potential increase in the “effective” number of 
parties and the increased seat share of anti-establishment parties may decrease the 
stability of cabinet government within the legislature.   
Second, and more importantly and surprisingly, all anti-establishment are not 
created equally; that is, anti-establishment parties on the left do not have their bases for 
electoral success in common factors with their counterparts on the right.  Whereas these 
results do not dispute that anti-establishment parties emerge due to the same factors (see 
Chapter I), the factors that fuel their electoral success depend upon which side of the 
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political spectrum the party is situated.  Thus, the assertions that anti-establishment 
parties are “the legitimate and unwanted children of the New Politics” (Ignazi 1992: 6) 
or that parties of “the New Populism and the New Politics have their bases in common 
factors” (Taggart 1996: 49), must be made in reference to their emergence, not their 
electoral success.  Given the political opportunity structure differs for parties on the left 
from parties on the right, one might argue that anti-establishment parties have the same 
catalyst or spark, but owe their electoral success to different types of fuel.     
Consequences of Anti-Establishment Parties 
  
 There are two important findings from the analyses in the third chapter.  First, 
establishment parties adapt their ideological profiles on numerous issues in order to 
counter the growing electoral threat from anti-establishment parties.  In particular, 
establishment parties shift their ideological position on issues championed by anti-
establishment parties on different sides of the spectrum.  This movement confirms earlier 
research from Downs (2001) as traditional parties engage anti-establishment parties by 
co-opting anti-establishment policies expanding their own programmatic agenda.  Thus, 
in order to remain in power in an unstable electoral environment, traditional parties trade 
principle for pragmatism and seek more innovative, engaging tactics to overcome the 
threat from anti-establishment parties.          
Surprisingly, contrary to the theory advanced in the third chapter, traditional 
mainstream parties do not alter their organizational structures as a consequence of this 
new electoral environment.  Despite the lack of organizational adaptation within 
traditional parties, confirms the contention that the most difficult challenge for 
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establishment parties in countering the threat from anti-establishment parties is changing 
their organizational structures (see Rohrschneider 1993).  It is easier for traditional 
parties to shift their policy positions and integrate new issues into their platforms than to 
fundamentally change their organizational power structures.  In other words, traditional 
parties are more resistant to changing their organizational structures than their 
ideological profiles in order to adapt to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. 
 Furthermore, there are several implications stemming from the analyses in the 
third chapter.  First, anti-establishment parties may hinder their own electoral fortunes 
by instigating movement among parties of the establishment.  Traditional mainstream 
parties are creating more distinct ideological profiles and more polarization within the 
system, which may help dampen support for anti-establishment parties.  Second, the 
movement of establishment parties alters the dynamics of the party system, particularly 
the process of coalition formation.  Establishment parties must look for new coalition 
partners, as traditional coalition alliances no longer remain viable options and the 
likelihood of “grand” coalitions between establishment parties decreases.  Finally, the 
movement of establishment parties may lead to governing coalitions introducing new 
legislation or implementing new policies favored by anti-establishment parties.  These 
new issue positions may become implemented policies if these parties enter into 
government since parties must deliver on their campaign promises in order to remain in 
power.  
Moreover, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties alters the larger 
party systems in which these parties compete.  Anti-establishment party electoral success 
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increases the amount of electoral volatility within the system and the amount of 
polarization, both between traditional mainstream parties and within the system.  These 
new entrants into party system further contribute to the instability experienced by these 
party systems by garnering seats in parliament and upsetting traditional coalitional 
dynamics.  However, and most surprisingly, the emergence and electoral success of anti-
establishment parties cannot stem the tide of declining voter turnout across the countries 
of Western Europe.  Although anti-establishment parties cannot reverse the trend of 
declining turnout, at the same time, this finding suggests that traditional parties, or the 
voters themselves, are not mobilizing groups against the anti-establishment movement.  
This further suggests that anti-establishment parties are stealing voters from other 
competitors within the party system. Finally, as anti-establishment parties gain electoral 
support, more and more of the electorate, which participated in previous elections, are no 
longer participating. This finding further confirms previous studies of declining partisan 
attachments in Western Europe.    
These findings also suggest that if they wish to remain viable electoral 
competitors, traditional mainstream parties must counter the electoral threat of anti-
establishment parties.  This increased volatility and “vote switching” comes at the 
expense of establishment parties as anti-establishment parties steal votes from traditional 
mainstream parties and increase their electoral success.  Traditional mainstream parties 
must learn to adapt to the new environment produced by the emergence and electoral 
success of anti-establishment parties.  If the establishment fails to change, these parties 
face the possibility of not regaining these votes and losing their viability in the electoral 
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market.  Thus, it is the traditional parties within these democratic systems and not the 
system itself, which are under attack from anti-establishment parties.   
More interestingly, the effects of anti-establishment parties counteract the effects 
of the electoral system.  Electoral system factors significantly decrease the amount of 
polarization, whereas the electoral success of anti-establishment parties significantly 
increases polarization.  This suggests that other competitors within the system are 
reacting to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties and their supporters.  It 
appears that the establishment parties are indeed attempting to meet the demands of 
those voters who are either mobilized by anti-establishment parties or feel abandoned by 
establishment parties.  This has increased the ideological space within the party systems 
of Western Europe.  This does not confirm that parties of the establishment are co-opting 
anti-establishment issues, but one can conclude that the electoral success of anti-
establishment parties is substantial enough to alter traditional coalitional politics and 
patterns of competition (see Mair 2001).   
Finally, stemming from this finding and further analyses, anti-establishment 
parties upset the traditional dynamics of coalition formation and coalitional duration. By 
gaining seats and reducing the opportunities available for traditional parties to form 
coalitional governments, anti-establishment parties significantly shorten the duration of 
cabinet governments within parliament.  How will parties of the establishment attempt to 
counter this threat?  Countering the threat to the coalitional dynamics within parliament 
may require different tactics than those required to counter the electoral threat of anti-
establishment parties.  In order to counter this threat, traditional parties may to choose to 
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establish new, non-traditional coalitional ties by co-opting anti-establishment parties or 
traditional enemies in governing coalitions.  Therefore, we may see the advent of 
coalitions between traditional enemies or fundamentally different parties as anti-
establishment parties usher in a new era of party competition.  
Paths of Future Research 
 
 The analyses conducted in this dissertation prompt several avenues for future 
research.  Arguably, the most important of these avenues concerns the further 
investigation into the consequences of anti-establishment parties. The first of these 
avenues relates to the aftermath of the movement of establishment parties following the 
electoral success of anti-establishment parties.  This induces a series of related questions.  
Does the adaptation of traditional mainstream parties help or hinder the electoral 
fortunes of these parties? Does the decision to alter their ideological profiles or 
organizational structures help the party counter the threat from anti-establishment parties 
or further fuel the decline of the party?  Do voters punish parties for moving too far from 
their core ideology or base supporters? Although it is possible, to some extent, to see if 
establishment parties increase their vote share in elections following these changes from 
the analyses presented in this dissertation, further research must shed light on the 
consequences of these changes for establishment parties.  
In a similar vein, future research may demonstrate the effects of these adaptations 
on the electoral fortunes of anti-establishment parties.  Do these changes allow 
establishment parties to limit or reverse the electoral successes of anti-establishment 
parties?  How do anti-establishment parties react to the movement of more established 
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parties?  If traditional parties encroach upon the issue positions of anti-establishment 
parties, the electoral success of these new parties may decline as voters return to the 
establishment fold.  Future research must look at the consequences of established party 
movement on the anti-establishment parties.  In addition, research needs to explore how 
other establishment parties react to the movement of their traditional rivals.  How does 
the movement of establishment parties influence other traditional mainstream parties 
within the system?  Does the electoral success of anti-establishment parties initiate a 
chain reaction creating ripples throughout the entire party system?  Establishment 
parties’ main rivals in pursuing governmental offices are other establishment parties.  In 
order to be in position to form governments, establishment parties must balance between 
reacting to threats from anti-establishment parties as well as their closest establishment 
rivals.   
Furthermore, how has the electoral success of anti-establishment parties affected 
these parties themselves?  In some instances, the electoral success of anti-establishment 
parties leads to the inclusion of these parties in governing coalitions; therefore, the party 
ceases to be an anti-establishment party.  However, after the collapse of the coalition, the 
party oftentimes continues its anti-establishment rhetoric.  Do voters punish anti-
establishment parties for being part of the government or continue to support these 
parties?  Do the electoral fortunes of anti-establishment parties wane after being in a 
governing coalition?  Given the electoral success of these parties, do anti-establishment 
parties attempt to become part of the establishment by moderating their extreme 
positions?  Do anti-establishment parties become victims of their own electoral success?   
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These questions are important to determine how anti-establishment party electoral 
success affects anti-establishment parties themselves.           
Finally, future research must answer whether the electoral success of anti-
establishment influences policy and the policymaking process?  Does the support 
garnered by anti-establishment parties lead to new policies or changes to old policies?  
Just as the electoral success of anti-establishment parties in Denmark leads to tougher 
immigration laws, does the electoral success of these anti-establishment parties lead to 
changes to other policies championed by anti-establishment parties?  For example, left-
oriented anti-establishment parties often campaign on environmental issues whereas 
anti-establishment parties on the right often advocate welfare reform.  Do we see similar 
success on these issues due to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties?   
This dissertation encourages just as many questions as it attempts to answer.  The 
emergence and electoral success of anti-establishment parties generates several 
possibilities for research.  More importantly, the electoral success of anti-establishment 
parties has numerous consequences for other competitors within the party system and the 
broader political system itself.  Clearly, the insights gained by these analyses further our 
knowledge of anti-establishment parties.  However, by asking and answering these 
questions in future research, we will gain a better understanding of the consequences of 
anti-establishment parties.  Therefore, continued research beyond this dissertation is 
necessary to fully appreciate the anti-establishment party phenomenon. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Anti-Establishment Parties 
  
Austria 
 
Alternative List/Green Alternative (ALO/GA), Communist Party of Austria (KPO) 
(since 1948), League of Independents/Freedom Party of Austria (VdU/FPO) (1970 and 
since 1986), NO-Citizens' Initiative (NEIN), The Independents (DU). 
 
Belgium 
   
All-Power-To-The-Workers (AMADA-TPO), Communist Party (PCB-KPB) (1970-78), 
Democratic Union for the Respect of Labour (UDRT-RAD), Flemish Block (VB), 
Flemish Christian People's Union (CVV), Flemish Concentration (VC), Greens 
(ECOLO-AGALEV) (until 1992), Growing Old in Dignity (WOW), Labour Party (PTB-
PvdA), National Front (FN), Flemish People’s Union 1970-1977), Radical Reformers 
Fighting for an Upright Society (ROSSEM-ROSSUM/ BANANE-BANAAN), 
Revolutionary Workers' League/Socialist Workers' Party (LRT-RAT/ POS-SAP), 
Walloon Rally (RW) (until 1974), Walloon Front. 
 
Denmark 
 
Communist Party (DKP), Communist Worker’s Party, Socialist Worker’s Party, 
Common Course (FK), Danish People's Party (DF), Danish Union (DS) (until 1948), 
Greens, Independents' Party, Left Socialist Party (VS), Progress Party (FRP), Red-Green 
Unity List (ELRG) 
 
Finland 
 
Alliance for Free Finland (VSL), Communist Party of Finland (SKP) (since 1997), 
Democratic Alternative, Finnish Peoples Democratic Union (SKT4L--)-(1948_46), 
Finnish Smallholders' Party/Finnish Rural Party/True Firms (SPP/ SMP/PS) (1962-83, 
and, since 1990), Green League (VL/VIHR) (until 1995), Progressive Finnish Party 
(NUORS), Reform Group (REM). 
 
France 
 
French Communist Party (PCF) (1947-81), Greens/Green Coalition (EE) (until 1993), 
National Front (FN), New Ecologists, Poujadists/Union for the Defense of Traders and 
Artisans (UDCA), Republican Communist Front (LCR), Unified Socialist Party (PSU), 
Workers' Struggle (LO), other extreme left, other extreme right. 
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Germany 
 
Bavarian Party (BP), Communist Party (KPD/DKP), Economic Reconstruction League 
(WAV), German People's Union (DVU), German Reich Party (DRP), Greens (until 
1990), Greys, National Democratic Party (NPD), Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)/ 
Die Linke, Republicans (REP) 
 
Greece 
 
United Left (EDA, KKE, KKE Interior), National Democratic Union, National 
Alignment/ National Front (EP), Communist Party (KKE), Alliance of Progressive and 
Left-Wing Forces (KKE Interior), Progressive Party, National Political Union (EPEN), 
Coalition of Left and Progress, Alternative Ecologists, Ecologists Greece, Communist 
Party of Greece (KKE Interior)-Renewal Left, Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of 
Greece, Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Greece, Union of Ecologists, Coalition of 
the Radical Left, other green lists 
 
Iceland 
 
Candidature Party (Frambodsflokkurinn), Citizens' Party II (Borgara-flokkurinn) (until 
1991), Left-Green (Vinstrihreyfingin-Graent Frambod), National Party (Thjodarflokkur), 
Women's Alliance (Samtok um Kvennalista) (until 1998)  
 
Ireland 
 
Comhaontas Glas/Green Party, Sinn Fein II, Sinn Fein III, Workers' Party (WP) 
 
Italy 
 
Common Man Front, Communist Party/Democratic Party the Left (PCI/PDS) (1947-95), 
Communist Refoundation (RC), Continuous Struggle, Forza Italia (1994), Greens (Liste 
Verdi), Green Federation (until 1996), Italian Social Movement/National Right/National 
Alliance (MSI/DN/AN) (until 1994), Lombard League, MS-Fiamma, Northern League 
(LN), Proletarian Democracy (DP), Radical Party/Panella List (PR), Referendum 
List, Sicilian Independence Movement, The Network/Movement for Democracy (La 
Rete/MPD) (until 1994), Venetian League 
 
Luxembourg 
 
Action Committee 5/6 Pensions for All/Action Committee for Democracy and Pension 
Justice (ADR), Alternative List, Communist Party (KPL/PCL)/ The Left (LENK), 
Ecologists for the North, Greens, Green Alternative (GAP), Luxembourg for the 
Luxembourgers National Movement, Middle Class Party, Popular Independent 
Movement. 
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The Netherlands 
 
Center Democrats (CD), Center Party (CP'86), Communist Party (CPN), Evangelical 
People's Party (EVP), Farmers' Party (BP), General Association of Elderly People 
(AOV), Green Left (GL), Middle Class Party, Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP), Political 
Reformed Party (SGP), Radical Political Party (PPR) (since 1978), Reformed Political 
Union (GPV), Reformed Political Federation (RPF), Socialist Party (SP), Union 55+ 
(U55+). 
 
Portugal 
 
Communist Party (PCP), People’s Democratic Union (UDP), People’s Socialist Front 
(FSP), Party of Christian Democracy (PDC), United People Alliance (APU) (until 1985), 
Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP), Unitarian Democratic Coalition (CDU), The 
Ecologist Party (PEV), Left Bloc (BE), Communist Party of the Portuguese Workers 
 
Norway 
 
Anders Lange’s Party/Progress Party (FRP), Communist Party (NKP), Red Electoral 
Alliance (RV) 
 
Spain 
 
Communist Party (PCE), Popular Alliance, Basque National Party (PNV), National 
Union (UN), Herri Batasuna (HB), Izquierda Unida (IU), Andalucist Party (PA) 
 
Sweden 
 
Ecology Party-Greens (MP) (until 1992), New Democracy (NYD) 
 
Switzerland   
 
Alliance of Independents (LdU/AdI), Federal Democratic Union (EDU), Labour Party 
(PdA/PdT), Green Alternatives (GRAS), National Action for People and Homeland 
(NA)/Swiss Democrats (SD), Motorists' Party Switzerland (APS)/Freedom Party of 
Switzerland (FPS), Progressive Organizations of Switzerland (POCH), Republican 
Movement, Ticino League, Vigilance 
 
United Kingdom  
 
Green Party, National Front, Plaid Cymru (PC), Scottish National Party (SNP), United 
Ireland/Sinn Fein, Respect/The Unity Coalition (RES) 
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APPENDIX B 
Interview Questions for Establishment Parties 
 
Organizational Changes 
 
1) In recent years, has your party undertaken any changes to the organization of the 
party?  
 
2) Has the party adopted primary elections to elect their candidates or leaders?  Did 
the party change their selection procedures? If so, why? 
 
3) Were there major issues about the need to reorganize the party?  Did these 
changes include allowing the decisions to be made by the lower level members of 
the party? 
 
4) Did these significantly change the party? In what ways? Were they major or 
minor changes?  
 
5) What caused these changes? 
 
a) How do you think these changes affected your party?   
 
b) Did these changes affect your electoral success? How? 
 
6) Were any of these changes due to the emergence of new parties? 
 
a) Did any of these changes take place after the electoral success of new 
parties? 
 
b) Did any particular new party prompt these changes?  
 
7) Are any of these changes still in effect today? 
 
Programme Changes  
 
8) Has your party changed its ideological position, in recent years?  If so, on what 
issues has the party changed its positions?  
 
9) Why did the party make these changes? 
 
a) How do you think these changes affected your party?   
 
b) Did these changes affect your electoral success? How? 
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10) Did these significantly change the party? In what ways? Were they major or 
minor changes?  
 
11) Were any of these changes due to the emergence of new parties? 
 
a) Did any of these changes take place after the electoral success of new 
parties? 
 
b) Did any particular new party prompt these changes?  
 
General Questions  
 
12) What do you feel is the greatest threat to your party’s electoral success? 
 
a) Do you feel that newer parties threaten your party’s electoral success? 
 
13) How has your party reacted to the emergence of new parties? 
 
Personnel Changes 
 
14) If any leadership changes took place, what was the difference in the leadership 
styles between leader A and leader B? How did this affect the party? 
 
15) What was the cause of the leadership change?  
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Interview Questions for Anti-Establishment Parties 
 
 
Questions Concerning Impacts 
 
1) What do you feel is your party’s greatest impact within the party system? 
 
2) Do you think you challenge the more established parties within your party 
system? In what ways do you feel you challenge established parties?  
 
3) How do you think the more established parties within the system view your party?  
 
4) How do you think your party has influenced the more established parties within 
the party system?  
 
5) Do you think your party has affected organizational changes, ideological position 
changes, or campaign activity changes within the more established parties within 
the system? 
 
6) Which party in particular do you feel you have impacted? What about parties on 
the opposite side of the political spectrum? 
 
7) What must your party do to continue the success you have seen in elections?  
What do you think is the greatest threat to your party’s survival?  
 
Organizational Changes 
 
8) In recent years, has your party undertaken any changes to the organizational 
structure of the party? 
 
9) What caused these changes? 
 
10) How do you think these changes affected your party?  How did these changes 
affect your electoral success? 
 
11) Did these significantly change the party or were they minor changes?  
 
12) What was the duration of these changes? Are any of these changes still in effect 
today? 
 
Programme Changes 
 
13) Has the party altered its ideological position in recent years? If so, what issue 
positions has your party changed? 
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14) What caused these changes? 
 
15) How do you think these changes affect your party?  How did these changes affect 
your electoral success? 
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Consent Form  
 
The Consequences of Anti-Establishment Parties in Western Europe 
 
You have been asked to participate in a research study investigating organizational 
changes made by establishment parties in response to the electoral success of anti-
establishment parties.  You were selected due to your position as party secretary or 
another party official within these particular parties.  A total number of 50 individuals 
have been asked to participate in this study.  The purpose of this research is to determine 
whether, and to what extent, establishment parties within the party systems of Western 
Europe have altered their organizational structures in response to the formation of anti-
establishment parties.   
 
If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to participate in a face-to-face 
interview in which you will be asked a series of questions related to the organizational 
structures of your parties.  These interviews will last about one hour and thirty minutes 
and will be audiotaped with your permission.  At any point during the interview, please 
let me know if you wish to go “off the record” with any comments.  These comments 
will not be attributed to you in any documentation of this research.  There are no risks 
involved with participation in this study.  There are no direct benefits to your 
participation and you will receive no monetary compensation for your participation. 
 
This study is not anonymous or confidential.  In order to report the results, it will be 
necessary to convey your position, although not your name, within the party as part of 
any documentation of this study.  The audio tapes of these interviews will be stored 
securely and only Jason Smith (principal investigator) will have access to the tapes.  The 
information on these audio tapes will be used as part of my dissertation and subsequent 
research.  Any personal identifiers contained within the tapes will be used solely by 
Jason Smith (principal investigator).  Any shared data produced using the audio tapes 
will have all personal identifiers removed before public dissemination. 
 
If you decide to participate in this study, you are free to refuse to answer any of the 
questions or stop the audiotaping process at any time.  You may withdraw from the 
interview at any time.  You can contact Jason Smith at the address listed below with any 
questions regarding this study. 
 
This research study has been reviewed by the Institutional Review Board – Human 
Subject in Research, Texas A&M University.  For research-related problems or question 
regarding subjects’ rights, you can contact the Institutional Review Board through Ms. 
Melissa McIlhaney. IRB Program Coordinator, Office of Research Compliance, (979) 
458-4067, (mcilhaney@tamu.edu). 
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Please be sure that you have read the above information and have asked and receive 
answers to your satisfaction before participating in this study.  Please keep this 
information sheet for your records. 
 
 
By signing this form below, you are giving your consent to participate in this study and 
to have this interview audiotaped for the purposes of documentation. 
 
 
Signature of Participant:  ___________________________ Date: _____________ 
 
 
 
 
Thank you, 
 
Jason Smith  
 
 
Doctoral Candidate  
Department of Political Science  
Texas A&M University  
4348 TAMU College Station, TX 77843-4348  
Phone: (979) 845-2511  
e-mail: jsmith@polisci.tamu.edu  
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APPENDIX C 
Coding Schemes 
LIMITATION OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS 
 
-5 (PRO-strong)  Advocates strict governmental control over what would normally 
be considered private affairs, regulating behavior in a wide variety 
of personal matters; strict enforcement and severe penalties are 
favored in at least some areas. 
 
-3 (PRO-moderate) Advocates governmental control over many personal matters, but 
recognizes individual sovereignty in certain areas; favors 
moderate levels of enforcement and penalties. 
 
-1 (PRO-weak)  Generally favors a low level of government involvement in 
personal matters, but does advocate maintenance of some 
regulation already in place plus extension in one or more specific 
areas seen as having special affect on society. 
 
0 (NEUTRAL)  Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, 
and/or is truly "centrist on the issue. 
 
 
+1 (ANTI-weak)  Accepts necessity of intrusions into personal matters in some 
areas where they may affect others than those directly involved 
(sometimes justifying such as a necessity for social responsibility), 
but opposes most attempts to extend such areas. 
 
+3 (ANTI-moderate)  Accepts necessity of intrusions in very limited number of areas, 
but generally is strongly opposed to extension of such intrusions. 
 
+5 (ANTI-strong)  Advocates no governmental intervention in personal matters, and 
gives broad scope to "personal matters; favors what are generally 
considered extremely libertarian positions with regard to private 
affairs; those behaviors considered "victimless crimes" should be 
legalized 
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INCOME/PERSONAL TAXES 
 
Special instructions: Personal taxes would include such as individual property tax or a 
tax on personal wealth, but would not include sales or value added taxes. 
 
-5 (PRO-strong)  Strongly favors a heavy tax on personal income and/or property or  
wealth, as the primary means of paying for government programs; 
though different groups, society may be taxed at different rate all 
rates would be considered heavy; advocates very strict 
enforcement and major penalties for violators. 
 
-3 (PRO-moderate)  Favors a generally high level of personal taxation, but does 
advocate lower tax rates for certain groups in society, may 
advocate alternative forms of revenue as well, so as to avoid 
increasing personal taxes much further. 
 
-1 (PRO-weak)  Favors a personal tax, but advocates that the- range , be kept low-
to-moderate generally; may favor slight increase in current rate, 
though emphasizing need to minimize the increase; may have a 
pattern of favoring only very limited increases 
 
0 (NEUTRAL).  Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, 
and/or is truly "centrist" on the issue. 
 
+1 (ANTI-weak)  Accepts need for a low level of personal taxation,. but, generally 
urges small reductions from current levels, at least for some 
segments of society; has a tendency to oppose increases beyond 
current rate, with few exceptions. 
 
+3 (ANTI-moderate)  Accepts need for just a very low level of personal taxation, and 
may generally urge major reductions from current levels; 
advocates developing alternative sources (to personal taxes of any 
kinds) of revenue so as to limit or reduce personal taxes. 
 
+5 (ANTI-strong)  Opposes any income or other personal tax; strongly advocates 
funding government through other means. 
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TOTAL TAXATION 
 
Special instructions: To code this variable, it is necessary to consider the material used 
also in coding H02; that is, "total taxes" obviously includes "income tax" as an important 
component. However, since "total taxes" will normally include more than just personal 
taxes, information on H02 alone (i.e. in the absence of statements on other taxes or taxes 
more generally) may be insufficient for coding HO2B. 
 
-5 (PRO-strong)  Favors heavy taxation of many types to pay for massive 
government spending; does not advocate reduction in the overall 
level of taxation, though may occasionally endorse shifting of 
burdens among categories of taxes or taxpayers.  
 
-3 (PRO-moderate)  Favors a high level and many types of taxation, though does see 
limits to growth in tax revenues, and may advocate planning for 
alternative, additional types of revenue; generally supports current 
taxes and levels, and regularly endorses increases, but 
occasionally resists. 
 
-1 (PRO-weak)  Favors a moderately high level and several types pf taxation, but 
strongly advocates planning for alternative sources of revenue so 
as to avoid continual increases in the future; expresses the need to 
be cautious about over-taxing; does not generally support 
decreasing the current overall level of taxation (unless in 
situations where objective observers would judge the current level 
to be higher than "moderately high"). 
 
0 (NEUTRAL)  Has, contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, 
and/or is truly "centrist", on the issue.  
 
+1 (ANTI -weak)  Accepts a substantial role for taxes as one source of revenue, but 
tends to favor modest reductions to ease the overall burden; 
regularly cautions about overtaxing, and sees the latter as 
something of a current problem rather than just something to be 
avoided in the future; regularly opposes increases that would 
result in an a greater overall tax burden. 
 
+3 (ANTI-moderate)  Opposes a high level of overall taxation on grounds of principle; 
accepts the need for some taxes but strongly advocates keeping 
the overall level low; opposes most increases and regularly 
advocates reductions in various specific taxes and in the overall 
level. 
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+5 (ANTI-strong)  Opposes all forms of taxes on principle; strongly advocates 
abolishment of all existing forms of taxation; opposes any 
proposals for new forms or higher levels of taxes. 
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SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT (Size of Public Sector) 
 
Note 1: For this variable, all levels of government (national, state, local) are included in 
"public sector." This variable is not about federalism; it is about the role of government 
in 
 
Note 2: Coding of this variable is based as much as possible on program statements 
specifically referring to governmental scope. When such statements do not exist, then -- 
even more so than for other variables -- coding of H03 depends heavily on coders' 
general impressions based on overall tone and content of the document as regards size of 
the public sector. 
 
-5 (PRO-strong)  Favors a very broad range of governmental programs, including in 
defense, foreign affairs, and social and economic programs; 
includes not just direct governmental provision of programs and 
ownership of means of production, but widespread regulation of 
private sector and personal behavior as well. 
 
-3 (PRO-moderate)  Favors a broad range of governmental programs, but also sees the 
needs for some limits on governmental involvement in certain 
areas; may favor regulation rather than direct governmental action 
or ownership in some areas, for instance; even identifies some 
areas as off-limits to government involvement of any kind. 
Government is legitimately involved, tends not to oppose 
expansion of the government's role. 
 
0 (NEUTRAL)  Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, 
and/or is truly "centrist" on the issue. 
 
+1 (ANTI-weak)  Accepts the need for a small public sector, but tends to oppose 
substantial expansions  even in those areas where government is 
currently and legitimately involved. 
 
+3 (ANTI-moderate) Accepts the need for a very small public sector, the range for 
which should be clearly stated in the constitution; tends to favor 
reductions in governmental roles in all but a few activities. 
 
+5 (ANTI-strong) Prefers no public sector at all, but may recognize that government 
is necessary for one or a very few activities (e.g. defense); where 
government is bigger than that now, tends to favor major 
reductions to bring about the minimal state. 
 
 
 
  
237 
SOCIAL SERVICES: RANGE (excludes education) 
 
-5 (PRO-strong)  Favors a very broad range of governmental provision of social 
services, covering health care, social welfare for the needy, care 
for the aged/infirm, family (parent/child) assistance, pensions, 
unemployment benefits, and more; tends to favor expansion of 
such programs, even where the range is already very broad.  
 
-3 (PRO-moderate)  Advocates a "middle" range of social services provided by the 
government, seeing some areas as more appropriately provided for 
in the private sector, where some regulation may still be necessary; 
will include favoring governmental provision of many, but not all, 
of the programs listed under -5 above. 
 
-1 (PRO-weak)  Strongly advocates direct government provision of a few of the 
items listed under -5 above, but also sees many areas in which the 
government's direct role should be nil or limited; tends to favor 
governmental regulation to assure good treatment of citizens 
rather than direct government provision/ownership of the 
programs. 
 
0 (NEUTRAL)  Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, 
and/or is truly "centrist" on the issue. 
 
+1 (ANTI-weak)  Accepts the need for government to be engaged in directly 
providing for one or a few of the items above, but would clearly 
see the government's role in providing social services as a very 
limited one; strongly prefers regulation to direct provision when a 
governmental role is necessary; tends to support incremental 
reductions in many social services. 
 
+3 (ANTI-moderate)  May grudgingly accept the need for government to directly 
provide just one of the items listed under -5 above, but tends not 
to support increases even in that area; prefers regulation to direct 
provision, but prefers that even the regulatory role be used 
sparingly; tends to oppose any expansion of the range of social 
services already provided. 
 
+5 (ANTI-strong)  Advocates that government provide no social services; prefers that 
these areas be handled completely by the private sector, without 
government regulation. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: GOVERNMENT ROLE 
 
-5 (PRO-strong)  Advocates extensive direct governmental involvement (including 
extensive expenditures) in environmental 
protection/improvements; also advocates governmental regulation 
of the private sector to prevent environmental problems and 
governmental incentive programs to encourage environmental 
improvements, but does not see such indirect programs as a 
replacement for direct governmental involvement. 
 
-3 (PRO-moderate)  Advocates some (broader than for -1) direct governmental 
involvement in environmental protection/improvement, but 
limited to specific areas of concern; also advocates substantial, 
relevant (see -5 above) regulation and incentive programs. 
 
-1 (PRO-weak)  Would accept (and possibly advocate) just a very limited direct 
role for government in environmental protection/improvement, 
but advocates substantial regulation of the private sector and 
relevant incentive programs to accomplish the same objectives 
indirectly; clearly prefers the primary responsibility to rest with 
the private sector, but under the watchful eye of government. 
(This code should be used, in preference over +1, when there is at 
least tacit agreement to some regulation and/or direct government 
role.) 
 
0 (NEUTRAL)  Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, 
and/or is truly "centrist" on the issue. 
 
+1 (ANTI - weak)  Opposes all but very limited conservation programs that would 
involve the government directly in environmental 
protection/improvement, but does accept a limited regulatory role; 
would oppose moves to make the regulatory role a 
substantial/extensive one. (Scores on the + side, including +1, 
should be assigned only when there is some opposition to a 
government role.) 
 
+3 (ANTI-moderate) Opposes any direct involvement of the government, and all but a 
very limited regulatory role; tends to seek reductions in 
governmental involvement where it is now more than minimal and 
regulatory. 
 
+5 (ANTI-strong) Opposes any involvement of the government in programs related 
to environmental protection/improvement, whether direct or 
regulatory.  
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STATE OWNERSHIP OF MEANS OF PRODUCTION 
 
 
-5 (PRO-strong) Strongly favors government ownership; advocates governmental 
ownership of all basic industries; advocates government 
ownership of means of production generally. 
 
-3 (PRO-moderate)  Favors government ownership, but with some limitation; 
advocates government ownership of some basic industries but not 
all; may advocate acquiring some industry not currently under 
government ownership, while it could oppose acquiring 
something else. 
 
-1 (PRO-weak)  Advocates very limited government ownership, with the 
limitations clearly stated; would oppose moves to have 
government take over most basic industries, for instance, but tends 
to base its preferences in this regard on practicality rather than 
principle 
 
0 (NEUTRAL)  Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, 
and/or is truly "centrist" on the issue. 
 
+1 (ANTI-weak)  May grudgingly accept very limited government ownership, but 
tends to oppose extension to additional industries, and certainly 
opposes the idea of governmental ownership of all basic industries; 
may advocate returning some government-owned industry to 
private ownership, while stopping short of advocating that all 
government industries should be returned. 
 
+3 (ANTI-moderate)  Opposes government ownership generally, on principle; may 
advocate returning one or more government-owned industries to 
private ownership as a short-term measure, while probably 
holding return of all remaining state-owned industries as a long-
term goal; would oppose government assuming ownership of any 
industry now in private hands. 
 
+5 (ANTI-strong)  Strongly opposes government ownership as intolerable; would 
advocate immediate return of any government-owned industry to 
private ownership. 
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MINORITY RIGHTS 
 
Special instructions: When providing text to support the code on this variable, include 
information on which minority group(s) are involved. Examples: racial, linguistic, 
regional. (Note that there is a separate variable on Women's Rights; see H17.) 
 
-5 (PRO-strong)  Favors extensive government action which promotes rights of 
minorities in all areas of concern, even at the expense of the rights 
of the dominant group in the population; favors strict enforcement 
of the policies with severe penalties for non-compliance. 
 
-3 (PRO-moderate)  Favors government action to promote rights of minorities, but 
only if the dominant group will not be affected negatively (or only 
minimally so); may advocate policies directed at many areas of 
concern (more than for a code of -1), but not all. 
 
-1 (PRO-weak)  Favors only limited measures to promote opportunities for 
minorities; tends to oppose policies that would significantly 
advantage the minority at the expense of the dominant group. 
 
0 (NEUTRAL)  Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, 
and/or is truly "centrist" on the issue. 
 
+1 (ANTI-weak)  Favors a small number of programs that would clearly have a 
negative impact on minority rights, even though may pay lip 
service to advocating minority rights; supports no concrete 
programs that would clearly enhance minority rights; clearly 
opposes any policies that would enhance minority rights at the 
expense of the dominant group. 
 
+3 (ANTI-moderate)  Favors a number of policies that would clearly have a negative 
impact on minority rights; may couple this with language that is 
anti-minority in tone; rights of the dominant group are clearly to 
be favored when in conflict with minority rights. 
 
+5 (ANTI-strong)  Favors exclusionary government policies which promote the 
interests of the dominant group at the expense of minority rights; 
opposes any policies designed to single out rights of minorities for 
protection; may favor legislation to keep or reduce rights of 
minorities to a level below that of the dominant group. 
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WOMEN'S RIGHTS 
 
(Note: "Equal work for equal pay" normally implies support for women's rights; i.e., not 
a position of neutrality on the issue.) 
 
-5 (PRO-strong)  Advocates strong government action to promote social, economic, 
and political status of women, even when such policies may be 
detrimental to men's rights or treatment; strict enforcement is 
advocated, with harsh penalties for noncompliance. 
 
-3 (PRO-moderate) Advocates action in many areas of concern for women's rights, but 
opposes some policies which would enhance women's rights or 
opportunities at the expense of men's, or where other justification 
is accepted for maintaining inequality. 
 
-1 (PRO-weak)  Advocates only limited action in promotion of women's rights; 
may tend to oppose policies that would clearly have a negative 
impact on men's rights and/or treatment. 
 
0 (NEUTRAL)  Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, 
and/or is truly "centrist" on the issue. 
 
+1 (ANTI-weak)  Advocates few, if any, policies that would clearly discriminate 
against women, but statements make clear that the party holds a 
negative view of special protections for women's rights; may tend 
to oppose women's rights legislation, but without making a major 
issue of it. 
 
+3 (ANTI-moderate)  Advocates a number of policies which would be exclusionary or 
in other ways discriminatory against women; justifications tend to 
be ad hoc rather than based on a general principle; tends to 
consistently oppose new women's rights legislation. 
 
+5 (ANTI-strong)  Advocates a broad range of policies which are discriminatory 
against women; may do so on the basis of general principle; 
opposes any legislation designed to give special protection to 
women's rights. 
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OPEN IMMIGRATION 
 
(To the extent that it is possible to distinguish between pledges and rhetoric on this 
variable, focus should be placed on the pledges.) 
 
-5 (PRO-strong)  Favors an open immigration policy, with only very minimal 
restrictions; would effectively allow all applicants (both asylum 
seekers and others) to immigrate; may base the position on a 
general principle of openness and/or extreme libertarianism. 
 
-3 (PRO-moderate)  Favors a policy that is generally open, but with significant 
restrictions and/or exceptions; may advocate very open policy 
with regard to applicants seeking asylum, while placing some 
restrictions on others; restrictions/limitations tend to involve very 
general quotas, and do not seem to be designed to discriminate 
against particular racial or ethnic groups. 
 
-1 (PRO-weak)  Advocates a very open policy with regard to asylum seekers, 
while favoring a much more restrictive policy for others; the 
restrictions/limitations tend to be based on general rules of 
practicality, rather than designed to discriminate against particular 
racial or ethnic groups. 
 
0 (NEUTRAL)  Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, 
and/or is truly "centrist" on the issue.  
 
+1 (ANTI-weak)  Accepts a policy for asylum seekers that exceeds the minimums 
set by international organizations, but advocates a very restrictive 
policy with regard to others; may (but not necessarily) favor 
restrictions that seem to discriminate against one or more 
particular racial or ethnic groups.  
 
+3 (ANTI-moderate)  Advocates (at most) a policy that would give immigrant status to 
only the minimum of asylum seekers established by international 
organizations, and a very few others; restrictions/limitations on 
the latter would be very severe; may favor particularly harsh 
limitations on specific racial or ethnic groups. 
 
+5 (ANTI-strong)  Favors an extremely "closed" immigration policy, effectively 
closing the borders to immigrants; may even favor ignoring 
minimums for asylum seekers set by international organizations; 
may advocate expulsion of all or some recent immigrants. 
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